The English Football Thread

[Vesper 31,181]

A harsh sacking isn’t always a wrong sacking

https://theathletic.com/2265342/2020/12/17/premier-league-manager-sackings/

How bad does it need to get? This is the question that stalks the mind of executives at every football club when it comes to hiring and firing their head coaches. In the coming months, it may be the concern for Chris Wilder at Sheffield United, Mikel Arteta at Arsenal or Ole Gunnar Solskjaer at Manchester United. What is the tipping point? How far is too far?

In recent weeks at West Bromwich Albion, the hierarchy arrived at a conclusion that has not been overly popular in the immediate aftermath. On Wednesday morning, after a creditable 1-1 draw at Manchester City, West Brom sacked Slaven Bilic. This came within five months of the Croatian coach guiding the club to promotion. To heighten the hysteria, it has subsequently emerged that the club interviewed candidates before the match took place. On social media and radio phone-ins, supporters and journalists were swift to condemn the latest evidence of boardroom brutality. The local newspaper reported on an “85-word statement” on the club website. One newspaper website made a list of the harshest sackings in Premier League history.

A sacking always feels a little more outrageous at this time of year, yet festive compassion and goodwill are not high on the agenda for a Premier League owner whose status in the top-flight is insecure and whose income has been severely reduced by a global pandemic. As for Bilic, the decision might appear callous to those supporters who credit him with returning their team to the top flight and any neutrals impressed by a backs-to-the-wall point against City on Tuesday evening. His team are not disastrous. But does it need to be disastrous to justify or provoke a change?

It is not overly difficult to assess both a pattern of behaviour and results that suggests West Brom’s trajectory to be worrying. This season alone, West Brom have won one of 13 Premier League games. Ahead of Wednesday night’s fixtures, they had conceded four more goals than any other side and only two sides had scored fewer goals.

Clubs assess both short and long-term patterns these days and perhaps the more compelling case against Bilic can be identified by West Brom’s record between December 11, 2019, and the end of last season, when the club failed to win 17 of their final 26 Championship matches of the campaign. Taken together, therefore, West Brom did not win in 29 of Bilic’s last 39 games in the Championship and Premier League. In the matches West Brom may realistically expect to take points from in the Premier League — against Newcastle, Crystal Palace, Burnley, Brighton, Sheffield United and Fulham — Bilic secured one win, against Sheffield United, and his team scored only four goals. This record, combined with longstanding friction over recruitment, suggests it to be improbable that Bilic would be able to retain the club’s Premier League status.

West Brom could have afforded Bilic more time, yet many within the club will recall how the decision to wait and see whether Alan Pardew could alter the curve of results led the club to dramatically “bottom out” by the start of April in the 2017-18 season. This may have informed this particular decision. How long, exactly, could West Brom afford to wait for this manager to improve results?

There are no guarantees with a managerial change. West Brom supporters, whose club appear to be permanently spinning on the managerial merry-go-round after recent spells with Tony Pulis and Pardew, could be forgiven for letting out a sigh when they saw Sam Allardyce as the successor. Yet Allardyce, for all the derision he receives, has never been relegated from the Premier League, is highly capable of organising a defence and has a proven record of maximising limited potential. The decision has logic.

If the common pattern of a managerial bounce suggests results can pick up quickly, there is some sense, too, in hiring Allardyce before a flurry of Christmas fixtures while it always enables a new manager to contribute towards the January window, rather than an outgoing coach suggesting transfers that may not be wanted by a new man.

The tension between reason and sentiment will always be highly-charged in football. A consensus has developed that sacking managers is, in some way, morally wrong and evidence of an industry that does not afford time, patience or empathy to its participants. It often falls under the umbrella of foreign ownership, too, yet this development predates English football’s globalisation. In the 2001-02 season, before overseas investors were common, 21 of the 92 clubs in the top four English leagues had changed their manager before the end of October, which is more than is currently the case this season by mid-December, albeit this campaign had a later start date.

More accurately, the culture can probably be attributed to a rise in money in the game. The more is at stake, the more likely we are to be impatient. Football supporters often shudder at any description of their local club as a business but Premier League clubs are globally-owned, corporate bodies with offices dotted around the world and owners who are highly demanding and often highly vain investors.

The battle for decision-makers is whether to be proactive to influence events or reactive to events that befall them. Bournemouth, for example, stood by Eddie Howe through thick and thin last season, most probably due to a debt of gratitude they felt they owed a manager who had given so much to the club, yet the result was relegation. If you speak to those at boardroom level at Watford, the decision they privately regret most is not the three times they sacked a full-time manager last season but rather their call to retain Javi Gracia into a third season when the club had ended the previous campaign by losing seven of their final eleven Premier League matches and then capitulating in a 6-0 FA Cup final defeat to Manchester City. The one time the Pozzo family decided to be a little sentimental, they saw their survival model collapse.

This is not to suggest every manager ought to be fired following a dip in form and there are, clearly, various examples of exceptional swings such as Ralph Hasenhuttl retaining the trust of the Southampton board even despite taking only nine points from his first 13 Premier League matches last season. Yet it is increasingly true that the overwhelming story for those owners craving survival is that they have too much riding on it to even contemplate the thought of accepting relegation without exploring every avenue. As Sheffield United toil desperately, it would take a naive mind to believe that the club’s Saudi ownership will not consider their own course of remedial action although, in truth, that decision may already have come too late.

If Wilder is dismissed, it will be greeted with another round of indignation but a personal view is that a manager of a football team should not keep his job solely as a reward for having performed the role successfully in the past. To put it simply, an employer in any walk of life must have the expectation that the employee can maintain or improve performances and results in the future. If the employer loses confidence in their ability to do this, it is quite normal to make a change. In the case of Wilder, it may be that he is deemed the best man to lead a promotion push in the event the club is relegated, much like Daniel Farke at Norwich, but it would not be unreasonable of the club’s owner to wonder whether he is the best-suited individual to keep the club in the top flight this season.

For those with the courage to make unpopular decisions, there have been remarkable success stories. Leicester are now a side regularly pushing the top six of the Premier League. Yet where might they be if the club’s hierarchy had remained nostalgic for Claudio Ranieri’s title-winning campaign and allowed the Italian to continue in his role as the club sank down the Premier League table in 2017? Ranieri’s champions were a point above the relegation zone, and it was all very sad to see him leave, but the courage to be proactive has served the club well in the long-term. Southampton, equally, pulled the plug on Nigel Adkins and recruited Mauricio Pochettino in 2013. The club were not in grave peril when they took the decision but recognised that it might be possible to not only maintain standards but improve under different leadership.

Curiously, this proactive approach is less familiar higher up the table. The travails of Arteta have left many to wonder whether Arsene Wenger was treated too severely in his latter years but there may be an equally compelling case that Arsenal in fact waited too long, allowing his reign to “bottom out”, with star players walking out and supporters screaming into cameras before the curtain finally came down.

When Manchester United and Jose Mourinho parted ways, it came to feel more like an exorcism than a managerial sacking, such was the intensity of the dressing room feuds, the surly interviews and the choreographed discord between the manager and the boardroom. Two years into Solskjaer’s reign, conversation lingers over whether he is the right man to elevate United to their former glories yet it would appear to require a “bottoming out” for United to make a change.

A more measured and mature view may be to say that Solskjaer has stabilised the club commendably, recruited reasonably well and, at times, produced superb bursts of results or concocted individual game plans that have outwitted coaches as talented as Pep Guardiola, Thomas Tuchel and Julian Nagelsmann. Yet an honest analysis can also say that United’s performances belie their results and the team do not have a defined way of playing that is almost always necessary to win a Premier League title.

As such, would it be so outrageous to make a proactive decision, recognise a greater talent on the market and provide the new man with a stable base? For some at United, firing Solskjaer may be akin to shooting Bambi but in the cold environment of a billion-dollar business seeking to maximise its potential, it would be hard to dispute the logic. A similar case may soon be made on Frank Lampard, who can be commended on restoring Champions League football after a transfer ban but questioned as to whether he possesses the tools to guide a team to the very summit of the domestic and European game. Either call would be harsh but harsh does not necessarily equate to wrong.

