The Board

[TheHulk 2,482]

Put them all over the stadium.

[Tomo 21,751]

9 hours ago, TheHulk said:

Put them all over the stadium.

So this sticker was planted inside the stadium by someone who was in there due to paying those same people on the poster a kings ransom for a ticket, most probably added to their coffers with some half time beers/food and very possibly went to the megastore before/after the game to give them even more money.

That'll show em!

[bluesman2610 1,422]

Since the other story from CST was posted figured we should hear what the FAB had to say

 

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-13235283/Chelsea-Fan-Advisory-Board-Supporters-Trust-Todd-Boehly.html

 

It's funny that the Chairman of the CST is on the FAB and knows they have things in the works about ticket prices yet still put out the original statement knowing what it would do to the fan base.

Edited March 25, 2024 by bluesman2610

[Vesper 30,226]

Fans turn on Chelsea owners and make it clear that they “never will be” welcomed

https://www.caughtoffside.com/2024/03/27/Chelsea/

Chelsea owner Todd Boehly has been a fan of the multi-club ownership model ever since acquiring the West London club but it looks like it is blowing up in his face.

BlueCo bought a majority stake last summer in Ligue 1 side Strasbourg to kick-start their multi-club project but the fans of the French outfit have never accepted the Chelsea owners.

There was resentment toward the idea from the start and it has just got worse amid poor results, criticism of their youth-first transfer strategy and fury among fans about a lack of communication from the owners

There will be a protest march before Strasbourg’s game against Rennes on Sunday and the Ligue 1 club’s largest fan group, Ultra Boys 90, have said that BlueCo “aren’t welcome and never will be”.

The group have also released a statement this month regarding their new owners, in which they said via The Standard: “Racing is now nothing more than a financial asset, owned by an investment fund that already owns another club.

“Multi-club is killing football, and we’ll fight it!”

Chelsea and others should be stopped from owning multiple clubs 

Strasbourg are currently just four points above the relegation zone in Ligue 1 and face a battle to avoid dropping down to Ligue 2 throughout the rest of the campaign.

Multi-club ownership should be banned in football as all it does is make the big clubs stronger while destroying the progression of the club being bought.

For example, Strasbourg can’t grow and challenge for titles in France when their purpose now is to serve Chelsea. The same goes for Red Bull and the City Group.

The concept is very unfair on the fans of the club being bought and it is one of many things wrong with modern football.

[milka 3,393]

It's clear

 

Edited March 28, 2024 by milka

[calculatingInfinity 1,472]

It's almost impressive how quickly American owners can destroy a club

 

 

[Fernando 6,585]

Yes noobster. 

Well the only bad part is that we will need to stay with them for a minimum of 10 years. 

[Blue Armour 4,448]

2 hours ago, calculatingInfinity said:

It's almost impressive how quickly American owners can destroy a club

 

 

In other words..Clownlake's got to sell, sell, sell, this coming window.

They are likely going to bank on any homegrown talent for this, and this could include players like Gallagher & Hutchinson, because, unlike last year, there are very few proven top 4 level players left in the squad.

Absolute shambles.

 

[ZAPHOD2319 4,819]

PR stunt

 

 

[Blue Armour 4,448]

On 28/03/2024 at 21:49, ZAPHOD2319 said:

PR stunt

 

 

Figurehead is the right word. Because that's all Boehly was. Just the face for the media to beat up in public.

The real masterminds are Eghbali, and that bloodhound Wyss. They are behind the youth revolution and mass reductions of the wage bill. Boehly was responsible for experienced big-wage signings like Sterling and Koulibaly.

At least most of Boehly's mistakes could be cleared through transfer sales.

[OneMoSalah 8,886]

On 28/03/2024 at 16:19, ZAPHOD2319 said:

PR stunt

 

 

Not a new figurehead we are needing, it is new OWNERS

[Vesper 30,226]

19 hours ago, OneMoSalah said:

Not a new figurehead we are needing, it is new OWNERS

yes, I feel like we are simply an investment firm playtoy

[King Kante 1,643]

You know Clownlake are absolutely twitching like a crackhead wanting to raise ticket prices massively but holding back as they know they can not do so before European competition has been secured. 

[Vesper 30,226]

The Chelsea ‘project’ is a mess, confused and drifting. This is not how to build a club

https://theathletic.com/5400398/2024/04/09/Chelsea-pochettino-boehly-clearlake-project/

The scoreboard said almost three minutes of stoppage time had been played when Sheffield United’s Oli McBurnie smashed the ball into Chelsea’s net on Sunday evening.

But that wasn’t strictly true. Since the game at Bramall Lane ticked into overtime, the ball had been in play for precisely 28 seconds. Until McBurnie scored, stoppage time had been a non-event.

The first passage of play consisted of Axel Disasi sending an aimless free kick into opposition territory, where an abject game of head tennis ensued — Sheffield United winning five headers, Chelsea one — before Enzo Fernandez fouled Gustavo Hamer.

Another minute passed without the ball in play. Chelsea coach Mauricio Pochettino made a double substitution, replacing Marc Cucurella and Nicolas Jackson with Benoit Badiashile and Cesare Casadei. It was textbook stuff: eat up some more time and get some more height on the pitch, given that an aerial onslaught was the opposition’s only real hope of forcing an equaliser.

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Ivo Grbic went short with the free kick and then Jayden Bogle went long. Badiashile challenged McBurnie for the ball, the pair of them at full stretch, but they both missed it. Vinicius Souza retrieved it from the byline, given a little too much time by Casadei. By the time Moises Caicedo and Carney Chukwuemeka had woken up to the sight of James McAtee in space, Oliver Arblaster was free behind him.

Arblaster clipped the ball into the danger area, but Fernandez got his head to the cross and, with that, Chelsea’s players seemed to relax.

There was another header to be won on the edge of the penalty area. Mykhailo Mudryk, another Chelsea substitute, seemed to be the favourite to win it against Hamer, the smallest player on the pitch — but while Hamer leapt with all the power he could muster, Mudryk barely got off the ground. Hamer won the challenge and suddenly the ball was travelling back into the Chelsea penalty area.

There were seven Chelsea outfield players between the penalty spot and the 18-yard line. If you were looking at it from above, you would say they were well-positioned — but they were also, almost without exception, flat-footed, ball-watching or both. Sheffield United’s Cameron Archer won the second ball; Trevoh Chalobah got closest to him but, like Mudryk, didn’t really get off the ground. McBurnie was already anticipating the flick-on. Badiashile, crucially, was not.

It was a terrible goal to concede at any time, never mind in stoppage time. The defending wasn’t quite as egregious as Manchester United’s when Chelsea scored a 111th-minute winner at Stamford Bridge on Thursday night, but it carried the same traits: lack of composure, lack of endeavour, lack of responsibility, lack of awareness, lack of fight.

