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Is the Chelsea project broken? | The Football Boardroom It’s been anything but quiet on the West London front this season at Chelsea. Ill-discipline on the pitch, fallings out off it at both boardroom and dressing-room level, financial losses, a controversial fine, question marks around the head coach… And it promises to be a summer of discontent in SW6 should the club fail to qualify for the Champions League. What exactly is the owners’ strategy? And is it time for them to change course and devise a new plan? Christian and Henry drill into both accounts and accountability at the Bridge and assess what the men from California can do to rewrite the script and land a Hollywood ending.

Come on boys, let's win this pls..

No Pedro. Delap, if there was any time to step up it is tonight.

Cole Palmer on Manchester United transfer rumours: ‘I’ve got no plans to move from Chelsea’ https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7206076/2026/04/17/Chelsea-news-palmer-transfer-man-united-rumours/ Cole Palmer has dismissed speculation linking him with a move to Manchester United and insists he wants to stay at Chelsea. The England international has been linked several times this season with a transfer to United, who Chelsea host in the Premier League on Saturday, partly because he supported them as a youngster. It has also been reported that the 23-year-old is homesick, having grown up in Manchester and wants to return to the north west, having joined Chelsea from Manchester City in the summer of 2023. But speaking to The Guardian, Palmer said: “I’ve got no plans to move from Chelsea. Obviously, Manchester is my home. All my family are there, but I don’t miss it. Maybe I’ll miss it if I don’t go for three months or something. But then when I get home, I think there’s nothing there for me anyway. “We’ve (Chelsea) still got a lot to play for. We’ve got the FA Cup semi-final [against Leeds] and if we finish in a Champions League spot it puts us in a good position to sign players that we need. We spoke to the owners and they’re sure of the players who are gonna do it. Palmer also revealed that he had spoken to club captain and fellow England international Reece James, who signed a new six-year contract with the club in March as exclusively revealed by The Athletic. Palmer said that he and the versatile defender had spoken about “the things we need, players we need to sign and how things need to be” as well as adding that James “wouldn’t sign a new (six-year) contract if he didn’t know what was going on.” What You Should Read Next Behdad Eghbali’s message to Chelsea fans: ‘We care … we’re committed’ A number of Chelsea fans are set to protest against the club's ownership before Saturday's Premier League game against Manchester United. Palmer has struggled to find his best form this season, having suffered a groin injury back in September. In his debut season at Stamford Bridge, the 2023-24 campaign, he scored 27 goals and provided 15 assists on the way to being named the 2024 PFA Young Player of the Year, England Men’s Player of the Year, and Chelsea Player of the Year awards. However, the versatile forward has scored just ten goals and provided three assists this season, and hasn’t scored for England since his goal in the Euro 2024 final almost two years ago. Palmer admitted that he has found the nature of the injury hard to come back from, saying: “I didn’t know how long I was going to be out for. I went to see a specialist and he said 10 to 12 weeks. “Then I was playing when I was injured because I was out for 12 weeks, and it was still not better. I didn’t know how to manage it. That’s probably part of it.” Chelsea, sixth in the Premier League, face United on Saturday, four points off fifth-place Liverpool and a Champions League qualification spot. Palmer is one of Chelsea’s ‘untouchables’ Chelsea regard Palmer as one of their ‘untouchables’, and he is certainly talking like one. Palmer signed a contract extension two years ago (August 2024) to commit his future to Stamford Bridge until 2033 and the club have no desire to sell the attacking midfielder. But this has not stopped people from talking about his future and whether he is happy at Stamford Bridge. Chelsea’s season has been a bit of a disappointment up till now and Palmer’s downbeat demeanour on the pitch has come under a lot of scrutiny. Obviously, no player is content when they lose matches but his injury issues have understandably also played a major part in his mood. What Chelsea fans should be encouraged to read is Palmer dismissing the desire to move away, especially to Manchester United, so strongly. The England international has clearly liked what he has heard about the direction the club is heading in having spoken to club captain James. Midfielder Moises Caicedo also committed his long-term future to Chelsea today by extending his deal until 2033, which sends a positive message at an important time too. With Champions League qualification via a top-five finish in the Premier League, plus a possible first FA Cup win for eight years, at stake in the final six weeks of the season, it is important the players believe they are at a club that can succeed. Palmer’s comments, coming so soon after James and Caicedo agreeing fresh terms, will perhaps reassure doubting fans that things are not quite as bad as they seem. By Simon Johnson Chelsea Correspondent

he looks like he is NINE years old ffs!

EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Chelsea FANS PROTEST In this video, I speak with Jacob from Not A Project CFC about tomorrows protest/march before Chelsea vs Manchester United. For anyone who was unsure on the motives or people behind this protest, hopefully hearing from Jacob here on GBFC can give some of you more insight! Manchester United preview will be out on Saturday morning! Follow Not A Project CFC here: https://x.com/NotAProjectCFC