For those seeking success, that tension between emotion and reason will rarely reconcile easily.

[Vesper 31,181]

How Slaven Bilic’s reign at West Brom unravelled

https://theathletic.com/2257769/2020/12/16/bilic-sacked-west-brom-allardyce/

Slaven Bilic’s 18-month reign at West Bromwich Albion is over and, barring any late hitches in negotiations, Sam Allardyce will be in charge for Sunday’s derby against Aston Villa.

Bilic and his coaching staff — Danilo Butorovic, Rean Racunica and Julian Dicks — were informed of Albion’s decision at a meeting this morning at Albion’s training ground.

Characteristically, Bilic took the news on the chin. There was a handshake with sporting and technical director Luke Dowling and CEO Xu Ke, who broke the news that had leaked last night.

The Croatian then asked for the chance to tell his players about his departure himself. There was shock and sadness in the squad which, by and large, had remained loyal to Bilic. But in the brutal world of football, Bilic then left the building and his team began the process of moving on. Albion’s players completed a recovery session with fitness coaches after last night’s excellent 1-1 draw at Manchester City. They will take tomorrow off, as per their schedule, and by the time they return on Friday to prepare to face Villa, Allardyce should be in place.

For Bilic and Albion’s fans, his sacking in the wake of their best defensive display of the season marks the end of a brief but enjoyable journey that helped reconnect supporters with their club.

But for Bilic and the club, this felt like a long time coming.

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On October 25, just three months after leading West Brom back to the Premier League at his first attempt, Bilic sat in his office at the club’s training ground. He was ready to resign.

As Bilic discussed his thoughts with his advisers, Albion were considering whether they should sack the man who had returned them to the top flight a year ahead of schedule.

The relationship between head coach and club had broken down to such an extent neither side could envisage it continuing beyond next summer, when the Croatian’s initial two-year contract would have expired. West Brom’s decision that week to sell defender Ahmed Hegazi and Bilic’s angry reaction to the deal had turned a small papercut into a gaping wound which seemed impossible to heal.

A short-term sticking plaster was the only hope.

Both sides pulled back from the brink over the next few days — Bilic persuaded by his closest confidants that it was not the time to walk away, Albion concluding conditions were not right to make a change.

In reality, Albion could not land any of the men they believed could do better than Bilic so decided to stand by their man.

But another eight weeks on, and with just one victory from the season’s first 13 Premier League games, Allardyce became available having previously been sounded out.

The club finally did the deed and ended a reign which, despite its relatively short life, was among the more eventful in Albion’s recent history.

The timing of the announcement brought shock among fans and pundits. Bilic had, after all, just overseen an excellent performance at Manchester City last night, claiming a point from a performance that was organised, resolute and full of spirit from a squad that rarely if ever wavered in support for Bilic.

But the decision to make a change had already been taken after too many previous displays in which such qualities had been lacking.

Albion’s decision-makers held Bilic ultimately responsible. The Croatian could quite fairly argue that Albion’s recruitment and budget in the summer had left him with little or no chance to keep them afloat, with a second-tier squad for a top-flight season.

But just 18 months after his appointment and only three after the joy of automatic promotion, Bilic has gone.

A relationship that began unravelling almost from day one has fallen apart.

In fact, even in the moment of triumph, the cracks were evident. As Bilic celebrated leading West Brom back to the Premier League in an empty Hawthorns on July 22, the sores that have led in part to his departure were quietly festering.

Disagreements between Bilic and the club — led in football terms by sporting and technical director Luke Dowling — date back to shortly after his appointment as head coach in the summer of 2019.

Having impressed Dowling and the club’s top brass with his aura and easy demeanour, former Croatia and West Ham United manager Bilic started work and… ran headlong into a recruitment dispute.

Albion had seen Dwight Gayle, their 23-league-goal loan star from the previous season, return to Newcastle United, while Jay Rodriguez, his 22-goal partner, was heading for the exit by virtue of a £10 million release clause in his contract. Replacing those 45 goals from their near-miss 2018-19 promotion campaign under Darren Moore and James Shan was Bilic’s No 1 priority.

Bilic’s well-publicised top target was the aptly-named Albian Ajeti of Swiss club Basel, while he also favoured a move for Vedat Muriqi, a Kosovan striker at Fenerbahce recommended by colleagues at his former club Besiktas. Ajeti signed eventually for top-flight West Ham instead while Muriqi headed for Serie A with Lazio, with Bilic feeling West Brom could have landed one or both had they moved sooner.

Albion however, with owner Guochuan Lai an increasingly distant figure, did not believe deals for Ajeti and Muriqi could be done within their means. Instead, they signed Kenneth Zohore from Championship rivals Cardiff City and Charlie Austin from top-flight Southampton, the latter with Bilic’s belated sign-off after a chat with that club’s former manager Ronald Koeman.

Austin was a qualified success in the promotion campaign with 10 league goals. Zohore, who was announced somewhat surprisingly as a £9 million signing, played almost no part with only five starts across the 46 games. Bilic was unimpressed with both signings to differing degrees.

Bilic landed countryman Filip Krovinovic, a player he had coveted for a while, on loan a few days into his reign and also got his way on the loan signings of Matheus Pereira and Grady Diangana, albeit after expressing private frustration at the length of time those deals took to complete.

And he signed off on bringing in Romaine Sawyers, Darnell Furlong and Semi Ajayi while calling off the search for a second right-back, choosing instead to promote an 18-year-old Nathan Ferguson from the academy after the home-grown youngster impressed in training.

But the disagreements over strikers and perceived delays on a couple of key deals sowed the seeds of the discord to come.

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Sometimes, your greatest strengths can also be your weaknesses.

In the eyes of Albion’s decision-makers, so it proved with Bilic.

At the training ground, the new boss made an immediate impression. His easy manner and big personality injected a shot of positivity and purpose into a club that, despite going close to promotion via the Championship play-offs in 2019, had not fully shaken off the debilitating effects of the slow Premier League decline and eventual relegation after the chaotic Alan Pardew reign either side of Christmas 2017.

Players and staff lauded Bilic’s man-management, his people skills and his ability to galvanise a first-team group still suffering the effects of a play-off semi-final defeat to local rivals Aston Villa on penalties a month earlier and the losses of Gayle, Rodriguez and key defender Craig Dawson.

His obvious passion and enthusiasm for the challenge gave Albion’s reshaped players a natural leader and offered the fans a rallying point around which to rediscover an affection for the club that had become worn down by the previous years’ struggles.

Bilic’s aura, status and personality were precisely the qualities West Brom needed, and he developed a happy knack of getting things right from the sidelines in his early weeks, too, building up reputational capital with supporters and players alike.

In last season’s opening games, with his new side still struggling for the fluency they would later find, Bilic’s substitutions changed several matches as Albion became adept at rescuing late points from the fire. A series of systemic and positional changes, most notably shifting Pereira to the No 10 role, also gave him and his coaches real credibility in the dressing room. Bilic and his staff found ways to make Albion potent despite their group of strikers often being anything but.

His 18-month reign contained many high points but it reached its zenith last December 8, when a swashbuckling team display, led by an inspirational Pereira, saw Swansea City battered 5-1 at The Hawthorns and confirmed West Brom’s status as the Championship’s most stylish outfit.

There were difficult times ahead, however, with a sequence of just one win in the next nine league games.

Questions were posed but Bilic appeared to have provided the answers. A change of system and a new role for Pereira brought about a second peak in Albion’s march to the Premier League.

It came together as his side defeated hosts Millwall and Storm Ciara for a landmark victory in early February and continued with memorable wins at Reading and Bristol City and a solid victory over Preston North End at The Hawthorns.

The team were flying again and Bilic’s stock was high.

Then came the first lockdown.

When football returned after a hiatus of more than three months, Albion were in the second automatic promotion place with a six-point lead over third-placed Fulham and a 10-point advantage over everyone else. Almost immediately, though, the club’s powers-that-be began to question Bilic.