Eight days earlier, Chelsea had contrived to surrender a winning position at home to struggling Burnley, who played the majority of the game with 10 men. After that match, Pochettino pointed to his heart and his head and said his team’s problems lay “here” and “here” — “the capacity, the energy, the hunger that is the minimum to compete in the Premier League”.

It was a sweeping, rudimentary diagnosis, the type that is very easy for a coach to offer when wishing to create lines of separation between himself and his team’s failings. But… he’s right, isn’t he? This is a group of players who, with Cole Palmer a very notable exception, have looked happy to go through the motions in the Premier League, performing when the conditions are favourable and the wind is in their sails but showing a distinct lack of fight on so many occasions when they have been required to dig deeper.

It is a coach’s job to instil those qualities in a team. For all the obvious technical and tactical advances made by Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal under Pep Guardiola, Jurgen Klopp and Mikel Arteta, those teams are underpinned by desire and a collective sense of purpose.

But those teams were also built with a clear vision in mind, rather than the type of reckless, unbridled, scattergun spending sprees that characterised Chelsea’s first three transfer windows under a consortium led by Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital.

GO DEEPER

Have Chelsea improved in the year since they sacked Graham Potter?

Even now, it is worth remembering that Chelsea’s transfer outlay in their first year under these owners was the biggest in the history of the game: £70million ($89m) on Wesley Fofana, £33m on Kalidou Koulibaly, £47.5m on Raheem Sterling, £63m on Cucurella, an initial £62m (potentially rising to £88.5m) for Mudryk, £33m on Badiashile, £29m on Noni Madueke and £106m on Fernandez, to cite just eight of the players they signed.

They followed that last summer by spending £115m on Moises Caicedo, £53m on Romeo Lavia, £52m on Christopher Nkunku, £25m on Robert Sanchez, £38.8m on Disasi, £23m on Lesley Ugochukwu, £32m on Nicolas Jackson and — in the final hours before the transfer deadline — a seriously overdue coup with the inspired acquisition of Palmer from Manchester City for £40m.

It all looked wild at the time. It looks even worse now with Chelsea sitting ninth in the Premier League — far closer, in points terms, to the relegation zone than the top three. Since the start of last season, they have won as many points as Brentford and three fewer than Fulham.

They are top of one table, however. On Friday afternoon, when the Football Association published its breakdown of intermediary payments by clubs over the past two transfer windows, Chelsea were shown to have paid an extraordinary total of £75,140,524 — almost £15million more than the next club, Manchester City, and more than double the sum paid by any other English club.

That reflects a huge number of outgoing transfers as well as incoming deals and new contracts for Thiago Silva and Fernandez, among others. But again the sums involved are enormous. The gains? Less so.

There are obvious attractions to a recruitment strategy that is based around young talent, but almost everything Chelsea have done has looked flawed. They had already signed four central midfielders between the ages of 19 and 22 (Fernandez, Ugochukwu, Casadei, Andrey Santos) before they broke the British transfer record to sign a fifth (Caicedo) in August and then, seemingly in a fit of pique, added a sixth (Lavia).

Talented players, all of them, but what is the vision here? What is the pathway for Lavia, Ugochukwu, Casadei and Santos? How many of these players are going to make the grade at Chelsea?

GO DEEPER

Chelsea top Premier League for spend on agent fees

And if the whole thing is based around resale value, then a serious question: how many of Chelsea’s signings have performed in a way that would enable the club, hypothetically, to sell them at a profit? Palmer certainly, Jackson probably, Gusto possibly, but many others would not. Even some of those players that looked like clever, low-risk, (relatively) low-cost investments now appear to be diminishing rather than flourishing assets.

All of this would be more easily glossed over if Chelsea were performing well on the pitch, but it has felt as if every step back forward has been swiftly followed by another step back. The injuries suffered by Reece James, Fofana, Nkunku and others offer a degree of mitigation, but it falls a long way short of excusing underperformance on this scale.

It is worth acknowledging they are scoring more goals and winning more games than last season. In terms of attacking play, their expected goals (xG) numbers are better (up from 1.34 per game to a much healthier 2.08 per game). Subjectively, it seems fair to say their best performances this term (the 4-4 and 1-1 draws with Manchester City, the 3-1 win at Aston Villa in the FA Cup) have been more energetic, more fluent and more incisive than anything they produced in the second half of last season under Graham Potter or Frank Lampard. But even Pochettino is not pretending it is good enough; having spent much of the campaign in trust-the-process mode, he has now begun to hint publicly at flaws in the dysfunctional project he has taken on.

GO DEEPER

The Premier League has descended into playground football - and it's great

“It’s about being able to compete,” Pochettino said in his post-match press conference on Sunday. “For different reasons, we struggle to compete in these types of games. Maybe I repeat too much, but watching football like us, at 52 years old, you identify really quickly if the team is ready to compete or not. Maybe this group still is not mature enough to compete in every single game every three days.”

The problem is that Chelsea’s lack of maturity is evident in almost every game. Their seven-match unbeaten run in the Premier League is their best since late 2021, but the draws with Burnley and Sheffield United were defined by frailties, as was the victory over Manchester United for long periods. Likewise the wins against Leeds United and Leicester City in the FA Cup. In arguably the best period of their season, with an FA Cup semi-final on the horizon and a top-six finish not out of the question, Pochettino sounds less convinced by the group of players he is working with.

It has been intriguing to hear him express concerns about players living in a “comfort zone”. Lampard spoke in similar terms during his brief spell as interim coach at the end of last season. It is almost as if signing more young, unproven players than a manager knows what to do with — giving some of them seven-year or eight-year contracts — is a recipe for confusion and complacency rather than a stroke of genius.

The whole thing looks so confused. Why did they sign Badiashile in January last year when they already had a highly promising left-sided central defender, Levi Colwill, earning rave reviews on loan at Brighton & Hove Albion? Why did they sign Ugochukwu last summer when they already had Fernandez, Casadei and Santos and were about to sign Caicedo and Lavia (to say nothing of Conor Gallagher, whom they were determined to sell but who ended up staying and starting almost every game)? Why loan out Lewis Hall and Ian Maatsen when left-back remains a problem? To what extent were the deals for Mudryk and Lavia in particular driven by FOMO? How many “project” players does it take before a wider “project” is undermined?

Quite apart from the defending for Sheffield United’s equaliser on Sunday, there was something insipid about the way Chelsea attacked at 2-1 up. Time and again there were poor decisions or poor execution: Jackson setting off too early and running into an offside position on 77 minutes (and Fernandez overhitting the pass in any case); Jackson running straight into a defender when he and Chukwuemeka had the chance of an overload on 79 minutes; Chukwuemeka misplacing a basic pass to Madueke on the right-hand side on 81 minutes. The only pass Mudryk completed, as an 82nd-minute substitute, was from the kick-off after McBurnie’s goal.