Chelsea accounts: BlueCo funding exceeds £4bn, £32m player profits this season, Kingsmeadow sold https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7193024/2026/04/13/Chelsea-accounts-player-trading-profits/ Chelsea’s bumper summer of player sales translated to just £32million in profits for the current season, the club’s latest accounts show. A reported £300m was earned from player sales in the summer 2025 transfer window, yet disclosures in Chelsea’s 2024-25 financial statements confirm only around one-tenth of that sum translated to bottom-line profit between July 1 and the closure of the transfer window on September 1. That is a consequence of Chelsea’s high-volume player trading strategy, with players signed for large sums still carrying sizeable book values at the time of their Stamford Bridge departures. Yet Chelsea’s business model is reliant on generating profits from such player trading, as underlying operating losses are swingeing. The latest accounts show the club’s day-to-day deficit jumped a further £45million to £258m or, in layman’s terms, Chelsea lost £491 a minute, every single minute for a full year. The figure would have been higher were it not for the exclusion of over £50million in ‘legal and regulatory costs’. Chelsea incurred a £26.5million fine from UEFA last summer for breaching financial rules, and booked a further £24m provision in relation to past unreported payments to players, unregistered agents and other third parties. The matter, self-reported by the club following the BlueCo takeover of May 2022, resulted in a £10.75m fine from the Premier League last month. A related investigation by the Football Association remains ongoing. BlueCo’s model since acquiring the club four years ago has prioritised activity in the transfer market, and a further £305.5million went on new players in 2024-25. Player sales of £125.9m meant a net spend of £179.6m, the third highest in last season’s Premier League, only trailing the two Manchester clubs. Those incoming fees took total player sales over three full seasons of BlueCo ownership beyond £500million, and reaped £57.9m in profit last season. £273.2m has been earned from player profits in those three years, again the third-highest in the Premier League, though Chelsea made £21m more from player trading in the final three seasons of Roman Abramovich’s ownership. Of greater concern is that lowly player profits figure for the current 2025-26 season. Chelsea will receive a marked revenue boost this year from both their FIFA Club World Cup success in the United States last summer and a return to Champions League football. Yet with operating losses so large they also need to keep being good sellers, and much was made of a summer in which they recorded the second-highest level of player sales ever recorded in a transfer window, only topped by Monaco in summer 2018. These accounts don’t put a number to the gross sales amount but if the profit of £31.8million remains unchanged, this season will generate Chelsea’s second-lowest profit on player sales in 12 seasons. The June sales of Bashir Humphreys and Marcus Bettinelli to Burnley and Manchester City fell into the 2024-25 accounting year but, even with those included, Chelsea’s player profits from last summer likely didn’t hit £50m. The £31.8million booked in 2025-26 is less than sister club Strasbourg generated from their own player sales last summer. Accounts for 22 Holdco Limited, the uppermost UK-registered company in the BlueCo group, disclose £66.8million in post-year-end player profits; Strasbourg’s player profit figure, by deduction, was £34.4m. Kingsmeadow sold to women’s team Under BlueCo’s ownership Chelsea have successfully skirted trouble with the Premier League’s profitability and sustainability rules (PSR), principally through the movement of assets within the club’s wider corporate structure. Such intra-group sales were noticeably lacking in 2024-25, leading to that record loss, though they weren’t entirely absent. The accounts disclose the sale of Kingsmeadow, the home of Chelsea Women, to Chelsea Football Club Women Limited (CFCW), the company which generated £198.7million in June 2024 when it was internally ‘sold’ to another BlueCo company. The Kingsmeadow sale appears to have reaped £3.4m profit last season but other loss-making sales of undisclosed assets meant Chelsea made a small loss on fixed asset disposals in 2024-25 (£3m). Chelsea women have played at Kingsmeadow since 2017Jasper Wax/Getty Images Following the 2024 sale, income from Chelsea Women was not expected to feature in the accounts of Chelsea FC Holdings, which houses the men’s team, yet these accounts tell a different tale. Chelsea booked £22.6m in income from CFCW, while expending £11.3m in costs. Sources with knowledge of the club’s dealings told The Athletic around half the sum comprises the proceeds from the Kingsmeadow sale to CFCW, while the rest reflects an inter-company agreement made between Chelsea FC Holdings and CFCW at the time of the intra-group sale. In essence, of Chelsea’s £490.9m revenue, around £11m came from CFCW (the Kingsmeadow sale proceeds are not recorded as revenue). How Chelsea made record pre-tax loss Chelsea’s English record pre-tax loss of £262.4million last season has already been well-documented, but the release of the club’s full financials lends greater detail to the story. The £258million operating loss marks the fourth consecutive season Chelsea’s day-to-day deficit has topped £200m, albeit 2024-25 saw a new peak. It is, unsurprisingly, the highest operating loss in English football history. That loss includes £12.1million in player value impairments, a lower amount than might have been expected given recent suggestions the huge loss was driven by one-off costs. Even without those £50.2m in legal and regulatory costs, Chelsea’s pre-tax loss would still have been the largest ever made in English football. Matchday and broadcast revenues each improved, the latter by £40million. TV money rose in three ways: from the early stages of the FIFA Club World Cup (roughly £20m in 2024-25, with a further £65m prize money recorded in 2025-26), a successful Europa Conference League campaign (£18.3million, versus no European football in 2023-24) and finishing two spots higher in the Premier League (£4.5m more in domestic prize money). Those improvements were welcomed, especially as commercial income dropped markedly, down £24million to £200.9m. Chelsea put that drop down to ‘reduced sponsorship revenue’, and the club went most of last season without a front-of-shirt sponsor, before DAMAC signed a deal for the final month of the season. It meant Chelsea trailed their ‘Big Six’ rivals by a large margin on the commercial front; the next-lowest among that cohort was Arsenal’s £262.2m, 31 per cent higher than Chelsea. Also worst among the ‘Big Six’ was Chelsea’s wages to revenue metric, which moved up a smidge to 73 per cent. The wage bill at Stamford Bridge hit £359.3million, likely the club’s highest ever once termination payments in the 2022-23 season are stripped. That seems to give the lie to the idea Chelsea have embarked on a strategy of paying notably lower, incentive-based wages — albeit non-football staff made their mark too. Administrative staff numbers jumped by 156 to 929, the highest in the Premier League. BlueCo have spent heavily in their time in West London, and rising staffing numbers shows an uptick in operations. Naturally, costs came with that; Chelsea’s operating expenditure topped £150million for the first time, although, again, that was a low among the ‘Big Six’. Not so low were player amortisation costs which are the byproduct of huge transfer spending. Those hit £212.2million in 2024-25, an English record and one which would be even higher if adjusted to reflect Premier League and UEFA rules limiting player amortisation periods to five years. No such limits apply to club accounts, yet Chelsea still racked up a bill which consumed over two-fifths of their revenue. A further £263.3million went on new players in the two months from 1 July onwards, taking gross transfer spending under BlueCo to £1.867billion overall. BlueCo’s significant funding continues Chelsea’s loss figure would have been even higher were it not for the fact the club has been funded interest-free throughout BlueCo’s tenure. The size of the commitment to the club continues to be substantial. Last season, Chelsea received a further £330million from their owners, taking the three-season tally beyond £1.1billion. In all, across both equity raises and borrowings further up the corporate chain, the first three seasons of the BlueCo project required over £4billion in funding. That funding does not come cheap, as those 22 Holdco accounts detail. Debt in the group increased a further £225million last season, even as only £157m in new cash was obtained from lenders. Much of the difference arose from payment-in-kind (PIK) interest, whereby borrowings accrue interest at lofty rates — around 11 per cent currently — which is tacked onto the principal to be repaid when the loan terms in. The Athletic has previously estimated BlueCo’s PIK interest could total over £850m across the 10-year term of that particular loan, and that estimate will grow yet higher if the group continues to increase borrowings. Even without the PIK interest, 22 Holdco paid out £58million cash to service loans last season. Across cash interest payments and transaction costs incurred on obtaining borrowings which now total £1.4billion, 22 Holdco has paid £177.7m in just three years. Much of the borrowed money has been used to build a Chelsea squad which, at the end of June 2025, had cost £1.51billion to assemble, almost £200m more than the next most expensive team in the world (Manchester City). Following Sunday’s 0-3 home defeat to City, Liam Rosenior’s team are sixth in the Premier League, four points away from a guaranteed Champions League place which looks essential if finances at Stamford Bridge are to improve. The Athletic estimates Chelsea earned around £80million from this season’s competition but that figure will drop precipitously if they miss out again next season. That would not help a club who, while maintaining they are now compliant with football’s financial regulations, are subject to the terms of that UEFA settlement agreement until the end of the 2028-29 season. By Chris Weatherspoon Football Finance Writer