Privately, they began to ask whether the passion that had served the club so well earlier in the season had begun to manifest itself in knee-jerk selections, inconsistent messages and an air of panic.

There was frustration among those around Bilic, with a perceived mental fragility in a team that failed to perform in pivotal post-lockdown fixtures, most notably in away losses to Brentford and Huddersfield Town and at home to Queens Park Rangers in a drawn season finale.

But within the boardroom there were concerns felt most acutely after defeat in Huddersfield in the penultimate game, when Bilic said, both publicly and within the dressing room, that Albion must prepare for the play-offs. The club’s decision-makers felt that message was premature and risked transmitting further nervousness to the players.

Eventually, Brentford felt the pressure too and lost their final match at home to Barnsley when victory would have sent them up with Leeds United instead, meaning Albion were rewarded for their pre-lockdown excellence with a deserved promotion.

But while the moment of triumph might ordinarily have been the cue for contract-renewal talks with your triumphant head coach, there was no such development.

Bilic’s doubts about West Brom, and their doubts about him, meant planning for the 2020-21 Premier League began with his future already uncertain.

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“It sometimes feels like we’ve been relegated to the Premier League, not promoted,” Bilic was heard to say privately in the aftermath of Hegazi’s mid-October sale.

The loss of the Egyptian defender was the incendiary move that projected Albion’s behind-the-scenes tensions into the public domain but the temperature had been rising throughout the summer as Bilic’s persistent doubts about recruitment returned to the surface.

Before heading back to Croatia for a post-season break, Bilic was shocked to learn the limits of their summer budget as they prepared to rejoin the elite.

He expressed that surprise in an interview in his homeland and, on his return to England, presented some ambitious transfer targets in the hope of persuading Albion owner Lai, via Dowling, to cough up more cash.

He was unsuccessful. Albion committed around £46 million in potential transfer fees for their return to the Premier League when add-ons and installments are taken into account. But the budget for up-front fees was only around £20 million.

Bilic believed the sum was not enough. Albion argued that, with a £25 million reduction in their allocation from the Premier League broadcast deal due to COVID-19, they spent every penny they could.

The remainder of the summer window became a battle of wills as both Bilic and the club steeled themselves for what they suspected would be a hugely difficult season.

There were disagreements over Diangana, a successful loan signing in the promotion-winning side who Bilic wanted back. While keen to re-sign the West Ham United winger, Bilic expressed concerns that the fee of up to £18 million would eat up too much of the club’s limited summer funds and even believed another loan deal for Diangana would be possible later in the window. But Dowling and Albion pressed ahead with the early-September deal, believing that signing a young English player with obvious re-sale value on a long-term contract was an exciting football move and a shrewd financial investment.

There were doubts within the boardroom of the merits of re-signing Krovinovic but Bilic pushed hard and Dowling finally struck another season-long loan deal for the midfielder — again only after protracted negotiations had saved Albion some vital money but left Bilic frustrated at these delays in building his squad.

Dowling believed full-backs and a holding midfielder should have been higher up the list of transfer priorities. Bilic wanted to strengthen in the same areas but not at the expense of Krovinovic and Karlan Grant, the striker who emerged as his top summer target.

Having investigated a move for Brentford’s Ollie Watkins, who ended up at Villa, Bilic instead set his sights on Grant and grew increasingly frustrated at a lack of progress on a deal for him. Dowling eventually agreed to pay for Huddersfield’s Grant in six instalments and Bilic got his man, but not before more ill-feeling had been created at having to start the Premier League campaign without him.

Dowling pushed for Brighton & Hove Albion’s Shane Duffy at centre-back but Bilic was not keen and eventually hung his hat on the experience of 36-year-old former Chelsea favourite Branislav Ivanovic. Dowling also did a deal for Wigan Athletic’s Cedric Kipre, as a raw young defender at the right price who could be an investment for the future. Bilic was unconvinced of its merits.

Bilic felt sold short. Dowling argued he had stretched a meagre budget as far as he could.

When the season finally began, the Albion board felt Bilic needed to provide more pragmatic answers to the difficult problems he faced. Those around Bilic felt the playing group was simply not strong enough, irrespective of how it was used.

Then came Hegazi’s move to Al-Ittihad of Saudi Arabia, after the domestic window had shut. For Albion, the deal for a player who had figured only sporadically under Bilic in the Championship was a no-brainer — and a transfer the head coach had effectively sanctioned earlier in the transfer window when plans were discussed to raise funds.

For Bilic, though, the landscape had changed since those conversations, with Hegazi’s successful return to the side in a goalless draw with Burnley one week before his sale, and the deal represented the loss of a first-team player.

He was doubly aggrieved that chief executive Xu Ke asked for his thoughts on the prospective transfer a few days before it happened, only to overlook his wish to keep the player.

Bilic was angry and spoke about resigning before being dissuaded.

Albion were ready to sack Bilic in the wake of the 2-0 loss at Fulham on November 2 but looked at the available replacements and, with Allardyce at that stage not in the running, decided none of them appealed.

The relationship with Bilic continued for a while but in the long term, it was irreparable and eventually results and performances gave Dowling, Xu and Lai justification for pulling the trigger.

They resolved to make a change after the 2-1 defeat at Newcastle on Saturday, having been pushed towards it by the 5-1 loss to Crystal Palace in the previous game.

Unable to get Allardyce, another candidate or a caretaker boss through COVID-19 testing in time for Tuesday’s trip to Manchester City, they left Bilic in charge. In the harsh world of football, it was a cold, calculated decision.

Yet still, it left a sour taste to see a man as likable as Bilic left exposed to such embarrassment.

Thankfully, Bilic’s team produced a stout, defensive display that at least gave him a palatable send-off.

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Had a stand-out candidate been readily available, Albion would have moved earlier to replace Bilic.

It had been clear for a while that his reign was living on borrowed time with no realistic prospect of a contract extension.

Now they have taken the leap, however, but the same issue persists — Allardyce may be the favourite to take over but the news has already split the fanbase as much as the decision to remove Bilic.

Allardyce, Black Country-born and briefly an Albion coach under Brian Talbot, specialises in survival missions but his boyhood affinity for Wolves will be an issue for a small number of Albion fans and his style of play will concern a few more who have revelled in the return to expansive football under Bilic.

Dowling and Xu have concluded, however, that the 66-year-old’s experienced and battle-hardened qualities mean a below-par squad will have a better chance of over-achieving with him at the helm.

They will risk the potential backlash for what they believe is an improved hope of survival. With owner Guochuan Lai keen to find a buyer for his controlling stake, top-flight survival this season is paramount.

Whatever change they made would have been a calculated gamble. And whatever decision they reached, they will be hard-pressed to replace a man like Bilic, who seemed a perfect fit but saw his reign quickly unravel in sadness and a sense of unfulfilled potential.

Quite simply, Bilic helped Albion fans to fall in love with their club again. His reign was relatively short and ended sourly.

But the memories will endure.

[Vesper 31,181]

David de Gea at United: the past, the present and the future

https://theathletic.com/2263343/2020/12/17/de-gea-united-goalkeeper-henderson/

The rise, fall and subsequent rebalancing of David de Gea has been one of the most interesting stories of Manchester United’s post-Ferguson era. The club’s four-time Player of the Year, for a long period the Spaniard was the only United player consistently performing at a world-class level.

“Dave Saves” used to be a popular adage among United fans but that unfortunately became a joke for other football fans as the Spaniard encountered a sharp decline. Now battling Dean Henderson for the No 1 spot as well as opposition attackers, the 2020-21 season has been one of the biggest tests in the goalkeeper’s career.

This is The Athletic’s guide to David de Gea: past, present and potential future. 

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De Gea the goalkeeping demi-god

 

To properly explain De Gea’s fall, we have to chart his rise. Jose Mourinho claims United’s second-place finish in 2017-18 is one of his greatest-ever coaching accomplishments, and that was largely thanks to the efforts of his goalkeeper, as De Gea produced one of the greatest seasons by a goalkeeper in Premier League history. 