It is a young team: Badiashile is 23, Malo Gusto 20, Fernandez 23, Caicedo 22, Chukwuemeka 20, Madueke 22, Mudryk 23, Jackson 22 and so on. So many of these players have the capacity to improve — but how many of them look substantially better prospects for the time they have spent at Chelsea? Gusto, arguably. Jackson perhaps, given he has scored nine Premier League goals. The qualities of Fernandez and Caicedo are obvious, but it is hard to go overboard about their impact when a sense of control in midfield is so often elusive.

There has been talk of both Arsenal and Liverpool having “dodged a bullet” when Chelsea blew them out of the water in the pursuit of Mudryk and Caicedo respectively. But that is nonsense. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which Mudryk would have made the same kind of impact at Arsenal as Leandro Trossard has. Likewise, it is easy to imagine Caicedo would have thrived in Liverpool’s midfield, resuming his Brighton partnership with Alexis Mac Allister.

At the same time, it is notable how many recent players who have left Chelsea over the past few years are thriving elsewhere: Jorginho and Kai Havertz at Arsenal, Marc Guehi at Crystal Palace, Antonio Rudiger at Real Madrid, Fikayo Tomori, Ruben Loftus-Cheek and Christian Pulisic at AC Milan. Mateo Kovacic hasn’t quite had the same impact at Manchester City and Mason Mount has experienced a wretched time with injuries at Manchester United, but the overall picture invites further questions about Chelsea’s strategy both before and particularly since the Boehly-Clearlake takeover.

Even Pochettino’s fiercest critic might concede that, for all the talent and potential in this squad, there is also a distinct shortage of players with the right combination of hunger and know-how. Yes, Fernandez was a World Cup winner at 21, but that was an experienced Argentina team full of battle-hardened competitors. At Chelsea, he and Caicedo are expected to be leaders at an age when they are still trying to find their way in an unfamiliar, unsettled environment.

It is legitimate to wonder whether Pochettino has what it takes to unlock the potential in this squad but the more you look at Chelsea, the more it becomes apparent this malaise goes far deeper than the manager and far, far deeper than his tactics or team selection on any given matchday.

It is only a few weeks since he was barracked with chants of, “You don’t know what you’re doing” for replacing Mudryk with Chukwuemeka at 2-2 against Leicester in the FA Cup. Quite apart from the vindication that followed when Chukwuemeka scored, the cold, hard reality is that Mudryk, like others, has done nothing like enough at Chelsea to become a cause celebre or a stick with which to beat another unloved coach. It sometimes looks like one of those squads where there are no right answers, only wrong ones.

There is always an assumption that young players and young teams will get better: another year older, another year wiser. But football rarely works like that. If individual and collective development was linear, the past two seasons would have gone an awful lot more smoothly for Chelsea. And while there is always the temptation to blame the coach for all of a team’s ills, surely the miserable 12 months that have passed since Potter’s dismissal, seven months into a five-year contract, should dissuade people from the assumption that another change of manager is all that is needed here.

The whole thing is a mess but it requires patience. Not because there is any certainty that patience will pay off, but because, having spent such a huge amount of money in such an extreme manner, Chelsea’s decision-makers have left themselves with little choice — either financially or strategically — but to hope that these players come good.

The past few weeks alone have given a few Palmer-inspired glimpses of how things could be, along with a few brutal reminders of how things are. Nearly two years into the Boehly-Clearlake era, the wild, overexcited zeal that launched that regime seems to have given way to an uncomfortable state of drift and a desperate hope that lessons are learned, pennies start to drop and that somehow, from out of the chaos of the past couple of years, a serious football team emerges.

GO DEEPER

Chelsea may have spent £1bn - but how much of that have they seen on the pitch?

Edited April 13, 2024 by Vesper

[Vesper 30,226]

Chelsea have spent £1bn – but how much of that have they seen on the pitch?

https://theathletic.com/5404135/2024/04/11/Chelsea-billion-boehly-clearlake-players/

The money colours everything.

Whenever and wherever Chelsea fail on the pitch these days, a reference (usually gleeful or taunting in nature) to the £1billion ($1.27bn) that owners Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital committed to transfer fees for player signings in their first three transfer windows after acquiring the club in June 2022 is never far behind.

That gargantuan number sets the parameters for both the expectations and the schadenfreude, most memorably encapsulated by Sky Sports pundit Gary Neville branding Chelsea “blue billion-pound bottle jobs” in the closing minutes of their Carabao Cup final defeat against Liverpool.

For many people, no further analysis of the £1billion is necessary.

It offers an incomplete picture of Chelsea’s overall transfer dealings (more than £300million has also been recouped through player sales in the same period) but, as numeric shorthand, it is accurate enough. The Athletic estimates that Boehly and Clearlake committed £977.5million to transfer and loan fees in their first three windows, with add-ons likely to take the eventual spend into 10 figures.

There is no debate that the short-term returns on that vast investment have been shockingly bad, with Chelsea forced to confront the very real prospect of a second consecutive Premier League season spent almost entirely in mid-table, followed by a second consecutive campaign without European football of any kind at Stamford Bridge in 2024-25.

But beyond the team’s deeply inconsistent performances and often underwhelming results there is a question that yields some equally startling answers: how much of the £1billion Boehly-Clearlake transfer spend have Chelsea even seen on the pitch in the last two years?

With the notable exception of Kendry Paez — who will complete his £17.3million move to Stamford Bridge from Independiente Del Valle when he turns 18 in May 2025 — The Athletic has looked at all of Boehly-Clearlake’s 29 other signings to examine what percentage of the available Chelsea first-team minutes each has played since they joined the club.

Based on the results, the players were then divided into four brackets: those who have played fewer than 25 per cent of the available Chelsea minutes since signing; those who have played between 25 and 50 per cent; those who have played between 50 and 75 per cent; and those who have played 75 per cent or more of the available first-team minutes as Chelsea players.

The breakdown of these brackets — and the cumulative transfer fees commanded by the players within them — is illustrated by the pie chart below.

As you can see, a whopping £303.9million (or 31 per cent of the total Boehly-Clearlake transfer spend in the first three windows of their ownership) has barely been seen on the pitch for Chelsea at all:

This lowest bracket includes developmental signings like Gabriel Slonina, Cesare Casadei, David Datro Fofana, Andrey Santos, Angelo Gabriel and Deivid Washington, several of whom have spent all or the majority of their young Chelsea careers out on loan. Boehly and Clearlake priced in their lack of short-term contribution in the belief that they can one day blossom into stars, or at least grow into assets who can be sold for profit.