Chelsea supporters’ trust calls for ‘greater clarity and accountability’ under BlueCo https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7201663/2026/04/16/Chelsea-supporters-trust-blueco-letter/ The Chelsea Supporters’ Trust (CST) board has called for greater clarity and accountability from the club with fans, citing an “erosion of trust”, before a separately organised protest against Chelsea’s owners on Saturday. In an open letter addressed to Chelsea’s owners, board of directors, and senior leadership, the CST board outlined concerns about the strategy under ownership group BlueCo, engagement between the club and their supporters, ticketing and club finances. “At the heart of supporter concern is a simple point: the current model has demanded a huge amount of faith from the fanbase, while giving too little clarity in return,” the letter reads. Chelsea are sixth in the Premier League table, four points behind fifth-placed Liverpool, before the visit of third-placed Manchester United on Saturday. Ahead of kick-off, the group ‘NotAProjectCFC’ is organising a joint protest, alongside fans of fellow BlueCo-owned, French club Strasbourg, against BlueCo’s ownership. CST’s letter says “the organisation and scale of such activity is a clear signal that frustration is deepening and becoming harder to ignore”. What You Should Read Next Chelsea handed another crushing reminder of how far they are off the elite BlueCo-era Chelsea have consciously tried to mould themselves on Manchester City, but have overlooked the key ingredients “Chelsea supporters have been asked to accept an unprecedented level of change in the name of a long-term vision that has never been clearly or consistently explained,” the letter reads. “Four years on, that vision has still not earned their trust. “This is not a reaction to a single result or a run of form. It reflects a deeper and more sustained concern about the direction of Chelsea Football Club, and the growing lack of confidence among supporters in the leadership, structure, and strategy that underpin it.” CST refers to the results of a survey it conducted in January, which found that more than 90 per cent of fans did not have confidence in “the ownership group’s football-related decision-making”, while more than 80 per cent were not confident the club are being run in a way that will deliver “sustained success over the next three to five years”. The board’s letter says that, since those findings were presented to the club, “supporters have seen no meaningful change, nor a response that reflects the seriousness of the concerns raised”. The letter said BlueCo’s vision had ‘never been clearly or consistently explained’Ryan Pierse/Getty Images The letter goes on to raise concerns about the club’s ticketing system, which it describes as “broken and in urgent need of reform”, whether structures intended to ensure supporters’ voices are heard are working and the club’s financial results. “Chelsea supporters have shown patience. They have absorbed upheaval. They have given the club time to make the case for this direction,” the letter adds. “That goodwill should not be treated as inexhaustible. “For that reason, we expect a clear and substantive response from the club’s leadership on the following: Does the club accept that supporter confidence in its current leadership model and direction has fallen to an unacceptably low level? What specific changes will now be made to provide greater clarity and accountability in football leadership and decision-making? What will change in how supporters are engaged, so that engagement is timely, meaningful, and capable of influencing decisions rather than simply explaining them after the fact? How does the club intend to demonstrate that its current strategy can deliver sustained sporting success, financial stability, and a recognisable Chelsea identity in a way that rebuilds supporter trust? “Chelsea supporters have shown patience through a sustained period of change. That patience has not been matched by the level of clarity or accountability the club owes its supporters,” a CST spokesperson said. “This is not about short-term results. It is about trust and at this moment in time, that trust has not been earned.” By Cerys Jones Football Writer

Behdad Eghbali’s message to Chelsea fans: ‘We care … we’re committed’ https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7203041/2026/04/16/Chelsea-fans-eghbali-message/ Behdad Eghbali has told Chelsea supporters that owners BlueCo are learning from their mistakes and are committed to bringing consistent success back to Stamford Bridge. Disaffected fans will stage a protest march ahead of Chelsea’s clash with Manchester United at Stamford Bridge on Saturday, organised by NotAProjectCFC and incorporating supporter representatives of BlueCo sister club Strasbourg in an attempt to mobilise opposition to the consortium led by Clearlake Capital and Todd Boehly. In the final stretch of the fourth season since they acquired the club from Roman Abramovich for £2.3billion in June 2022, Chelsea are sliding down the Premier League table under head coach Liam Rosenior and face the prospect of missing out on Champions League qualification with a youthful squad assembled at historically vast expense. Speaking at CAA’s World Congress of Sports conference in Los Angeles on Thursday, Clearlake co-founder Eghbali admitted that BlueCo are still looking to improve their ownership strategy, but reiterated that they care about maintaining Chelsea’s modern standards of consistently competing for the biggest trophies. “For the fans, we care,” he said. “We want the club to be successful. We’re focused on delivering that on-pitch performance. I think six months ago everyone was super-happy. Results have been mixed, disappointing more recently. There’s a full reflection on what we can do better, what we can improve on. “There is a plan. We reflect on the plan. We try to improve the plan and tweak the plan if it’s not working. The message is we’re committed. “Can this be successful without winning? The answer is no. We’ve got to win. And it doesn’t mean you’re going to win every game, it doesn’t mean you don’t make mistakes, that you don’t have downturns, but ultimately the objective, and especially the objective that a club like Chelsea is you’ve got to win, you’ve got to win trophies, and you’ve got to win consistently again. “We were fortunate enough to do so last year. We’ve had a bit of an up and down year this year, but the objective hasn’t changed.” What You Should Read Next Chelsea supporters’ trust calls for ‘greater clarity and accountability’ under BlueCo A letter from the group cited an 'erosion of trust' with BlueCo in charge A huge reason for the downturn in Chelsea’s season was the abrupt departure of head coach Enzo Maresca on New Year’s Day. “Our policy has been no in-season changes,” Eghbali added. “You certainly review and hold not only the manager, but the management team, the sporting team, accountable, but typically in the summers, not in season. “It’s not a change we wanted to make. It’s a change that had a bit of a negative impact in the season, when you’re changing systems and personnel, and it’s one we’ve got to fight our way out of. “We still have six matches in the Premier League, and an FA Cup semi final coming up. So hopefully the story of this season hasn’t been written yet, and you’ve got a lot to fight for. In my perspective, when you get punched in the face, you’ve got to fight back, you’ve got to stand up and fight. And it’s going to hopefully show a lot about the character of this squad. “I think the perspective is stability, and frankly, getting that stability on the manager side is one of the things we haven’t done right yet, and it’s something we’re striving to improve on.” Chelsea replaced Enzo Maresca with Liam Rosenior in JanuaryAdrian Dennis/AFP via Getty Images Maresca’s replacement Rosenior has won just one of his last six matches across all competitions, but Eghbali confirmed the former Strasbourg boss retains the support of the board and sporting leadership. “On Liam, we had the opportunity to work with him daily for 18 plus months, so we knew what we were getting,” Eghbali said. “We think he has every attribute to be successful here. He got off to a great start. We’ve had a tough past five, six matches, but I think we’re behind Liam. Of course, it’s a results business, but we think he can be successful long term.” Chelsea’s recent struggles have also drawn more criticism to their heavily youth-oriented recruitment. Eghbali signalled that the club are ready to target players equipped to make an immediate impact in this summer’s transfer market. “The view was to recruit and build elite players that can, frankly, be together and have that stability in the squad,” Eghbali said. “We’re still in the 40th, 50th minute of that process. But the view is to keep, sign and retain and compensate and extend some of the world’s best players, and ultimately the view was you need, eight, 10, 12, 15 elite players to win and win sustainably, year after year.“I think we’ve done a few things right, a lot of things right. We’ve got to be better on a few things, to add more ready-made players at this part of the project, to take (it ) to the next level, to be consistent over time. “We recognise we need balance. We have world champions, we have Champions League winners, we have elite, elite young players. Experience has developed now. The team has been together for two or three years. The objective is to keep your best players, and we’ve done that, and there’s no intention to rebuild every three or four years. You tweak a model, you improve, you learn from mistakes. “Our goal is to have elite, elite players on the pitch, elite characters off the pitch that our fans can bond with, that will be at the club, that will be club legends for the next 10 or 15 years and beyond. I think, generally, we’ve been fortunate, not in getting everything right, but we do have a core (of) good players, global players. Cole Palmer, Moises Caicedo, Enzo Fernandez, Levi Colwill, Estevao Willian, Reece James. “The view is now that we’re here with a great core base, to add some of that experience, to take the team to the next level and have consistency. That fact is not lost on us, and we’re at a point where we can take that next step, hopefully in the next year and beyond.” By Liam Twomey Chelsea Correspondent