That season he was United’s very own version of Hans Brinker, the fictional Dutch speed skater who plugged a dike using just his finger. For De Gea, it was United’s defence that was leaking.

Look at the chart below and you can see just how good De Gea can be. The key thing you’re looking for is the “goals conceded” and “xGOT conceded” columns. The latter is a metric that measures the expected goals on target an individual goalkeeper faces and then equates how many goals an “average” goalkeeper would concede. If you swapped De Gea for an average goalkeeper in 2017-18 then United would have conceded closer to 39 goals, rather than the 25 they actually did. As the goals prevented column will show you, De Gea was the difference between almost 14 goals conceded for United that season. On 14 occasions fans exclaimed “How has that not gone in?” and the answer was: “Because Dave Saves”.

(All the data in this piece is provided by Opta and excludes penalties and own goals)

There is a more than reasonable case to be put that without De Gea that season, United would have finished fifth in the league rather than second. There’s a reasonable argument in saying that De Gea’s 2017-18 is one of the greatest seasons a goalkeeper has ever produced in the Premier League. It is one of the greatest seasons a player, either outfield or goalkeeper has had without either winning the league title or being the nucleus of a side that narrowly avoids relegation. A team as monied as United should have a defence that protects its goalkeeper rather than the other way around, but in 2017-18, De Gea’s Herculean performances helped a team that often played to less than the sum of its part.

Then came 2018-19, where De Gea went from demi-god to something very human.

So, what happened?

Teams find out De Gea’s weakness

To remix an old boxing quote, De Gea “grew old in the ring”, the cumulative wear and tear of all of these battles diminishing his otherworldly glow. Another unfortunate byproduct of De Gea’s form is, like with many a superstar player, increased scrutiny led to his greatest strength being used against him.

Teams figured out the Spaniard is one of the best goalkeepers in the world at making saves with his feet, and began shooting earlier and from a greater distance, in order to test him before he could get into proper position to make saves in the way that he prefers. A goal conceded to Marcos Alonso in United’s 1-1 draw with Chelsea in April 2019 epitomised the career nadir for the goalkeeper.

Antonio Rudiger attempted a long-range effort from a central area to test De Gea, but rather than try to collect the ball the goalkeeper parried it right into the path of an onrushing Alonso, who converted for a tap-in.

It was his third error in four games (all competitions) that led to a goal that season. That was as many as De Gea had made in his previous 123. After that result The Athletic wrote that De Gea had a “glitch” in his goalkeeping, referring to the eight goals he had conceded to efforts from outside the penalty area.

By the season’s end the decline was clear – in 2018-19 De Gea was an average Premier League goalkeeper. That doesn’t sound bad until you realise the difference between the 10th-best goalkeeper in the land and the fourth-best is what possibly cost United a finish in the Champions League spaces that season. De Gea was the difference between 14 goals being conceded in 2017-18, able to bail his team out when the defence switched off, but in 2018-19, with his defence still asleep (contrast the ball watching from his back four to Alonso’s movement in the first screenshot above), De Gea’s difference was negligible at best. His -0.1 goals prevented indicates that while De Gea probably still had some of his tricks about him (his performance in United’s 1-0 victory over Spurs at Wembley in January 2019 saw him make 11 saves in one game — a Premier League record for a goalkeeper while keeping a clean sheet), there was a flaw to his game that sides were exploiting. 

This is one of the crueller aspects of top-tier goalkeeping; teams are constantly trying to find flaws in your game, forcing you to either adapt and develop, or stumble in stature. (One only has to look at Joe Hart’s struggles once his very particular weakness became known.) In the space of a season, De Gea had gone from someone who papered over United’s cracks, to needing someone to hide his. 

Which brings us to Dean Henderson…

De Gea vs Henderson

The 2019-20 season introduced a new threat to De Gea, that of Henderson’s performances at Sheffield United. 

When comparing De Gea to the on-loan Henderson at Sheffield United, it is important to remember their position in relation to the rest of the team.

Henderson spent last season as the final line of defence in a bold unit that, at times, had two of their three centre-halves upfield along with both wing-backs. The sight of Henderson and one other defender ahead of him, as the rest of the Sheffield United team got forward, was not that uncommon, and as such Henderson made for an aggressive goalkeeper, marshalling his penalty area and the space beyond it. Take a look at this screenshot below of Henderson distributing the ball late on in a game against Chelsea last season. His Sheffield United team are 3-0 up and he is all by himself…

At Manchester United, De Gea is supposed to be the final line of defence in a team that largely defends in a middle block — the team’s backline is between De Gea’s penalty area and the halfway line — while the attacking unit applies good pressure higher up the pitch. De Gea was not the aggressor shooting off his goal-line to make saves and stop counters in the same way Henderson was, as he typically had one of Aaron Wan-Bissaka or Harry Maguire to make those challenges for him, and then either the United captain or Victor Lindelof either side of him to pass to when he was taking goal kicks.

That said, De Gea and Henderson displayed markedly different stopping values last season. The following graphics look to illustrate the manner in which either goalkeeper makes saves on shots faced last season.

Yellow dots indicate saves made, while red dots indicate a shot that went in, The larger the dot, the greater the goalscoring opportunity (the higher the xG value).

As you can see above, De Gea was a decent-to-good shot-stopping goalkeeper last season, brave in his one-v-ones and able to cover his corners. There are some centralised shots that you’d like him to be stopping (look for the smaller red dots on the image above, think back to Steven Bergwin’s shot against United in their first Project Restart game), but in the Premier League at least, De Gea was an adequate goalkeeper. (See those yellow dots in the top corners? De Gea can still be incredibly agile when making saves.)

Over at Sheffield United, Henderson was more than adequate. While he conceded the same amount of goals as Dea Gea (32 without penalties and own goals), Henderson’s “xGOT conceded” value (or goals an average goalkeeper would concede) is 39.4, meaning there were around seven shots when Henderson made a save that would make you get out of your seat and applaud. 

Last season Henderson’s performances stopped Sheffield United from conceding seven extra goals that probably “should” have gone in. He was an aggressive shot-stopper, blessed with strong wrists and a never-say-die attitude. (The cluster of red dots on the left of the chart may raise eyebrows among opposition scouts as to a potential weakness. This is not bad, but perhaps watch if Henderson can make saves quickly to his right in the future.)

Both De Gea and Henderson conceded the same number of goals (excluding own goals and penalties) last season — De Gea faced and conceded three penalties in 2019-20, while Henderson faced three, saved one and conceded one while the third was missed.

The difference was that Henderson, although facing fewer shots on target, had to deal with chances of greater quality. As mentioned earlier, the xGOT conceded value of the shots he faced was 39.4; De Gea’s was 33.

It’s also important to look at how each goalkeeper was making saves last season. De Gea’s strength may be in jutting out his legs to make saves, but, as you can see below, Henderson ability with his feet last season was still among some of the league’s best.

To sum up, last season De Gea was once again performing slightly below average in the league, but had enough about him to suggest that if properly protected by his defence he could still be the No 1 in a decent United side. 

However, Henderson had performed in such a manner for Sheffield United to suggest that if United’s defence were unable to properly protect De Gea, then Henderson could be fast-tracked to the No 1 position once he returned at the end of his loan deal. 

Readers may remember The Athletic suggested Henderson be given the starting goalkeeper position in the Premier League and De Gea be given the chance to show there was still fight in the (older) dog during Champions League and League Cup outings. That did not come to pass, with De Gea continuing to start in both domestic and European competitions, while Henderson has had to make do with League Cup outings and one start in the Premier League and Champions League respectively.

So, how has De Gea coped with the responsibility this season?

The now and what happens next

Here’s a sentence that feels weird to write: David de Gea is an average Premier League goalkeeper. 

Before the Manchester derby the Spaniard had a save percentage of exactly 50 per cent, the man who used to be a goalkeeping demi-god now the equivalent of a coin toss when shots are fired. 