It also includes Wesley Fofana (20.3%), Christopher Nkunku (11.4%) and Romeo Lavia (0.9%), £176million in purchases who were expected to play big first-team roles but have instead been derailed by injuries.

Fofana has not featured at all this season, Lavia will finish the campaign with 33 minutes to his name and Nkunku has played almost 300 fewer minutes in 2023-24 than Armando Broja, who joined Fulham on loan at the start of February.

The two middle brackets indicate signings who have at least been supporting contributors in Chelsea’s squad. At the lower end are Marc Cucurella (38.6%), Benoit Badiashile (32.9%), Mykhailo Mudryk (39.3%) and Noni Madueke (27.3%).

At the higher end, you find Raheem Sterling (62.6%), Nicolas Jackson (72.3%) and Malo Gusto (58.6% this season, after spending 2022-23 back on loan at Lyon) as well as goalkeepers Robert Sanchez (50.2%) and Djordje Petrovic (56.2%), who have both been given sustained runs in the No 1 spot this season.

Only four players have been on the pitch for more than 75 per cent of Chelsea’s available first-team minutes since arriving: Enzo Fernandez (83.9%), Moises Caicedo (85.8%), Axel Disasi (95.4%) and Cole Palmer (86.3%), who have all been pillars of head coach Mauricio Pochettino’s team selection.

This is not a direct indicator of a successful signing. Fernandez and Caicedo in particular appear to have struggled with such a high load. But it does underline that they are regarded as key cogs in the team being constructed at Stamford Bridge.

Fernandez and Caicedo’s status as two of the four most expensive Premier League signings ever has been a gift and a curse. On the one hand, it has saddled them with arguably impossible expectations at a time when both are still developing their skills. On the other, it virtually guarantees them opportunities to play through their mistakes and stretches of bad form, since Chelsea have so much invested in their success.

Below them, the other expensive acquisitions of the Boehly-Clearlake era have had wildly diverging fortunes.

Mudryk and Cucurella are not as prominent in this Chelsea team as their price tags suggest they should be while Sterling, the marquee signing of the summer of 2022, has not played enough minutes to be viewed as integral despite missing no significant time through injury over the past two seasons:

The fact that Fernandez and Palmer, two of the most important players to the Boehly-Clearlake project, were deadline-day signings only provides further ammunition to those who believe their unprecedented recruitment drive was haphazard and lacking in coherent strategy.

Chelsea were also only in position to announce the arrival of Caicedo on August 14, a day after the opening game of the 2023-24 season, despite pursuing him as their top midfield target for much of the summer and ultimately going well above their own valuation in order to get their man.

But the bigger picture offers tentative signs of improvement.

The summer window of 2023 was the first to be formally led by co-sporting directors Laurence Stewart and Paul Winstanley, and the players who arrived at Stamford Bridge in that period have been significantly more prominent than those signed when Boehly first assumed the role on an interim basis:

Breaking down the Boehly-Clearlake transfer spend clarifies details and entrenches viewpoints.

Those who believe Chelsea’s owners have contrived to spend £1billion wildly badly will point to almost a third of that figure barely being seen on the pitch for the first team, and fewer than a handful of the signings establishing themselves as stalwarts under Pochettino.

Others will look at the same figures and argue it shows a heavily future-focused transfer strategy, undermined in the short term by bad injury luck, but retaining huge long-term upside.

It may be years before the argument is definitively settled, and Chelsea’s fortunes on the pitch in the coming seasons will be decisive. But from now until then, expect the word “billion” to remain the central word in the discourse around this Boehly-Clearlake investment project, because the money colours everything.

[chef 51]

 

[Blue Armour 4,448]

Posted the highest operating loss of any club in the PL with £249m, but apparently managed to not fall foul of the PL profit & sustainability rules by selling two hotels to BlueCo (themselves?)

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-13304941/Chelsea-hotels-Premier-League-Profit-Sustainability-Rules.html

 

[robsblubot 3,595]

21 hours ago, Vesper said:

when a sense of control in midfield is so often elusive.

There has been talk of both Arsenal and Liverpool having “dodged a bullet” when Chelsea blew them out of the water in the pursuit of Mudryk and Caicedo respectively. But that is nonsense. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which Mudryk would have made the same kind of impact at Arsenal as Leandro Trossard has. Likewise, it is easy to imagine Caicedo would have thrived in Liverpool’s midfield, resuming his Brighton partnership with Alexis Mac Allister.

At the same time, it is notable how many recent players who have left Chelsea over the past few years are thriving elsewhere: Jorginho and Kai Havertz at Arsenal, Marc Guehi at Crystal Palace, Antonio Rudiger at Real Madrid, Fikayo Tomori, Ruben Loftus-Cheek and Christian Pulisic at AC Milan. Mateo Kovacic hasn’t quite had the same impact at Manchester City and Mason Mount has experienced a wretched time with injuries at Manchester United, but the overall picture invites further questions about Chelsea’s strategy both before and particularly since the Boehly-Clearlake takeover.

A bit all over the place, but still a nice read. I Agree about Caicedo potentially doing better at Liverpool (still unsure about his passing ability). I disagree about Mudryk for the earlier point made in the article, which was conveniently forgotten when making the point above: Trossard is competitive, while Mudryk isn't.
Sometimes it's just the mentality of the players, and not about tactics or nice speeches in the locker room.

[OneMoSalah 8,886]

On 13/04/2024 at 04:22, Vesper said:

Chelsea have spent £1bn – but how much of that have they seen on the pitch?

 

Short answer: quality wise only seen £50m (Cole Palmer). Rest have been embarrassing, be it injuries, performance level, genuine ability, whatever. Shocking.

Edited April 14, 2024 by OneMoSalah

[Vesper 30,226]

monster data dump!

 

Chelsea Finances 2022/23

We Live So Fast

 

 

https://swissramble.substack.com/p/Chelsea-finances-202223

 

 

Chelsea’s 2022/23 accounts covered a disappointing season, as they slipped from third place to 12th in the Premier League, thus failing to qualify for Europe for the first time since 2015/16.

The Blues also crashed out of both the FA Cup and EFL Cup in the third round, though they did reach the Champions League quarter-finals before being eliminated by Real Madrid.

The poor results on the pitch led to the dismissal of head coach Thomas Tuchel in September 2022, when he was replaced by Graham Potter. However, the Englishman was shown the door after only seven months, succeeded by his former assistant Bruno Saltor for one game, before the caretaker made way for the return of the prodigal son in the shape of Frank Lampard.

Ownership

In May 2022 a consortium led by American businessman Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital acquired Chelsea for £2.5 bln (plus £1.75 bln infrastructure commitment), following Roman Abramovich’s decision to sell the club as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Accordingly, 2022/23 was the first full season completed under the new ownership.