MY RESPONSE TO BEHDAD EGHBALI 🔑 Timestamps: 0:00 — Intro & why the timing matters 1:30 — Eghbali's key quotes broken down 5:00 — The Club World Cup moment they wasted 9:00 — On Maresca leaving & the "no mid-season changes" lie 13:00 — Is Liam Rosenior really the long-term answer? 17:00 — The "8-15 elite players" delusion 21:00 — Which Chelsea players are actually elite? 25:00 — Why words aren't enough anymore 24 hours before the biggest Chelsea fan protest in years, Clear Lake Capital's co-founder has told supporters that Blueco "care," are "committed," and are "reflecting on the plan." In today's video, I go line by line through Liam Tumi's piece on The Athletic and break down every single word — because at this stage, words are all we're getting. Four seasons in. 1.7 billion spent. Two managers walked out the door. And now, the night before the Not A Project CFC march outside Stamford Bridge, Eghbali wants to talk about tweaking the model. We cover everything — from the Club World Cup opportunity they wasted, to the Maresca bombshell, to why Liam Rosenior being backed "long term" is the most damning sentence in the entire interview. I also give my honest take on which Chelsea players I think are genuinely elite — and the number is nowhere near eight. This is about more than one bad season. This is about the financial reality, the coaching environment, and whether this ownership can ever deliver what Chelsea fans deserve.