In fact, when you look at De Gea’s save percentage totals in the Premier League across the years, you get an illuminating look at Manchester United’s post-Ferguson cycles. The Spaniard’s lowest-ever save percentage in a full season came under David Moyes in 2013-14, a season that United earned their lowest league position. United’s highest ever league finish after Ferguson’s retirement came in 2017-18, when De Gea earned a save percentage above 80 per cent. So, in a season when Solskjaer’s United often look a coin toss away from winning or losing games, it’s little surprise that De Gea’s save percentage at the moment is around 50 per cent in the Premier League.

Fifteen goals conceded in nine games seems bad, but we must apply a little context and remember results such as the 6-1 defeat against Spurs that De Gea was part of.

De Gea went into the 2020-21 season with a very confident, very talented and very loud challenger in Henderson (literally, you can hear him shout “Up! Up! Up!” from the sideline of games) and he has defended his position as No 1 to a decent degree.

Now, to be very clear, these numbers register the retrospective actions (or inactions) of a goalkeeper in order to evaluate them primarily as shot-stoppers. A save is the culmination of a sequence of smaller decisions including things such as foot placement, hand position, communication with your back line and an appreciation of angles and timing. 

As De Gea has proven in his league games this season, his approach to goal kicks, often opting to play it short, makes him a better stylistic fit for a United side that has designs from building out the back. Compare that screengrab of Henderson taking a goal kick from above to this United situation in the derby against City.

United tend to play it short as it allows them to involve players like Maguire and Luke Shaw, who are vital to how the team builds up passing sequences. It also lulls the opposition deeper into their half, allowing for those dangerous United counter-attacks.  Henderson’s approach, preferring longer direct passes, may have helped United get a goal against West Ham (kind of), but some concessions in playing style will have to be made, both from him and his back line, if he is to replace De Gea as United’s starting goalkeeper in the immediate future.

That said, it looks like Henderson is more confident goal at the moment. While we have tried to keep this piece Premier League-focused, compare De Gea’s reaction to Justin Kluivert’s goal against RB Leipzig in the Champions League, where he fails to properly extend himself and attack the ball…

… to that of Henderson in United’s win over West Ham. First, he goes big…

… then he attacks Fornals…

If you are reading this and part of you is thinking “De Gea has done nothing to indicate he should be dropped”, while another part thinks “De Gea has also done nothing to indicate he should continue as starting goalkeeper”, then you’ve hit the chewy nougat of the situation that Ole Gunnar Solskjaer finds himself in. 

Whether United can progress with an average shot-stopper, one who is one of their highest-paid players in excess of £375,000 a week, is another story. There was once a point when David de Gea was asked to do everything for this United defence and he succeeded. Then there was a point where he could no longer operate at those superhuman levels and some believed he was finished. Now the Spaniard looks capable of doing some things for this United defence, so it becomes a point either for United’s back four to give him greater protection, or for Solskjaer to roll the dice and give Henderson a proper run as goalkeeper.

[Vesper 31,181]

FA charge Edinson Cavani for using racial term in Instagram post

https://theathletic.com/news/manchester-united-edinson-cavani-instagram/7ZmzeOf2RvVG

The Football Association has charged Manchester United striker Edinson Cavani with misconduct in relation to a social media post that used a racial term, reports Laurie Whitwell. Cavani “sincerely apologised” for using the word “negrito” in a social media post following Manchester United’s 3-2 win at Southampton in November. Cavani now faces the prospect of a minimum three-match ban. In a statement United said “the player and the club will now consider the charge and respond to the FA accordingly.”

What happened?

On November 29, Cavani came off the bench for United and scored a double as they came back from 2-0 down to beat Southampton 3-2.

After the game, he reposted an image from a fan to his story on Instagram, adding the caption “gracias negrito”. The phrase loosely translates to “thanks little black person”.

Cavani went on to delete the post. “The message I posted after the game on Sunday was intended as an affectionate greeting to a friend, thanking him for his congratulations after the game. The last thing I wanted to do was cause offence to anyone,” he said in a statement.

“I am completely opposed to racism and deleted the message as soon as it was explained that it can be interpreted differently. I would like to sincerely apologise for this.”

What has the FA charged him with?

The FA stated: “Edinson Cavani has been charged with misconduct for a breach of FA Rule E3, in relation to a social media post on Thursday 29 November 2020.

“It is alleged that, contrary to FA Rule E3.1, a comment posted on the Manchester United FC player's Instagram page was insulting and/or abusive and/or improper and/or brought the game into disrepute.

“It is further alleged that the comment constitutes an 'Aggravated Breach', which is defined in FA Rule E3.2, as it included a reference, whether express or implied, to colour and/or race and/or ethnic origin.

“The striker has until Monday 4 January 2021 to provide a response to the charge.”

What punishment does he face?

Cavani faces a minimum three-game ban.

FA sanctioning guidelines for aggravated breaches of this nature advise a ban between six and 12 games in almost all cases. But sanctions below that standard range can be imposed where an offence is ‘in writing only or via any communication device’ and another specific mitigating factor is present.

The rules also make it clear that the owners of social media accounts are responsible for any content posted from their account, whether by themselves or by a third party.

Deleting an inappropriate post does not necessarily prevent a punishment from being imposed. Last season, Manchester City midfielder Bernardo Silva was suspended for one match after posting and then deleting a tweet comparing his teammate Benjamin Mendy to the cartoon figure on a brand of Spanish chocolate.

How have United responded?

The Athletic understands that Manchester United are attempting to offset such punishment by providing “cultural context”, as revealed in David Ornstein's weekly column.

One aspect to be put forward is that the term has been used by Cavani and his close circle as a specific nickname for the friend in question, with written evidence available. In the offending message the Uruguayan striker was expressing thanks, giving an indication as to his meaning.

United issued the following statement on Thursday in response to the FA charge. “Manchester United and all of our players are fully committed to the fight against racism and we will continue to work with the FA - along with other governing bodies and organisations, and through our own campaigns - in that regard.

“We note the FA decision today to charge Edinson Cavani for his social media reply to a friend's message of congratulations, following the Southampton game.

“Edinson and the club were clear that there was absolutely no malicious intent behind the message, which he deleted and apologised for, as soon as he was informed that it could have been misconstrued.

“The player and the club will now consider the charge and respond to the FA accordingly.”

 

[killer1257 3,282]

At least the FA is consistent [emoji23].

Gesendet von meinem VOG-L29 mit Tapatalk

[NikkiCFC 8,529]

Klopp who cries over 5 subs did not use ONE sub last night.

[Vesper 31,181]

2020-21 English Premier League

Aston Villa          
Burnley               

http://www.sportnews.to/sports/2020/premier-league-aston-villa-vs-burnley-s1/

http://www.dubsstreamz.com/totalepl17a1.php

https://www.totalsportek.com/aston-villa/

[Atomiswave 6,120]

So Vesper my friend, what kind of bullshittery will we witness in the united game tonight

[Vesper 31,181]

30 minutes ago, Atomiswave said:

So Vesper my friend, what kind of bullshittery will we witness in the united game tonight

VAR given dodgy pen

maybe a red car to SUFC for a bonus

[Vesper 31,181]

Liverpool, Tottenham and the battle for superiority

Sign up now! Sign up now! Sign up now? Sign up now!

It was them, no? Photograph: Clive Brunskill/AFP/Getty Images

Barry Glendenning  @bglendenning

IT’S ABOUT MORE THAN JUST WINNING Time was when fans of different clubs would bicker at great length about whose was the best, only for the teams in question to play against each and provide them with an answer. They were halcyon days, before heat maps, expected goals and green rectangles festooned with numbers, arrows and circles, the non-existence of which meant people were more or less happy to use the evidence of both the scoreboard and their own eyes to assess which of the two teams they were watching was better. Of course that was then and this is now, and with debate still raging over which was the better team in Liverpool’s victory over Tottenham Hotspur long after the final whistle was blown, a daily football email could be forgiven for wondering why the two teams bothered playing each other at all. What, after all, is the point in two sets of players going toe to toe on the field of play, if doing so only serves to provoke, rather than settle debate over which of them is superior?