Profit/(Loss) 2022/23

Chelsea’s pre-tax loss reduced from £121m to £90m, mainly thanks to £107m once-off accounting entries, including the sale of hotel buildings to another group company for £77m and £31m other operating income.

Revenue rose by £31m (6%) from £481m to a club record £512m, breaking through the half billion pound barrier for the first time, though this was wiped out by a £37m (5%) increase in operating expenses to £761m.

The loss would have been even higher without the benefit of £63m profit from player sales, though this was only around half of the previous season’s £123m. However, net interest payable was up from £2m to £12m.

 

The higher revenue was largely driven by commercial increasing £33m (19%) from £177m to £210m, while match day was also up £7m (11%) from £69m to £76m. Both of these established new club records. This was partly due to Chelsea being able to operate without the government restrictions placed on the club in the prior year.

However, broadcasting fell £9m (4%) from £235m to £226m, mainly because of the worse performance in the Premier League.

 

Investment in the squad led to significant increases in both wages, up £64m (19%) from £340m to £404m, and player amortisation, up £43m (27%) from £160m to £203m. In addition, other expenses increased £25m (22%) to £139m.

However, there was no repeat of a couple of substantial once-off costs in the previous season: £77m player impairment and £18m legal fees. In other words, the underlying year-on-year increase was even higher than reported at £132m (21%).

Chelsea’s £90m pre-tax loss is not great, but two clubs in the Premier League did even worse last season, namely Aston Villa £120m and Tottenham £95m. Many other clubs also posted large losses, including Leicester City £90m, Everton £89m and Southampton £87m.

On the other hand, a few clubs did manage to generate a profit, most notably Brighton £133m and Manchester City £80m. Bournemouth also reported a £44m profit, though this would have been a £27m loss without the benefit of a £71m owner loan write-off.

Player Sales 2022/23

 

Chelsea made £63m profit from player sales, which by most standards is pretty good, but is only around half of the previous season’s £123m. In the summer of 2022 they sold Timo Werner to RB Leipzig, Emerson to West Ham and Billy Gilmour to Brighton, followed by Jorginho to Arsenal in the January transfer window.

A number of big deals were also agreed just before the end of June 2023, namely Kai Havertz to Arsenal, Mateo Kovacic to Manchester City, Kalidou Koulibaly to Al-Hilal and Ruben Loftus-Cheek to Milan.

Given that all of these sales were included in the 2022/23 accounts, the £63m profit is perhaps lower than might have been anticipated by some.

Nevertheless, this was still one of the largest gains in the Premier League last season, though only around half of Manchester City £122m and Brighton £121m.

 

Profit/(Loss) Trend

Chelsea have now lost money in four of the last five years, adding up to a hefty £434m, including three losses over £100m in this period. The good news is that losses have reduced two years in a row, albeit from a chunky £156m in 2020/21.

In fairness, like all clubs Chelsea were adversely impacted by COVID. I estimate their revenue loss as £128m, split between £32m in 2019/20 and £96m in 2020/21. Most of this was match day £76m plus £36m commercial and £16m broadcasting.

 

In addition, Chelsea’s results were impacted by the sanctions placed on Abramovich from 10th March to 30th May 2022 (when the club’s sale was completed). During this period, the club was restricted in “its ability to sell match day and season tickets, sell merchandise, accept event bookings, as well as sign contracts with players and commercial sponsorship partners.”

That said, Chelsea are no strangers to posting large losses, being responsible for two of the four highest losses ever reported in the Premier League (and five of the top 20). Last season’s £90m deficit just sneaks into this list.

In fact, over the last five years, Chelsea’s £434m loss is the second worst in the top flight, only “beaten” by Everton’s £506m in this period.

To be fair, only four clubs managed to make money, namely Brentford, Brighton, Manchester City and Wolves, but Chelsea’s loss was much higher than every other club – with the unfortunate exception of Everton.

 

Exceptional Items

In recent years Chelsea have often been adversely impacted by exceptional charges, including management changes, legal matters and early termination of the shirt sponsorship.

However, it was very different this year, as the bottom line benefited from £107m of exceptional credits, especially a £77m gain from selling hotels on the Stamford Bridge site to another group company, Blueco 22 Properties Ltd.

In addition, other operating income included £31m, made up of £17m litigation costs recharged to the parent company, £12.5m for an unexplained “settlement fee” and £1m research and development credit.

Interestingly, the club opted not to classify an estimated £46m for last season’s management changes as exceptional items, but instead include these in wages. These covered:

• Tuchel pay-off £10m

• Compensation paid to Brighton for Potter and his support team £23m

• Potter pay-off £13m

The only other Premier League club that reported anything like Chelsea’s £77m exceptional items last season was Bournemouth, who booked a £71m credit for the write-off of a loan from a former owner.

Chelsea’s £31m was also the highest other operating income in the top flight with the only other club in double digits being Brighton with £25m. That was also very largely driven by Chelsea, as it was almost entirely made up of the compensation for poaching Potter.

 

 

Player Sales Trend

Chelsea’s business model has been far more reliant on player sales than any other major English club, so they generated more than half a billion pounds in the last six years, including good money from Academy graduates, who represent pure profit in the books. This included no fewer than three years when they generated more than £100m.

To place this into perspective, Chelsea’s £530m profit from player sales in this period was around £150m more than the next highest club in the Premier League, namely Manchester City £376m.

However, the accounts state that Chelsea have only made £48m to date this season from the disposal of the registrations of 10 players. This has presumably come from Mason Mount to Manchester United, Christian Pulisic to Milan, Edouard Mendy to Al-Hilal, Ethan Ampadu to Leeds United and Callum Hudson-Odoi to Nottingham Forest. The figure probably excludes Lewis Hall’s loan to Newcastle United with an option to buy.

This is again probably less profit than fans might expect, once again highlighting that transfer fees in the media should be treated with a degree of caution. A few players left on free transfers, such as Aubameyang, Kanté, Azpilicueta and Bakayako, thus producing no profit from the sales, but helping to reduce the wage bill.

Of course, there is still time for Chelsea to boost their player sales, but these would have to be registered by 30th June for them to be included in the 2023/24 accounts.

Whether the Blues can realise decent fees is debatable, as other clubs will be well aware of the club’s PSR issues, so will use this to their advantage and look to pick up players for low fees. It might also be difficult to match the wages paid by a leading club, so players might be unwilling to leave.

 

Operating Profit/(Loss)

If we exclude the significant exceptional items, player sales and interest payable, Chelsea’s operating loss further widened from £224m to £249m, which means that this has worsened three years in succession.

The club’s business model has essentially been to offset large operating losses with profits from player sales, so this is not overly surprising, but there’s not much good to say about an operating loss of a quarter of a billion pounds.

This means that they have lost nearly £900m from day-to-day business in the last five years, which takes some doing.