"Anyone with a remote interest in how Chelsea are funded by Ares, please put aside 10 minutes to read this...." An article on our finances https://siphillipstalkschelsea.substack.com/p/anyone-with-a-remote-interest-in Now, I always hold my hands up here. Numbers and finances will always go straight over my head. I don’t understand a lot of the wording used and I don’t understand the ins and outs of finances, the legal jargon, and I find it all super complicated to understand. So, I apologise but if you want any break downs of the an in-depth look into the financial side of our club right now, then you wont find it from me. But what I do try to do is share others with knowledge on this subject, and try to give you some insights from elsewhere. It seems that this article below by a financial writer called Paul Quinn, is very good and is being widely shared around. It helped me understand things a little better, even though it’s quite a worrying read…. Anyways, I’ll copy it all here below and allow you all to judge for yourselves…. The Analysis Series: Financial architecture of 22 Holdco Limited: Analysis of Ares Management’s credit exposure, warrants, and embedded derivative structures within the Blueco consortium For anyone wanting an understanding of how Chelsea are funded and how Ares operate this is a must read: Summary and macro-financial context The global sports finance landscape has undergone a profound and irreversible structural change. Over the past decade, the industry has transitioned away from traditional, sovereign wealth or billionaire benefactor-led ownership models, moving decisively toward highly leveraged, institutionalised financial frameworks dominated by private equity sponsors and opportunistic private credit funds. The 2022 acquisition and subsequent re-capitalisation of Chelsea Football Club by the Blueco consortium, fronted publicly by Todd Boehly and fundamentally controlled by Clearlake Capital, serves as the preeminent, defining case study of this macroeconomic evolution. The financial architecture engineered to sustain this sports enterprise is defined not by simple senior bank debt or traditional equity syndication, but by a labyrinthine, multi-tiered structure of revolving credit facilities, preferred equity, and mezzanine capital orchestrated strategically at the parent company level. At the absolute centre of this matrix is the £410.2 million (approximately $500 million) capital injection provided by Ares Management Corporation to 22 Holdco Limited, the ultimate parent entity of the Chelsea Football Club operational group. This research report delivers a detailed examination of Ares Management’s direct and indirect exposure to 22 Holdco Limited, Blueco 22 Limited, and the underlying Chelsea Football Club entities. Through analysis of United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, UK Companies House statutory accounts, scheme particulars, credit fund prospectuses, and institutional financial disclosures, this document deconstructs the structural anatomy of the debt, the severe mechanics of its Payment-in-Kind (PIK) interest accrual, and the overarching strategic rationale behind its deployment. Crucially, this report provides an exploration into the presence, mechanics, and accounting treatments of warrants, equity kickers, and embedded derivative structures contained within the Ares credit agreements. By exploring the deliberate semantic, regulatory, and legal blurring between debt and equity inherent in hybrid financial instruments, the analysis uncovers precisely how opportunistic credit providers utilise convertible mechanics to secure out-sized, equity-like yields while navigating the stringent confines of global sports regulatory frameworks. The resulting synthesis reveals a sophisticated, high-wire capital deployment strategy that temporarily shields the football club’s immediate operational cash flows at the severe, perhaps existential, cost of a rapidly compounding, long-term structural liability that matures in 2033. Corporate architecture To accurately map and understand the precise nature of Ares Management’s financial exposure, it is first necessary to delineate the corporate hierarchy established by the acquiring consortium. In modern private equity leveraged buyouts, the capital structure is deliberately and meticulously fragmented across multiple tiered legal entities. This stratification is engineered to optimise tax efficiency, ring-fence operational liabilities, facilitate tiered debt subordination, and navigate the rigid strictures of domestic and international financial sustainability regulations. Blueco Consortium The primary acquisition vehicle, Blueco (formally registered and later dissolved or re-organised in various capacities such as Blueco 22 Limited), was formed specifically in 2022 to execute the takeover of Chelsea Football Club following the forced divestment by the previous owner, Roman Abramovich, amidst geopolitical sanctions. While the consortium is consistently represented in the public domain by Todd Boehly, chairman and CEO of Eldridge Industries, the underlying reality of the ownership structure is far more institutional. The consortium is majority-owned and ultimately controlled by Clearlake Capital Group L.P., a formidable private equity firm co-founded by Behdad Eghbali and José E. Feliciano. Clearlake Capital’s historical model relies heavily on general partner-led private equity secondary markets, making them highly adept at complex financial structuring. Minority equity stakes within the Blueco consortium are held by Todd Boehly, Mark Walter (co-founder and CEO of Guggenheim Partners), and Swiss philanthropist Hansjörg Wyss. This ownership dynamic is highly relevant to the overarching capitalisation strategy. When the consortium required an additional $500 million to fund infrastructure and multi-club expansion, calling for common equity cash contributions from this disparate group of partners would have diluted minority stakes or required highly synchronised, pro-rata funding. Instead, the consortium opted to import external, non-dilutive (in the immediate term) hybrid capital from Ares Management, injecting it at the absolute top of the corporate structure to avoid disrupting the underlying equity capitalisation table. Separating operations from financial burdens The operational mechanics and the overwhelming financial burdens of the enterprise are structurally separated across distinct corporate layers: Chelsea FC Holdings Limited (Company No. 02536231): This is the historical operating entity, registered at the Stamford Bridge stadium on Fulham Road, London. The company possesses a long filing history, previously operating under the names Chelsea Village PLC and Chelsea FC PLC before its re-registration as a private limited company in May 2022. This is the flagship subsidiary responsible for the day-to-day football operations, generating domestic and international broadcasting revenues, securing commercial sponsorships, and processing matchday income. Blueco 22 Limited (Company No. 13949552): Functioning as the intermediate holding company that facilitated the buyout, this entity holds large amounts of secured senior debt. According to UK Companies House statutory filings and financial journalism reports, this specific entity holds a £755.2 million revolving credit facility. This facility acts essentially as a massive corporate credit card, attracting a floating interest rate estimated between 7.5% and 8% based on current macroeconomic rates, and is strictly repayable by July 2027. This debt is secured by a floating charge over the group’s assets, including the shares in the underlying football clubs. 22 Holdco Limited: Sitting at the apex of the structure, 22 Holdco Limited is the ultimate parent entity designed to absorb the highest-risk, most subordinated tranches of the consortium’s debt structure. 22 Holdco Limited is the direct counterparty to the Ares Management facility. It holds a £595.9 million (a figure escalated heavily via capitalised interest) loan characterised by deeply subordinated, equity-like features and complex embedded derivatives. Deconstructing the deficits and Intra-group eliminations The consolidated financial statements of the group reveal the unprecedented strain of this highly leveraged private equity model. For the fiscal period spanning from March 2022 through to the end of June 2023, Blueco 22 Limited reported a staggering, headline-generating statutory loss of £653 million. Subsequent annual accounts for the fiscal year ending June 2025 demonstrate a continued deterioration of the balance sheet, with a statutory loss before taxation of £700.8 million at the consolidated 22 Holdco Group level. These record-breaking deficits represent a fundamental, philosophical shift toward a private-equity-driven capital deployment strategy. The ownership group has prioritised the high-velocity, debt-fueled acquisition of intangible assets, specifically young, highly amortisable professional footballers and multi-club network teams like Racing Club de Strasbourg, over any semblance of short-term operational profitability. The true financial engineering is exposed by examining the disparity between the losses at the club level versus the parent level. While the operating club level (Chelsea Football Club Limited) reported a severe pre-tax loss of between £256.7 million and £262.4 million, the parent group’s loss was nearly three times larger. This massive widening of the deficit highlights the crushing burden of intra-group eliminations, the removal of non-market asset transfer profits between network clubs, the monumental amortisation of acquisition-related goodwill, and, most critically, the extraordinary debt servicing costs sequestered exclusively at the 22 Holdco holding company level. By trapping the debt at 22 Holdco, the consortium attempts to insulate the operating club from the immediate optics and regulatory consequences of insolvency. Table 1: Revenue dynamics for Chelsea Football Club operating entity (2024-2025), demonstrating that while broadcasting revenues surged due to European competition participation, total turnover growth (+6.6%) remains vastly insufficient to cover the expanded cost base and the monumental debt load held at the 22 Holdco parent level. Ares Management’s capital injection: In September 2023, Ares Management Corporation, a publicly traded, Los Angeles-based global alternative investment manager overseeing hundreds of billions in credit, private equity, and real estate assets, provided a critical financial lifeline to the Blueco/22 Holdco structure. This £410.2 million (approximately $500 million) capital injection was not a standard corporate loan; it sits squarely within the highly specialised mandate of the Ares Opportunistic Credit group. The Opportunistic Credit division at Ares explicitly targets debt and structured investments in middle-market and large-cap companies requiring highly flexible, non-traditional capital. Crucially, their stated investment approach dictates that they consistently seek potential equity upside where possible when partnering with healthy, stressed, or distressed companies operating in the void between traditional senior private debt and pure private equity. Allocation and deployment of the credit facility The capital provided by Ares Management was explicitly earmarked and allocated to two high-priority, capital-intensive strategic goals designed to exponentially increase the long-term enterprise value of the Blueco portfolio: Stamford Bridge infrastructure expansion: Facilitating the substantial upgrade, redevelopment, and potential complete rebuild of the 40,000-seat Stamford Bridge stadium. This is a generational, highly