Mourinho's firing of darts shows he believes Spurs can win the title | Jonathan Wilson Read more

Like many disputes before it, this one was prompted by comments made by José Mourinho, specifically his post-match claim that “the better team lost”. It is an arguably spurious view Liverpool fans greeted with post-match apoplexy on their Social Media Disgrace Twitter accounts, despite the cold-eyed and completely unjaundiced manner with which they usually greet any opinions that might be considered even mildly critical of their team or its glorious leader. In stark contrast, Spurs fans were quick to endorse their manager’s view, pointing out that despite having 0.00000001% of possession, their team created more clear-cut chances and would have won comfortably if: a) they’d scored more than one of them; hadn’t fallen victim to a fluke deflection; and c) had bothered keeping tabs on Bobby Firmino for that late corner. Valid points on both sides of this sophisticated debate then, The Fiver is sure you’ll agree. It is an argument that looks set to rumble tediously on until the season ends. And if, as seems quite likely, one of these teams goes on to win the title, then and only then will we know which of them is the better. Except we won’t know, because if Wednesday night’s frothing internet frenzy showed us nothing else, it’s that we have now reached a point of absurdity where teams attempting to decide superiority on the football pitch is merely the prelude to a series of far more unseemly squabbles elsewhere. LIVE ON BIG WEBSITE! Join Nick Ames from 6pm GMT for hot coverage of Fifa’s The Best Awards, before Simon Burnton guides you through Sheffield United 2-3 Manchester United at 8pm. QUOTE OF THE DAY “Leo Messi loves Barça, and I think he’ll consider the proposal the new Barcelona president makes him … it’s not about money, never has been; if it had, he would have taken very different decisions throughout his career. We have work hard to continue that beautiful story: Messi and Barcelona” – Joan Laporta, standing again to become president of Barcelona, tells Sid Lowe about his vision for the club.

The man himself. Photograph: Juan Medina/Reuters

RECOMMENDED LISTENING Football Weekly Extra is right here for you. FIVER LETTERS “Big Sam gets the West Brom job after all (yesterday’s Fiver). A kick in the swingers might have been a better Christmas present” – JJ Zucal. “I suspect Paul Sheppard’s hero, Paul Moulden (yesterday’s Fiver letters) will now have every hungry Boltonian turning up with a home-made Bournemouth face mask expecting a free fish supper (or since it’s Bolton, a complimentary John Bull, chips and curry sauce). That great goal against Newcastle is going to cost him dearly” – John Myles. Send your letters to [email protected]. And you can always tweet The Fiver via @guardian_sport. Today’s winner of our prizeless letter o’the day prize is … John Myles. RECOMMENDED SHOPPING Available at our print shop now, Tom Jenkins’s pictures of the past decade. There’s also a Gazza picture, one of Pelé, another of Kenny Dalglish and this Bobby Moore one too. NEWS, BITS AND BOBS Edinson Cavani has been charged with misconduct by the FA for using the word “negrito” on some social media disgrace and could be banned for three matches if found guilty. David Elleray reckons VAR’s benefits outweigh its problems. “It’s clear that football is fairer, but it’s also clear that [it] has had an impact on the flow of the game,” he whistled. Bad news for Jürgen Klopp and co: Premier League clubs have voted against the proposal to allow five substitutes, although the number allowed on the bench has increased to nine. Arsenal fans will doubtless be gratified to hear that Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang has solved all the club’s problems in the wake of their 10 men holding Southampton to a draw. “We have to stay cool in the head and try to be a little more intelligent,” he advised, “and try to stay with 11 on the pitch.” Barcelona came from behind to beat La Liga leaders Real Sociedad and Cristiano Ronaldo missed a penalty – it’s all going off in our Euro roundup. And $tevie Mbe is sifting through the remains of the Pope’s Newc O’Rangers’ 27-game unbeaten run, after they were knocked out of the CIS Insurance Cup by St Mirren. “You’ve got two choices. You either let it linger and feel sorry for yourself, or you react in the right way,’” he roared. “You stand up and be counted.”

A moody shot under the lights in Paisley. Photograph: Stuart Wallace/BPI/Rex/Shutterstock

STILL WANT MORE? It’s Jonathan Wilson – tiny violin in one hand and pen in the other – on poor, misunderstood, put-upon José. Meanwhile, Barney Ronay writes a love letter to Curtis Jones. Nicky Bandini contemplates the potential end of a love story between Atalanta and Papu Gómez. Jonathan Liew’s piece on West Brom features a particularly fetching picture of Big Sam. Specially-designed boots for women – featuring narrow heels and changed studs – are finally here. Suzanne Wrack tells all. YouTube of the classic variety. David Hytner on the three As: anxiety, Aubameyang and Arsenal.

Gabriel gets ready to see red. Photograph: Stuart MacFarlane/Arsenal FC/Getty Images

Oh, and if it’s your thing … you can follow Big Website on Big Social FaceSpace. And INSTACHAT, TOO! ONE MORE SLEEP TILL THE FIVER CHRISTMAS AWARDS

[Atomiswave 6,120]

28 minutes ago, Vesper said:

VAR given dodgy pen

maybe a red car to SUFC for a bonus

Highly highly probable

[Vesper 31,181]

25 chances so far for Villa

still nil nil

[Vesper 31,181]

nil nil FT

insane they drew that

27 attempts

[Vesper 31,181]

2020-21 English Premier League

Sheffield United                 
Manchester United           

http://www.sportnews.to/sports/2020/premier-league-sheffield-united-vs-manchester-united-s1/

https://www.totalsportek.com/manchester-united-weekend/

[Vesper 31,181]

Ampadu starts

and must be wondering what fresh hell he has wondered into

[Atomiswave 6,120]

10 minutes ago, Vesper said:

nil nil FT

insane they drew that

27 attempts

Not being clinical will always bite you in the ass somehow

[Vesper 31,181]

lol

1 nil Sheff U

[Special Juan 28,871]

Henderson proving he is still Sheff Utd's best player

[Blue Armour 4,759]

18 hours ago, Vesper said:

took Pep one season at Shitty, and then he won the league back to back, including 100 points and 98 points

he won the league the first 3 years in a row he was at Barca, won the CL his first and third years

Pep won the league his first 3 years at Bayern as well, won the FIFA World Club Championship his first year

I would prefer we compare only PL seasons, and not other leagues simply because of the level of competition involved., but even if we do accept that Pep did all this, what does it mean?

For example does it make Klopp bad given that he took longer to deliver a league title? Given time, he's also ended up churning out trophies and breaking league records.

My point is you cant use comparisons with other managers at this stage of Lampards managerial career, and certainly not at this stage of the season.

All this talk of other managerial candidates like Pochettino, etc. is premature. If the team is languishing in relegation spots, fair enough. Making a call at the end of the season is also fair, but not now.

17 hours ago, Jason said:

Fair sentiment but Klopp had achieved success and had a track record of building a successful team over time back in Germany before going to Liverpool. Hence, there was likely the trust by their board that he will get things right eventually when he joined them.

But with Lampard? He hasn't had the same or even similar achievement before managing us. So, we have nothing whatsoever to fall back on and have to judge him and his work based on what he's doing right now. He is still a relatively inexperienced manager and he's learning on the go. Whether it's fair or not on him, we're basically being "forced" to judge him based on his current work because he hasn't done anything of such in the past. I don't think Lampard has failed in this job but I also don't think he has fully convinced yet. Moreover, giving a manager time is one thing but we also do not want to give it for the sake of it. Otherwise, we could easily end up with a situation like Solskjaer at Man United, where he has been there for like 2 years and they are still yo-yoing between being good and bad on a regular basis. 

He can be criticized/judged, fair enough. I've been questioning him too.

Just feel that all this talk of replacement managers is a bit premature. Especially given the point you made,.he may not have fully convinced yet., but he has not failed like some are claiming.

Its risky having a manager-in-training in charge, but my point is the club can deal with it until the league position becomes too dangerous.