In fairness, very few clubs make an operating profit, but Chelsea’s £249m loss was comfortably the worst in the Premier League last season, nearly £100m more than the next highest, Leicester City £151m.

In fact, Chelsea’s £249m operating loss last season is the highest ever recorded in England’s top flight, though they have actually produced three of the top four. The only club close to this level of performance has been Manchester City.

 

 

Revenue

Chelsea’s £512m revenue is the club’s highest ever, £66m (15%) more than the £447m pre-pandemic peak in 2019. The growth since then has been led by commercial £30m and broadcasting £26m, though match day is also up £10m.

Both commercial and match day set new club records last season, but broadcasting remains Chelsea’s most important revenue stream, accounting for 44% of total revenue. Commercial is just behind with 41%, while match day is only 15%.

Chelsea’s £66m revenue growth in the past four years compares favourably with most of the Big Six, only significantly outpaced by Manchester City’s £178m.

One point worth noting is the difference in fortunes between Chelsea and Tottenham in the course of the last decade: the Blues were £139m ahead of their North London rivals in 2014, but were £37m behind last season, i.e. a massive swing of £176m.

As a result, Chelsea’s £512m revenue is now the fifth highest in the Premier League, having been overtaken by Spurs. Furthermore there is a sizeable gap to the top three clubs: Manchester City lead the way with £713m, followed by Manchester United £648m and Liverpool £594m.

Chelsea dropped one place to 9th place in the Deloitte Money League, which ranks clubs globally by revenue. That’s not too shabby, though they were as high as 5th in 2011/12.

 

 

Broadcasting Revenue

Chelsea’s broadcasting revenue fell £9m (4%) from £235m to £226m, mainly because of the worse performance in the Premier League, though the previous season also benefited from winning both the UEFA Super Cup and the FIFA Club World Cup.

Despite the reduction, Chelsea’s £226m broadcasting income remained the third highest in England, only behind treble winners Manchester City £299m and Liverpool £242m. The impact of European qualification is evident.

Chelsea received £138m from Premier League central TV distribution, which was £8m lower than prior year, as they finished nine places lower (12th vs. 3rd), which meant a reduced merit payment. The decrease was partially offset by the favourable impact of the new 3-year cycle.

 

 

Europe TV

Chelsea earned €96m for reaching the Champions League quarter-finals, which was €4m higher than the €92m they received the previous season for getting to the same stage.

Success on the pitch is most visible financially with TV money, so Manchester City earned €135m for winning the Champions League, i.e. €39m more than Chelsea.

The difference in earnings between Europe’s leading tournament and the other competitions is stark. As an example, England’s Champions League representatives averaged €95m, which was over three times as much as €29m in the Europa League, and four times the €22m in the Europa Conference.

Chelsea’s record in Europe was very impressive in the Abramovich era, as they won both the Champions League and Europa League twice. Their victory against Manchester City in the 2020/21 Champions League final was worth €120m on its own.

In fact, Chelsea have earned half a billion Euros from Europe in the last six years, though this was still a fair way behind Manchester City €615m and Liverpool €564m. On the other hand, this was a lot higher than Manchester United €355m, Tottenham €322m and especially Arsenal €150m.

 

Chelsea’s failure to qualify for Europe this season will obviously hurt them, leading to an immediate decrease of €96m TV money plus lower gate receipts and contractual reductions in sponsorships.

 

Commercial Revenue

Chelsea’s commercial revenue rose £33m (19%) from £177m to £210m, which was a new high for the club, driven by strong sales of non-match day activities including stadium tours, as governments restrictions were lifted, plus a net increase in sponsorships.

It’s possible that this category also includes player loans income, e.g. Lukaku to Inter, Batshuayi to Fenerbahce and Sarr to Monaco.

However, Chelsea’s £31m commercial revenue growth in the last four years is one of the smallest in the Big Six, only (slightly) ahead of Manchester United. Others had much higher increases, e.g. Manchester City £114m, Tottenham £93m, Liverpool £84m and Arsenal £58m.

 

As a result, Chelsea’s £210m commercial revenue has been overtaken by Tottenham £228m, while they are miles behind the top three clubs: Manchester City £341m, Manchester United £303m and Liverpool £273m.

This will surely be an area of focus for Chelsea’s new owners, who will hope to bring US expertise to the commercial operations.

Chelsea have a long-term kit deal with Nike £60m (£900m over 15 years), but the Three UK £40m shirt sponsorship expired in June 2023, belatedly replaced by Infinite Athlete. In addition, Whale Fin did not renew their £20m sleeve sponsorship at the end of last season, succeeded by BingX, but only from January 2024.

Chelsea will be seeking more lucrative deals, e.g. there was talk of a £60m shirt sponsorship with Riyadh Air, but that might prove difficult without more success on the pitch.

 

Match Day Revenue

Chelsea’s match day income rose £7m (11%) from £69m to a club record £76m, just above the previous £74m peak in 2017/18. This was helped by the removal of government restrictions and an increase in attendances.

In 2020/21 all games were played behind closed doors (except three with severely restricted capacity).

Chelsea’s match day income has only increased by £6m over the last decade, while other clubs have invested in stadium development, leading to significant growth, especially Tottenham (up £77m), Liverpool (up £35m) and Manchester City (up £32m).

 

This is Chelsea’s Achilles heel in terms of revenue, as their £76m is far below some of their rivals, especially Manchester United, Tottenham and Arsenal, who all generate well over £100m.

However, the club does benefit from steep London prices, as their cheapest season tickets are the third highest in the Premier League, only less than Arsenal and Tottenham.

Chelsea’s average attendance increased from 37,698 to 40,002, but this was only the ninth highest in England (and fourth best in London). Seven clubs regularly attract crowds above 50,000, while Manchester United’s 73,671 is over 30,000 more than the Blues.

 

Chelsea have frozen ticket prices since 2011/12 – with the exception of the more exclusive areas of the upgraded West Stand. The club said that this meant that prices had fallen in real terms by around a third.

However, there has been talk of a price increase for 2024/25, which the Supporters Trust said “could lead to irreversible toxicity”.

 

Stadium

The relatively low match day income helps explain why the club is considering a new stadium. Plans had been well advanced under Abramovich before the development was put on hold after his political difficulties started.

There is no doubt that stadium development at Stamford Bridge is extremely challenging, because of its location, close to a railway line, the Tube, a cemetery and an underground river.

The cost has been estimated as between £1.5 bln and £2 bln, though this should be covered by the infrastructure expenditure that the new owners committed when they acquired the club.

Chelsea fans should probably not hold their breath, however, as the club is unlikely to “break ground” in any development for a while.

 

Wages

Chelsea’s wage bill shot up £64m (19%) from £340m to £404m, easily a new high for the club, after the net increase arising from the numerous player purchases and sales (plus contract extensions).