complex real estate and infrastructure project with preliminary cost estimates potentially exceeding $2 billion. The Ares capital provides the foundational liquidity to begin the architectural, legal, and municipal planning phases of this monumental undertaking. The multi-club network: Supporting the aggressive, debt-fueled global expansion of Blueco’s multi-club portfolio. This strategy initiated with the acquisition of a controlling stake in French Ligue 1 side Racing Club de Strasbourg, with continued, highly publicised exploration of other strategic assets across Europe and South America, including Portuguese outfit Sporting Lisbon. Ares sports, media, and entertainment strategy To understand the structuring of the 22 Holdco debt, one must analyse Ares Management’s broader, thematic push into the commercialisation and financialisation of global sports assets. The Chelsea investment is a flagship transaction within a massive, coordinated sports strategy led by senior Ares partners and co-heads of U.S. direct lending, including Mark Affolter, Jim Miller, Kort Schnabel, Michael L. Smith, and CEO Kipp deVeer. In 2022, Ares emerged as the preeminent heavyweight in sports private credit by raising a dedicated $3.7 billion fund to invest exclusively across the sports, media, and entertainment industries. The firm has deployed billions into high-profile assets, including preferred equity and credit injections into Olympique Lyonnais (via John Textor’s Eagle Football MCO vehicle), Inter Miami CF, the Miami Dolphins, the Kylian Mbappé-backed France SailGP team, and McLaren Racing in Formula One. Furthermore, Ares is actively utilising this high-profile exposure to premier sporting brands to launch new investment vehicles targeted at high-net-worth European individuals and the global retail wealth management channel. Ares has publicly stated a strategic objective to manage $100 billion from private wealth investors globally by 2028, a move that could generate upwards of $600 million in recurring management fees. By structuring highly complex, high-yielding debt with Chelsea FC’s parent company, Ares packages the allure of elite European football into a high-yield credit product distributed to retail and institutional investors alike. Ares credit facilities: SEC disclosures and instrument profiling The deliberate opacity of private credit markets often masks the precise mathematical mechanics of private debt agreements. However, because Ares Management originates, syndicates, and holds these bespoke loans across a large network of publicly registered Business Development Companies (BDCs) and interval funds, highly detailed parameters of the 22 Holdco Limited exposure are accessible via mandated SEC Form 10-K, 10-Q, N-PORT, and prospectus supplement filings. The $500 million overarching commitment is not held in a single portfolio; it is highly syndicated internally across various Ares-managed funds. This is done to optimise yield distribution, satisfy liquidity requirements, and strictly manage portfolio concentration risk under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The primary holders of the 22 Holdco debt within the Ares ecosystem include the flagship Ares Capital Corporation (ARCC), the Ares Strategic Income Fund (ASIF), and the CION Ares Diversified Credit Fund (CADC). Instrument classification, yield profile, and SONIA benchmark Across all analysed SEC consolidated schedules of investments, the 22 Holdco Limited facility is definitively classified as a “Senior subordinated loan” or, in certain tranches, a “Subordinated Delay Draw Term Loan” operating within the Sports, Media & Entertainment sector. The pricing of the instrument reflects its highly subordinated risk profile, sitting below the £755.2 million senior revolving credit facility held by Blueco 22 Limited. The interest rate is structured not as a fixed coupon, but as a massive floating spread of 7.50% above the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA). SONIA is the premier risk-free rate benchmark for sterling markets, having replaced LIBOR. Because the base rate is floating, the total effective yield demanded by Ares fluctuates with the macroeconomic monetary policy of the Bank of England. Given the elevated interest rate environment from 2023 through 2025, this floating benchmark structure has resulted in total effective coupon rates ranging between a huge 11.47% and 12.96% during the reporting periods across the various Ares funds. The terminal maturity date for this entire facility is universally cited across all SEC filings as August 2033 (08/2033), establishing a rigid 10-year lockup period from the date of origination in 2023. Mathematics of the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) mechanism The single most consequential structural feature of the 22 Holdco loan, and the element that poses the greatest existential risk to the Chelsea Football Club ownership structure, is its Payment-in-Kind (PIK) mechanism. In traditional corporate debt, interest is serviced via periodic (monthly or quarterly) cash distributions. If 22 Holdco were required to pay the circa 12.96% interest in cash on a £410.2 million principal, it would require a crippling cash outflow of over £53 million annually. This would immediately drain Chelsea’s operating cash flow, violate financial sustainability regulations, and entirely cripple their aggressive player acquisition and infrastructure strategy. To circumvent this, the Ares facility is structured as PIK. Rather than being paid in cash, the interest is capitalised, meaning it is added to the outstanding principal balance of the loan at each compounding period. This creates a deferred but mathematically explosive liability. At an annual compounding rate of roughly 12% to 13%, the initial £410.2 million principal will double in approximately six years. If no cash repayments are initiated prior to the August 2033 maturity date, the total cost required to service, satisfy, and retire the preferred equity agreement will vastly exceed £850 million, and is highly likely to approach or surpass £1 billion due to the snowball effect of compound interest. This places immense pressure on the Blueco consortium to exponentially grow the enterprise value of the club to outpace the crushing arithmetic of their own debt. Distribution and tranching across Ares vehicles An analysis of the SEC consolidated schedules of investments demonstrates exactly how Ares Management has parsed the 22 Holdco exposure across its retail and institutional vehicles. Table 2: Breakdown of 22 Holdco Limited debt tranches held across public Ares Management investment vehicles. Note: The principal amounts listed here represent only the allocation to specific SEC-registered funds, which constitute a mere fraction of the total $500m (£410.2m) private syndicate underwritten and managed centrally by Ares Management. Furthermore, the presence of specific unfunded commitments is a critical detail. SEC filings for ARCC note a total revolving and delayed draw loan commitment of $14.0 million to 22 Holdco Limited, with $0 funded and $14.0 million unfunded. The Subordinated Delay Draw Term Loan classification utilised by CADC confirms this structure. This implies that Ares operates not as a passive lender, but as a strategic capital partner, retaining the contractual right to release sequential tranches of debt only upon the realisation of specific, pre-negotiated developmental milestones (such as the acquisition of municipal planning permissions for the Stamford Bridge stadium rebuild). Warrants, equity kickers, and the pursuit of asymmetric upside A central objective of this research report is the identification and analysis of warrants, derivative structures, and equity conversion mechanisms contained within the 22 Holdco debt agreements. In the realm of opportunistic private credit and mezzanine finance, funds rarely provide unsecured or deeply subordinated nine-figure capital injections without demanding substantial equity upside to compensate for the severe, asymmetric downside risk. Preferred equity nomenclature While the SEC investment schedules legally categorise the instrument strictly as a “Senior subordinated loan,” external financial analyses, corporate reports, and industry journalism consistently refer to the Ares injection as a redeemable preferred equity agreement, a hybrid instrument, or a capital injection structured as preferred equity. This dichotomy in nomenclature is not an error; it is a deliberate, highly engineered feature of complex corporate finance. The Ares instrument operates at the very bottom of the 22 Holdco capital stack. Because it carries a cumulative dividend (the PIK interest) and sits below senior secured lenders but above the common equity held by Clearlake and Boehly, it possesses the precise economic characteristics of preferred stock, regardless of its legal debt designation for tax and regulatory purposes. SEC disclosures: evidence of warrants and equity kickers Ares Management explicitly lists the provision of referred equity, common equity, and warrants as core, standard financing instruments offered by its Opportunistic Credit division. In private credit syndications utilised for leveraged buyouts or massive growth capital, an equity kicker (often in the form of a detachable warrant) is a standard structural enhancement. It is utilised to bridge the vast gap between the cash yield a borrower can actually afford to pay and the high Internal Rate of Return (IRR) the credit fund requires to satisfy its own limited partners. Direct, irrefutable evidence from Ares SEC filings details their standard operational procedures regarding the valuation and holding of such convertible instruments. Footnotes directly appended to the consolidated investment schedules for ARCC, ASIF, and other vehicles clearly dictate a universal policy: “Percentages shown for warrants or convertible preferred stock held represents the percentages of common stock we may own on a fully diluted basis, assuming we exercise our warrants or convert our preferred stock to common stock”. While this represents standard boilerplate accounting language applied across the entire portfolio, it actively confirms that Ares routinely, systematically embeds convertible warrants into its subordinated loan agreements. Regarding 22 Holdco Limited specifically, the filings confirm that Ares Management directly or indirectly owns less than 5% of the outstanding voting securities of the company, and thus is not deemed an affiliate under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Under the Investment Company Act, a BDC generally assumes control if it owns more than 25% of voting securities, and becomes an affiliate if it owns between 5% and 25%. However, holding less than 5% of voting securities at the present reporting date absolutely does not preclude the existence of highly lucrative, out-of-the-money warrants or un-exercised options. These instruments are designed to remain structurally non-voting until they are exercised, triggering conversion upon a predefined future liquidity event, an Initial Public Offering (IPO), a partial sale of the club, or a debt default. To contextualise this, one must look at how Ares structures other loans within its portfolio. SEC filings show Ares holds explicit warrants in companies like Capstone Acquisition Holdings (Warrant to purchase Series 1 preferred stock), Health Care Equipment entities (Warrant to purchase Class A common stock), and Zoro TopCo (holding Class A common units alongside debt). Given the extreme risk profile of the £410.2 million exposure, the massive 10-year lockup to 2033, the PIK nature of the debt, and the explicit structural intent of Ares’ sports