[Blue Armour 4,759]

6 hours ago, Vesper said:

Arsenal FC: The decline

https://theathletic.com/2265368/2020/12/17/arsenal-fc-the-decline/

How did we get here? Arsenal are 15th in the 20-team Premier League, substantially closer to its relegation zone than the Champions League places. There is a surreal quality to their plight and a cautionary tale about the careful management of a football club. Spirits may have been raised by a dogged 1-1 draw with 10 men at home to Southampton, but the table still makes for bleak reading. As we approach the crucial Christmas period, Arsenal — one of the supposed “big six” — find themselves in the bottom six.

That Arsenal will be relieved to have taken a point for the first time in five home games tells you how far they have fallen. The speed at which the optimism of the summer has evaporated is shocking, but for those familiar with the club, not altogether surprising.

Newer staff talk of the need for a fundamental change in the culture and mentality at London Colney — that if Arsenal continue to exist in a comfort zone, they will continue to slide. They feel that standards have slipped over such a long period that bad habits have become ingrained and not addressed. Sometimes it requires a fresh pair of eyes to tell you who you really are. These insiders feel that without a winning culture, without a different level of standards and expectations, Arsenal’s potential will remain unfulfilled. They feel that the training ground at Colney is a haven where outside noise and criticism doesn’t breach the walls when it should be an elite competitive environment.

There is a distinction to be drawn between the current crisis at Arsenal and their broader decline. While one seems to have swept in overnight, the other has been years in the making. If the responsibility for results must sit largely with the incumbent manager, blame for the wider malaise is more widely shared. This failure has many fathers. 

Manager Mikel Arteta and his staff certainly have their share of culpability, something which the Arsenal manager readily admits. He is not inclined to shirk responsibility, telling the media on the eve of the Southampton game: “We have to take the bullets. We are not winning football matches and you have to put your chest there.”

Arsenal will desperately hope this point against Southampton represents a turning point — this is their worst start to a season since 1974-75 after all. After the defeat to Burnley in the previous game, Arteta was so disappointed and frustrated that he did not speak to the players after the game, preferring to address them at the training ground the next day. Behind the scenes, the club’s leadership have stressed the importance of simply not losing. Arsenal and Arteta will take the spirited second half against Southampton as a sign of the players’ continuing faith.

Even if there are justifiable questions over this squad of players, they are surely better than they have shown of late. Arteta arrived just under a year ago and adopted a system and style of play that saw Arsenal achieve some impressive results during Project Restart this past summer, but his tactical grip on the team seems to have slipped. Arsenal have now won just one of their last nine Premier League games.

To his credit, Arteta has tried to tackle the culture head-on, albeit with mixed results. Consistently applying his behavioural “non-negotiables” has proved increasingly difficult, with some accusations of double standards. There was also some anger within the club when Willian was permitted to start the match against Leeds United after his unauthorised trip to Dubai. The feeling from some quarters was that other players have been more harshly punished for less serious transgressions. Indiscipline has crept in both on and off the pitch. Since Arteta took charge, no team has received more than Arsenal’s seven red cards. Some people speak of punctuality being an issue at training.

While Arteta retains strong support from the majority of the squad, some divisions have emerged — perhaps inevitable when the group is so large and many players are short of game time. An unsuccessful team is a frustrated team. The desire to turn things around has led to the atmosphere at London Colney becoming more fractious of late. The Athletic understands David Luiz was unhappy to be left out of the trip to Manchester United last month as an injury precaution. The player felt fully fit and consequently cut a frustrated figure when left behind.

Many close to Arsenal have labelled Arteta’s job title change from head coach “a mistake” — a premature commitment to a manager whose stock has suddenly fallen.

Sources believe the team is suffering primarily due to poor finishing and red cards, and that their fortunes will soon change. Technical director Edu also admitted in the Arsenal fans’ forum this week that it’s clear “a player with creativity in the middle” is needed.

The Athletic understands that Arteta’s position remains secure. The sense those familiar with the club’s executive team have is the young coach is regarded as a long-term appointment they remain utterly committed to. Despite being on a learning curve himself, Arteta is viewed internally as more of the solution than the problem.

Nevertheless, the speed with which crisis has enveloped Arteta feels astounding. Nobody, including the club’s executives and owners, anticipated this. Just four months ago, he was lifting the FA Cup at Wembley — a triumph that seemed to signal the start of a bold new era. Since then the pedestal on which Arteta was raised has crumbled beneath him. 

This has not, however, happened overnight.

Football emergencies, like economic emergencies, seem to arrive slowly, and then all at once. As dramatic as this reversal of fortunes feels, the fault lines have been there for some time. Some at Arsenal speak of deeper cultural problems which are yet to be overcome. Plot a course of the club’s Premier League standing since their title win in 2004, and the five FA Cups won across that period begin to look like anomalous spikes along that broader trend of decline.

If Arsenal finish outside the Champions League places this year, it will mean a fifth consecutive season of failing to be among the Premier League’s end of season top four. This is, to coin a phrase appropriate for 2020, their very own new normal.

For Arsenal fans, that one question looms large: how did we get here? 

---

Arsenal’s owners knew that the period following Arsene Wenger’s departure would be difficult. They had the good fortune to observe Manchester United wrestling with the loss of Sir Alex Ferguson and sought to learn from their mistakes.

United had been hit with a one-two punch in losing not just Ferguson but also chief executive David Gill in the same summer of 2013. Gill, who had been a senior figure at Old Trafford since 1997, left his post to take up a role on UEFA’s executive committee. Instead of working alongside an experienced CEO, Ferguson’s successor David Moyes found himself teamed with Ed Woodward, a man new to the job.

Arsenal sought to do all they could to assemble an executive team robust enough to support Wenger’s successor. In the months before Unai Emery’s appointment, then-chief executive Ivan Gazidis recruited Raul Sanllehi to be head of football relations and Sven Mislintat as head of recruitment. Contracts expert Huss Fahmy was hired to replace Dick Law. The idea was to assemble a team of specialists who, under Gazidis’ direction, could steer the club forward.

Then, a bolt from the blue. Offered a post at AC Milan, Gazidis quit. Despite their best-laid plans, the club suddenly found themselves in precisely the same situation as United: losing a legendary manager and long-term CEO in the space of just a few months.

Gazidis’ departure set in motion a game of executive musical chairs that has continued at considerable pace for more than two years.

The list of executive departures since that summer of 2018 is quite something: Gazidis, Mislintat, director of high performance Darren Burgess, analytics expert Jaeson Rosenfeld, head of international scouting Francis Cagigao, Sanllehi and finally Fahmy have all moved on.

At each turn, Arsenal have sought to promote internally: Sanllehi and Vinai Venkatesham succeeded Gazidis on the outgoing CEO’s recommendation. When Sanllehi left earlier this summer, incumbent managing director Venkatesham and Edu effectively assumed his responsibilities.

While the club take pride in promoting “Arsenal” people, it’s fair to query whether the net was cast sufficiently wide in the search for football expertise. Were these the best appointments, or simply the most convenient? 

The latest iteration of Arsenal’s executive hierarchy has seen Arteta’s role change from the original title of head coach to “manager”. While some see this promotion as a natural consequence of the Spaniard’s hands-on, holistic leadership style, others close to the club have characterised it as a hasty and ultimately unnecessary move. They argue it has burdened a young coach with responsibilities he does not need.

As head coach, Arteta’s specific focus was on player management, training sessions, team preparation and opposition analysis. His sole objective was to maximise the performance potential of the first team. The club’s previous model was designed to shield Arteta from distractions and complications — Edu and Fahmy would lead any additional technical and organisation matters, Per Mertesacker would handle the academy and Sanllehi would co-ordinate the team and shield them from additional pressure. Arteta’s repositioning means he officially plays a more active role in wider club matters, such as transfers and operational matters, something he was happy to take on.

While each of their individual records is open to debate, the departure of highly experienced football people in Cagigao, Mislintat, Rosenfeld and Sanllehi has left Arsenal looking a little green. Arteta, Edu and Venkatesham are all highly regarded but are 38, 42 and 39 respectively. Arteta is a first-time manager, Venkatesham a first-time chief executive. While Edu has fulfilled similar roles with Brazilian club Corinthians and that country’s FA, his experience in European football is limited.