That said, it was inflated by the inclusion of last season’s management changes, which the club has previously classified as exceptional items. I estimate this cost them £46m, covering pay-offs to Tuchel and Potter plus compensation paid to Brighton for Potter and his support team.

If this were excluded, wages would still have increased year-on-year by £18m (5%) from £340m to £358m.

Based on the reported figure, Chelsea’s wages have increased by £118m (41%) in the last four years, which is the highest growth of the Big Six, even more than Manchester City’s £108m.

Last season Chelsea’s £404m wage bill was only below Manchester City’s £423m, but their rivals’ figure included hefty bonuses for winning the treble. This was higher than Liverpool £373m, Manchester United £331m and especially Tottenham £251m and Arsenal £235m.

In fact, Chelsea’s £404m wages are the second highest ever in the Premier League, while they have had three of the top ten – all with wage bills in the last three seasons. They are only the second English club to break through the £400m barrier.

Chelsea’s wages to turnover ratio increased from 71% to 79%, the club’s highest since 2010. However, if the once-off management changes are excluded, this would fall to 70%, which is more in line with the usual level.

Either way, this is by far the worst of the Big Six, with Liverpool being the next highest at 63%. Others have much better ratios, such as Arsenal 51%, Manchester United 51% and especially Tottenham 46%.

 

Clearlake’s co-founder José Feliciano told a private equity conference last year that the club needed to cut costs, “I think what we are trying to do is reduce the salary and the operational expenses of the business by over $100m per year.”

Clearly, that has yet to come to pass, though wages should have come down this season, as there would have been lower bonus payments due to no European football, while a few expensive players have been offloaded.

 

Directors’ Remuneration

Chelsea’s highest paid director only received £286k, which was one of the lowest in the Premier League, miles below the likes of Daniel Levy at Tottenham £6.6m, Denise Barrett-Baxendale at Everton £3.3m, Paul Barber at Brighton £2.9m and Richard Arnold £2.6m at Manchester United.

However, it’s possible that payments were made by other group companies, as was the case the previous season when Blueco 22 Limited paid £50m to former directors for services relating to the sale of the club (£35m to Marina Granovskaia, who acted as Abramovich’s lieutenant for many years, and £15m to others, including former chairman Bruce Buck).

 

Player Amortisation

Following the significant investment in the squad, Chelsea’s player amortisation, the annual charge to expense transfer fees over the length of a player’s contract, inevitably shot up £43m (27%) from £160m to £203m, which easily broke the previous club record of £168m four years ago.

As a result, Chelsea’s £203m player amortisation is by far the highest in the Premier League, a long way above Manchester United £170m and Manchester City £145m, reflecting the club’s enormous transfer expenditure.

In fact, Chelsea’s £203m player amortisation last season is the highest ever reported in the Premier League. They actually have four of the five highest, which is pretty clear evidence of their spendthrift transfer policy.

 

Of course, player amortisation will further increase in 2023/24, following another huge outlay this season, exacerbated by the full year impact of purchases in the January 2023 transfer window.

Incredibly, Chelsea’s player amortisation would have been even higher if they had not signed many players on incredibly long contracts. For example, Mykhailo Mudryk is on an 8½-year deal, while central defenders Benoit Badiashile and Wesley Fofana signed for 7½ years and 7 years respectively.

This has the benefit of spreading the cost of the transfer over more years, thereby reducing the annual expense booked to the profit and loss account and considered for the PSR calculation.

If the player works out, then this will prove to be an astute piece of business. However, it also carries significant risk, as Chelsea could be saddled with an under-performing player on high wages, who might prove difficult to move on.

Since then, the Premier League has agreed a new rule to limit the amortisation period to five years for the purpose of the PSR calculation, in line with UEFA. However, this change was not backdated to include transfers that had already been signed, so Chelsea will still benefit from their fancy financial footwork.

 

Player Impairment

In addition, Chelsea booked £77m player impairment in the prior year, which had the benefit of reducing amortisation going forward (as well as being a pretty good indicator of poor recruitment).

To highlight just how large this charge really was, it is by far the highest player impairment ever booked in England, way ahead of Stoke City’s £43m in 2019/20.

 

Wages & Player Amortisation

Many clubs look at wages and player amortisation combined to give the annual cost of squad investment. Indeed, this is likely to be the basis of the Premier League’s new squad cost control ratio. Per this metric, Chelsea’s annual squad cost increased by over £100m (21%) last season from £501m to £607m.

This is the highest in the Premier League, even ahead of Manchester City’s £568m, but without anything like the same level of success.

 

 

Other Expenses

Chelsea’s other expenses rose £24m (22%) from £115m to £139m, yet another club high for a cost category, though still a fair bit lower than the two Manchester clubs and Tottenham.

 

Transfers

Chelsea splashed out an incredible £745m on player purchases in 2022/23, which was the highest by some distance in the Premier League, more than the next three clubs combined (Arsenal £251m, Manchester United £247m and Manchester City £221m).

In the summer of 2022, they brought in Wesley Fofana from Leicester City, Marc Cucurella from Brighton, Raheem Sterling from Manchester City, Kalidou Koulibaly from Napoli, Carney Chukwuemeka from Aston Villa and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang from Barcelona.

The spending did not stop there with more arrivals in the January 2023 window, including Enzo Fernandez from Benfica, Mykhaylo Mudryk from Shakhtar Donetsk, Benoit Badiashile from Monaco, Noni Madueke from PSV Eindhoven, Malo Gusto from Lyon, Andrey Santos from Vasco da Gama, Cesare Casadei from Inter and David Fofana from Molde.

Chelsea’s £745m gross spend last season is easily an all-time high for the Premier League, over twice as much as Manchester City’s £328m in 2017/18. Of course, the Blues are no strangers to splashing the cash, being responsible for three of the top four annual transfer outlays.

To a certain extent, it could be argued that Chelsea were playing catch-up, as their expenditure in the transfer market was “relatively” restrained in the three preceding seasons, averaging £144m, only around half the £285m in the previous 2-year period.

That said, their £1.2 bln outlay over the last four years has easily outpaced their domestic rivals, being at least £400m higher with Manchester City spending £744m, Arsenal £736m and Manchester United £698m. For more context, it was more than three times as much as Liverpool’s £368m.

 

Of course, Chelsea have continued to invest in their squad this season with the accounts stating that they have spent another £454m, bringing the total outlay since Boehly’s consortium arrived to a staggering £1.2 bln in less than two seasons.

The new signings include (deep breath) Moisés Caicedo and Robert Sanchez from Brighton, Roméo Lavia from Southampton, Christopher Nkunku from RB Leipzig, Cole Palmer from Manchester City, Axel Disasi from Monaco, Nicolas Jackson from Villarreal, Lesley Ugochukwo from Rennes, Deivid Washington and Angelo from Santos and Djordje Petrovic from New England Revolution.