strategy to secure potential equity upside where possible, it is an overwhelming financial probability that the 22 Holdco debt agreement contains un-exercised warrants or a hard conversion feature. This embedded mechanism grants Ares the ultimate option to convert its ballooning, billion-pound PIK debt directly into a common equity stake in the overarching Blueco consortium, securing a direct, highly profitable slice of the terminal valuation of Stamford Bridge and the multi-club network. Furthermore, 22 Holdco is explicitly listed as a non-qualifying asset under Section 55(a) of the Investment Company Act. BDCs are mandated to keep 70% of their assets in qualifying US-based investments; the fact that Ares allocates highly restricted non-qualifying bucket space to a UK-based football holding company indicates the anticipated total return, driven by debt yield plus equity upside, is exceptionally high. Embedded derivatives and accounting mechanics The structural complexity of the 22 Holdco hybrid instrument extends deeply into its corporate accounting treatment. Analysis of commercial documentation highlights the rigorous standards required by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 9) and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) when dealing with complex, convertible debt. Under modern accounting frameworks, an embedded derivative is defined as a component of a hybrid contract that also includes a non-derivative host, with the specific effect that some of the cash flows of the combined instrument vary in a way similar to a standalone derivative. This variation is usually based on a specified interest rate, financial instrument price, or foreign exchange rate. The £410.2 million debt agreement between 22 Holdco and Ares Management is highly likely to contain multiple embedded derivatives that require intense, continuous valuation methodologies: Equity conversion options (warrants): If the preferred equity provides Ares the contractual right to convert the principal into shares of Blueco or 22 Holdco at a predefined strike price, this option represents a classic embedded derivative. Accounting standards explicitly stipulate that unless an embedded derivative in a convertible liability is itself classified wholly and clearly as an equity instrument (the fixed-for-fixed rule), the host liability must be legally separated. The debt portion is measured at amortised cost, while the derivative (warrant) portion must be remeasured at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) at the end of each reporting period. Prepayment, call protection, and make-whole provisions: Due to the extensive 10-year term to 2033, it is standard, non-negotiable operating procedure for private credit agreements of this magnitude to include strict call protection or make-whole provisions. These clauses ensure the lender receives their targeted yield even if the borrower’s financial situation improves and they attempt an early refinancing. Such economic penalty provisions are frequently deemed embedded derivatives by auditors and must be tracked accordingly. Delayed draw forward contracts: The existence of unfunded commitments (the $14.0m Subordinated Delay Draw Term Loan) acts essentially as a derivative forward contract. It legally obligates Ares Management to provide future capital at historically negotiated spreads, regardless of subsequent macroeconomic volatility or credit degradation of the borrower. Valuation techniques for derivative upside The requirement to continuously monitor the fair value of these derivatives underscores why Ares credit funds utilise highly advanced, proprietary modeling. SEC filings indicate that Ares utilises yield analyses and enterprise value techniques to track potential credit impairment and warrant valuations within unlisted, highly illiquid sports franchises. If the 22 Holdco debt investment were to become credit-impaired, perhaps due to Chelsea failing to qualify for the UEFA Champions League for successive seasons, thereby eroding broadcasting revenues, an EV analysis, or even a liquidation/wind-down analysis, would be utilised to estimate the fair value of the underlying derivative structures and collateral. Strategic Rationale: regulatory arbitrage and systemic engineering The decision by Clearlake Capital and Todd Boehly to execute an unprecedented £1.165 billion leveraged capital structure via nested holding companies is not merely a byproduct of corporate expansion; it is a highly calculated, precise exercise in regulatory arbitrage and financial sustainability engineering designed to circumvent the authorities governing global football. Bypassing profitability and sustainability rules (PSR) Modern football finance is governed by a web of stringent domestic and European regulations, most notably the English Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) and Squad Cost Rule parameters. These regulations are fundamentally designed to curb excessive operating losses, tying a club’s ability to spend on player wages and transfer amortisations directly to their generated football revenues. By pushing the £410.2 million Ares preferred equity/PIK loan up to the absolute top of the corporate structure at 22 Holdco Limited, rather than holding it directly at the operating club level (Chelsea FC Holdings Limited), the consortium achieves a vital, potentially season-saving legal ring-fence. The staggering approximate 12.96% compounding interest does not immediately drain cash from the operating football club. Furthermore, because it is structured as Payment-in-Kind and legally insulated at a holding company level entirely detached from football operations, the massive interest expense is abstracted away from the club’s statutory PSR calculation. This financial engineering allows the operating entity to continue functioning, spending billions in the transfer market, without being constrained by catastrophic debt servicing costs. This represents a stark, deliberate contrast to historical leveraged buyout models, such as the Glazer family’s ownership of Manchester United, where senior bank debt was loaded directly onto the operating club, resulting in massive annual cash interest payments that severely suppressed operational growth and fan sentiment. As highlighted by leading industry analysts, global sports regulations are built upon the archaic assumption of a clear, binary distinction between debt and equity. This traditional, rigid regulatory framework is entirely ill-equipped to police a modern financial ecosystem dominated by hybrid capital, PIK notes, delayed draw facilities, and convertible preferred equity with embedded derivatives. The structure engineered by Blueco and Ares Management actively and aggressively exploits this regulatory lag. By categorising the injection as preferred equity in press releases, but as a senior subordinated loan in SEC filings depending on the required accounting context, the consortium optimises both its regulatory treatment and its leverage metrics. It is a brilliant, albeit high-risk, legal and semantic game that allows Chelsea to operate with the financial aggression of a sovereign wealth fund while relying strictly on the debt mechanics of a distressed corporate leveraged buyout. Systemic risk and a ticking time bomb While the immediate benefits to Chelsea’s liquidity and regulatory compliance are evident, the macro-level implications of this structure present severe systemic risks to the broader football ecosystem. The massive private equity and private credit influx into professional football has been characterised by prominent market observers and financial reports as a potential bubble and a ticking time bomb. The total reliance on PIK structures means that 22 Holdco Limited is essentially running a desperate race against a mathematical clock. The debt is compounding exponentially. If the Clearlake/Boehly consortium’s core strategic bets, namely, the redevelopment of Stamford Bridge yielding vastly expanded, world-class matchday revenues; the multi-club network (Strasbourg) generating a sustainable, highly profitable pipeline of player trading; and the continued, uninterrupted inflation of global broadcasting rights, fail to materialise rapidly, the terminal balloon payment in August 2033 will be mathematically impossible to refinance organically. In such a distress scenario, the warrants, equity kickers, and embedded derivative conversion features held by Ares Management would instantly shift from passive upside enhancements to active mechanisms of hostile control. Should a technical default, covenant breach, or an inability to refinance occur, Ares’ subordinated position and derivative rights would allow it to execute its conversion clauses. This would effectively execute a massive debt-for-equity swap, wiping out the Clearlake/Boehly equity buffer, and triggering a total change of control at the parent level of one of the world’s most valuable sports franchises. Synthesis and conclusions The vast financial exposure of Ares Management Corporation to Chelsea Football Club via 22 Holdco Limited is a defining masterclass in modern opportunistic private credit and corporate structuring. The £410.2 million capital injection provided by Ares is exponentially more sophisticated than traditional senior bank lending; it is a deeply subordinated, highly engineered hybrid instrument that combines a massive-yielding, floating-rate PIK structure (pegged at SONIA + 7.50%, yielding upwards of 13%) with a rigid ten-year maturity profile. This structure is designed specifically to accommodate the highly illiquid, capital-intensive, and volatile realities of generational stadium infrastructure development and aggressive multi-club network acquisitions. Crucially, the entire architecture of this debt agreement relies entirely on the delayed realisation of capital. By exclusively utilising a Payment-in-Kind mechanism, 22 Holdco successfully shields the underlying football club from immediate cash flow insolvency and masterfully navigates the stringent, archaic perimeters of Premier League Profitability and Sustainability Rules. However, this regulatory deferment engineers a rapidly expanding, toxic structural liability that is projected to exceed £850 million to £1 billion by its August 2033 maturity date. Within this precarious framework, the presence of warrants, equity kickers, and embedded derivatives is not merely incidental, nor is it a minor contractual footnote; it is absolutely foundational to the Ares Opportunistic Credit thesis. While currently maintaining less than 5% of active voting securities to comply with the Investment Company Act’s affiliate restrictions, Ares Management’s standard, SEC-documented operating playbook regarding opportunistic capital deployment necessitates the inclusion of conversion rights, preferred stock options, or detachable warrants. These embedded derivative structures, which must be carefully separated, tracked, and fair-valued under international accounting standards like IFRS 9, provide Ares with the critical, asymmetrical equity upside required to justify its highly exposed position at the very base of the 22 Holdco capital stack. Ultimately, the capital structure of 22 Holdco Limited represents a monumental, high-wire financial act without precedent in European sports. It empowers the Blueco consortium to aggressively and unilaterally reshape the global football landscape today, but leaves the entire enterprise tethered to an exponentially compounding, billion-pound liability, one where Ares Management holds the derivative keys to eventual equity ownership should the underlying football assets fail to outpace the crushing, inevitable arithmetic of their own debt. My head hurts!