Last season, Arsenal’s board proposed the addition of club legend David O’Leary to provide some football-oriented oversight. The suggestion was dismissed, but would perhaps gain more traction now.

Arsenal argue their new structure makes them more efficient; their detractors believe they may simply be too light on expertise. Much of the recent reshuffle has been attributed to new board appointment Tim Lewis. Although an avid Arsenal fan, his background is in law rather than football. Arsenal have confirmed they intend to replace Fahmy as contract negotiator, but with the January transfer window two weeks away, there has as yet been no addition.

It is difficult to decipher whether Arsenal landed on this current structure by accident or design. The owners could do nothing about Gazidis’ departure, but did his blueprint for the future have to be torn up? Some within the hierarchy feel they now have a more clear, dynamic way of working but until results follow, those assertions will be challenged.

US owners Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE) acted decisively to remove Sanllehi, but should he have been more directly replaced? Certainly, some sources close to the club feel there is a lack of direction from on high now and that that instability is seeping through to the squad. Others, who have worked for KSE at Arsenal, speak gratefully of the autonomy they have been granted, but have the owners been guilty of showing too much trust?

---

One of the consequences of the executive churn at Arsenal has been a disjointed transfer strategy.

Their management team has a youthful look, which would seemingly suggest a club adopting a long-term approach. That has been undercut by several short-term decisions: as recently as this summer, Arsenal handed lucrative contracts to Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang, Willian and David Luiz — three players already over 30. They also spent £45 million on Thomas Partey, who at 27 offers no guarantee of retaining resale value.

This is not new.

Since January 2018, Arsenal have signed several players already in or beyond their late 20s: Henrikh Mkhitaryan (29 on arrival), Aubameyang (28), Stephan Lichtsteiner (34), Sokratis (30), Luiz (32), Cedric Soares (28), Willian (32) and Partey. As well as that, they gave a club-record £350,000 per week contract to a 29-year-old Mesut Ozil. So far, Arsenal have not recouped a penny on any of those deals. In most cases, it’s unlikely they ever will.

It’s possible to mount a credible case for each of those decisions in isolation: Willian (below) brings huge Premier League experience, for example; Cedric offers depth and versatility; Luiz is a leader.

Placed alongside each other, however, they begin to tell a story of a club making costly and arguably rash outlays in the hope of securing an immediate return to the Champions League. It is difficult to argue for the success of that strategy: consider the money sunk into these contracts with little hope of return.

If Chelsea, who knew Willian’s qualities intimately from his seven seasons with them, only considered him worthy of a two-year deal, how did Arsenal justify offering him three years?

Arsenal have adopted a “win now” policy with a manager and executive team who are still developing. It does not appear to add up.

The tension between the short term and long term defines Arsenal’s predicament. There are those among the club’s leadership who believe they won’t be truly competitive until after 2022, when their young players have sufficiently developed and many of the current squad will have moved on, taking some of the club’s old culture with them. While some are content with that timeline, others worry that’s too long to wait, and that the club must find a faster route back to the top.

In the case of Aubameyang, Arsenal granted him a three-year contract this summer at the age of 31. While the decision was largely welcomed by the fans, some close to the club wondered if it was necessary. As The Athletic exclusively revealed in July, the attacker’s original contract from January 2018 granted the club a purchase option on an additional year. Triggering that would have forcibly extended Aubameyang’s contract until 2022. Ultimately both Arsenal and the player’s camp chose to disregard the clause.

Arsenal do spend money. Since the summer of 2016 — an ultimately disappointing window in which the club acquired Shkodran Mustafi, Granit Xhaka and Lucas Perez for the best part of £100 million — The Athletic estimates the club have spent almost £500 million in the transfer market, as well as the significant compensation outlay for dismissing Wenger, Emery and their staffs. The constant change in coaching and executive positions, however, has meant the strategy behind this transfer expenditure has never appeared particularly coherent.

After signing Xhaka, Wenger described him that September as a “box-to-box midfielder”. By the November, he had changed his tune entirely, telling reporters this Swiss “is more a deep playmaker than a box-to-box player”.

Arsenal then broke their transfer record twice in the space of six months to sign Alexandre Lacazette and then Aubameyang, seemingly without a clear plan of how the two centre-forwards might play together. Promising centre-half William Saliba was acquired fully 17 months ago, but is yet to play a competitive game for the club — and now the recruitment department is considering adding another right-sided centre-half. Arsenal smashed their transfer record again to sign Nicolas Pepe for £72 million in summer 2019, but have yet to successfully integrate him.

While clubs such as Liverpool buy players to fit within a defined system, Arsenal have sometimes seemed to be simply making the best of what they’ve got. 

There are indications that may be changing and the hierarchy do recognise that the squad has major issues in terms of technical quality, tactical understanding and mentality. The signing of Partey was predicated on a tactical vision for this team, presented by Edu to the club’s ownership. However, that vision is yet to be realised. Arteta recently told DAZN in Spain that the club are “five or six positions” short of what he requires. Is it realistic to fill those gaps before the likes of Willian and Aubameyang enter steep decline?

There have been bright spots in Arsenal’s recruitment. When they have bought young, it has tended to work for them. Kieran Tierney and Gabriel Martinelli appear excellent additions, and 22-year-old centre-half Gabriel has started strongly. With an exciting generation of academy players, Arsenal should arguably be leaning into this young talent.

The last summer transfer window, capped by the addition of Partey, was largely greeted as a success. Arsenal failed, however, to make the sales needed to balance the books. In what was admittedly a difficult market, only Emiliano Martinez left for a transfer fee. Arsenal’s approximate spend of £500 million since the summer of 2016 is set against estimated sales of just £198 million.

It is safe to assume that, come the end of the season, Ozil will join the likes of Aaron Ramsey, Alexis Sanchez, Mkhitaryan and Danny Welbeck in leaving the club for no transfer fee. There have been tens and tens of millions left on the table.

While much of the blame for that can be laid at the feet of people who have now left the club themselves, the current management should also consider whether assets have been appropriately managed. Did the complete exclusion of Matteo Guendouzi, for example, help his value in the transfer market?

Arsenal will need to sell better to fund the next phase of their evolution. The substantial outlay on older players is indicative of a club attempting to postpone a rebuild; gambling on experienced names in the hope they’ll secure immediate passage back to the promised lands of the Champions League.

As technical director, Edu is the man charged with laying out a squad-building strategy for the next three to five years. Supporters will feel entitled to ask, “What is the plan?”

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This has been a period of tumultuous change for Arsenal.

A club which under Wenger and Gazidis set the standard for stability has been plunged into perpetual transition. Since 2018 began, they have had three managers (four, if you count interim head coach Freddie Ljungberg’s brief spell before Arteta succeeded Emery), and as many senior executives at the helm. It is difficult to adopt a clear strategy when the decision-makers at the top of the club are constantly changing.

The owners, of course, remain the same. Stan Kroenke’s KSE only took sole control in late 2018 but have been the majority shareholders since 2011. While the club’s split ownership enforced a period of paralysis, this competitive drift has happened on their watch. They believe the club now have the right structure and set-up to bring success, although there is an acceptance that current results are far from satisfactory.

There are two problems at Arsenal: the short-term and the long-term; the crisis and the decline. One can be fixed quickly with results, the other will require much more work behind the scenes.

As head coach, Arteta would only have been responsible for the former. As manager, he must tackle both. It is a huge task for someone in the top job for the first time. Stopping the rot would be challenging enough; turning the club around is another matter entirely. 

The title of “manager” is arguably a poisoned chalice at the Emirates.

There were times during Wenger’s reign when the whole club seemed to hide behind the iconic Frenchman.

To place the inexperienced Arteta in that role would be reckless and unfair. He may be willing to “take the bullets”, but is that right? Clearly, he should be held accountable for the team’s poor performance. Step back, however, and it is clear that the mess at Arsenal is not entirely of this coach’s making.

Why do we always seem to catch these teams at the arse end of their bad run of form?

I'll be fucking furious if we hand them another lifeline like we did for Everton and Wolves. 

Need to treat them like the team they are. Shit.