That’s a full football team on its own, but most supporters would agree that only Palmer has been an unqualified success to date.

 

Agent Fees

Chelsea also sit at the top of the table in terms of agent fees, spending £75m in the 12 months between 1st February 2023 and 1st February 2024, ahead of Manchester City £61m and Manchester United £34m. In fact, this was a new record for the Premier League.

 

Squad Cost

Chelsea’s squad cost, based on amounts paid per the club’s balance sheet (as opposed to market value), increased from £918m to £1.1 bln.

They are the second English club to break through the billion pound barrier, though they were still slightly below Manchester City. That is likely to change this season after the £454m player purchases.

 

 

Debt

Chelsea’s gross financial debt increased from zero to £146m, all owed to the parent undertaking. This is slightly strange, as the cash flow statement references £428.5m proceeds from borrowings, while nothing is mentioned in the Related Parties note.

There were many media reports last September about Chelsea reaching an agreement with US investment firm Ares Management for a similar amount to the figure in the cash flow statement, so that seems to make sense.

Some described this as similar to the infamous Payment In Kind (PIK) loan notes used by the Glazers when they acquired Manchester United. These are high interest, but payments are usually deferred until the loan matures.

Abramovich had regularly provided cash injections to Chelsea during his tenure, putting in over £1.5 bln, resulting in the highest debt in the Premier League. However, this was written-off as part of the club sale.

Based on the £146m in the balance sheet, Chelsea’s debt is far below the likes of Tottenham £851m (to fund their new stadium), Everton £792m (stadium and transfer spend) and Manchester United £636m (the lingering impact of the Glazers’ leveraged buy-out).

As a result, Chelsea did not pay any interest last season, but received £0.6m interest. This as in contrast to some other clubs that had to make substantial annual payments, e.g. Manchester United £31m, Tottenham £25m and Everton £23m.

 

 

Transfer Debt

Chelsea don’t separately report transfer debt, but assuming that this represents 90% of Trade Creditors, it massively increased from £137m to £479m. This is obviously a modeled number, but the club did attribute the significant increase in creditors to “the amounts owed in relation to player trading”.

On this basis, Chelsea’s transfer debt is the highest the Premier League, though many clubs have significantly increased purchases on credit in the past few years. so huge amounts were also owed by Tottenham £307m, Manchester United £277m, Arsenal £240m and Manchester City £204m.

 

 

Cash Flow

Chelsea’s £218m operating loss (including exceptional items) swung to £173m positive operating cash flow, after adding back £218m non-cash items (player amortisation and depreciation) plus £174m working capital movements.

This was boosted by £203m from player sales before spending a huge £748m on player purchases and investing £21m in infrastructure.

The resulting cash outflow was £392m, which was fully funded by net £426m from loans, though the source was not specified.

 

As a result, Chelsea’s cash balance rose £34m from £54m to £88m, one of the highest in the top flight, though still a fair way below Tottenham’s £198m.

 

 

Profitability and Sustainability Regulations (PSR)

Chelsea stated that the club has complied with Premier League and UEFA financial regulations “since their inception in 2012 and expects to do so for the foreseeable future.”

They added, “The football club continues to balance success on the field together with the financial imperatives of complying with UEFA and Premier League regulations.”

My model suggests that they were well over the maximum £105m loss for the 3-year monitoring period up to 2022/23, even after considering allowable deductions for “healthy” expenditure, such as infrastructure, academy, community and women’s football, plus losses caused by COVID.

However, they were saved by the sale of the hotels on the Stamford Bridge site to another group company for a £76.5m profit, leading to them (just) complying with PSR.

Such property sales have been used in the past by a number of Championship clubs to help meet PSR targets, including Derby County, Sheffield Wednesday and Aston Villa. The EFL subsequently closed this loophole, but this is apparently not the case in the Premier League. Indeed, Chelsea have claimed that their approach was discussed in advance with the PL.

The big question now is whether Chelsea will comply with PSR this season.

Based on my estimate for Chelsea’s cumulative PSR loss for the two years up to 2022/23 of £141m (even after the hotel sale), they would have to somehow generate a PSR profit of £36m this season to meet the target.

Assuming that allowable deductions remain at £35m, this means that they would basically have to break-even in the accounts.

That seems a tall order, given that revenue will be much lower due to not playing in Europe, while profit from player sales is currently also less than 2022/23 The wage bill should fall, but player amortisation (and possibly impairment) will increase.

The expectation is that Chelsea will address this with player sales before the end of June, especially Academy products such as Conor Gallagher, Reece James, Armando Broja, Ian Maatsen and Trevor Chalobah.

There are two other possibilities:

• Chelsea pull another rabbit out of the hat with more property sales, though a stadium disposal might be prevented by the Chelsea Pitch Owners, as they own the Stamford bridge freehold.

• The club might argue that further adjustments to the PSR calculation should be made to take into consideration:

  • Revenue lost when sanctions were applied by the government

  • Exceptional player impairment (as claimed by Everton)

  • Lost player sales, due to the transfer market being deflated by COVID and the economic sanctions preventing deals being made.

 

UEFA Financial Sustainability Rules

If Chelsea do manage to qualify for Europe, they would also have to comply with UEFA’s regulations, but the good news is that these are less strict than the former regime, as the maximum allowable loss has doubled from €30m to €60m (potentially as much as €90m if a club is deemed to be in good financial health).

UEFA have also introduced squad cost control via a new ratio of player wages, transfers and agent fees that will be limited to 70% of revenue & profit on player sales, though there is a gradual implementation over 3 seasons (90% in 2023, 80% in 2024 and 70% from 2025), giving clubs time to get their house in order.

Based on my calculations, Chelsea’s ratio was 86% in 2022/23, which suggests that this will also be something of a challenge. This will also be the basis of the Premier League’s new PSR, so will have to be an area of focus for the club’s owners, especially as property sales are excluded from this calculation.

 

Legal Matters

Chelsea self-reported some issues related to historical transfer payments that they discovered during the takeover. The resultant Premier League investigation could lead to “future liabilities that cannot be quantified”.

Conclusion

Not only did Chelsea report another significant loss of £90m, but it would have been even worse without around £100m of once-off adjustments, including £77m from the hotel sale.

It’s one thing applying a series of accounting “tricks” to satisfy Profitability and Sustainability Regulations, but the reality is that this is a pretty awful set of financial results, notwithstanding the record revenue.

Chelsea fans will probably not care too much about the balance sheet, so long as the owners continue to provide financial support, but they will be concerned that the massive investment in new players has so far produced little success on the pitch.

Edited April 19, 2024 by Vesper