LAMPARD TO RAID Chelsea? | DISASI BIG FEE? | VAN HECKE DEAL? | Chelsea NEWS

Sources: Chelsea's midfield rebuild - only Moises Caicedo stays as a permanent fixture (for now) Some big changes in the middle of the park this summer https://siphillipstalkschelsea.substack.com/p/sources-chelseas-midfield-rebuild-a5c We’ve been reporting on here a number of new midfielder targets that the club are looking at for the summer. But of course, a lot will depend on whether we get Champions League football as to the type of names we will end up landing and also, whether we can convince them to join the club with our strict wage structure when other clubs will be out there offering them more money. However, Chelsea have a shortlist of midfielders they are looking at for the summer window, and we could see as many as THREE new midfielders added into the mix, depending on sales. SPTC Sources have heard that basically the only permanent fixture in our midfield for this summer at least, is Moises Caicedo. Even though he has serious interest coming in for him and his agents are being contacted frequently, he’s expected to stay at Chelsea this summer. However, he is at the moment trying to negotiate better wage terms at the club, and those talks are ongoing. So let’s hope it’s not a case of watch this space. You know the story with Enzo Fernandez, we’ve gone over that enough lately so no need to go through it all again. But yes, it’s quite possible that he leaves in the summer. As well as Fernandez, our sources have heard that Chelsea will listen to offers for both Romeo Lavia and Andrey Santos this summer. There’s obvious concerns over the sustainability of Lavia, and Santos hasn’t quite stepped up to the plate as expected. Chelsea are not actively looking at pushing either player out, but they will certainly listen to offers for them, with both players now attracting serious Premier League interest for the summer. Dario Essugo is being lined up for a loan move away this summer. So if all three (four) of the above players do end up going, and it’s a big IF, then Chelsea could target three new midfielders this summer. Valentin Barco is expected to be one of the new midfielders arriving, and then there will be one other at least, possibly three. Chelsea have a bunch of names on the midfield list, but I’d still put Adam Wharton of Crystal Palace as one near the top. They’d love to bring Elliot Anderson of Nottingham Forest and will be looking to try, but he will have heaps of clubs coming in for him so that’s seen as unrealistic by sources. Alex Scott of Bournemouth is another player Chelsea really like, as consistently and first reported on this site. And as I reported yesterday, there are some other midfielders Chelsea are looking at from clubs who could get relegated. Joao Gomes, Lucas Bergvall, Mateus Fernandes, are a few that have been mentioned to us by top sources. As always, there will be other names, we do not get them all here. But we could certainly see a bit of a midfield revamp this summer - depending on sales.

Absolutely nothing but three points is acceptable.

Don't forget to post protest stuff. Want to see all that stuff. ✌️

💥🔵Chelsea and Newcastle could still win the race for Said El Mala transfer. (@cfbayern)

he is not an easy player to replace to a satisfactory degree, let alone find a clear improvement the clear (or even semi close) improvements are all crazy hard and/or impossible (plus SO SO costly) to pull: (bold are my top choices of those who are not impossible, and (a good good thing) all 4 in bold have substantial EPL experience) in order of valuation (mostly): Pedri Jude Bellingham Federico Valverde Dominik Szoboszlai (would be my top choice, but he is an impossible pull, as would be my 2nd, Valverde, and 3rd, Bells) João Neves Vitinha Declan Rice (I know, I know, I will get stick for placing him on this list, but he is what he is, a world class MFer, at least for moi) Sandro Tonali Adam Wharton Elliot Anderson Warren Zaïre-Emery Ryan Gravenberch Bruno Guimarães Aleksandar Pavlovic Aurélien Tchouaméni here are the top goal scorers at CMF and DMF in the top 10 leagues all club comps CMF (including pens) CMF (excluding pens) DMFs (including pens) DMFs (excluding pens)

CMFs that we probably have a shot at (bold ones I really rate): Pablo Barrios Ayyoub Bouaddi Felix Nmecha Senny Mayulu Tom Bischof Lucas Bergvall Johan Manzambi Lamine Camara João Gomes Archie Gray Alex Scott Mateus Fernandes Habib Diarra Hugo Larsson Victor Froholdt Noah Sadiki Yegor Yarmolyuk Mamadou Sangaré Jobe Bellingham Assan Ouédraogo Nathan De Cat Christos Mouzakitis Lewis Miley Kees Smit Javi Guerra Quinten Timber Breno Bidon Thiago Pitarch Patrick Zabi off the board now, will move this summer to Paris FC Christ Inao Oulaï Rodrigo Mendoza Ezechiel Banzuzi André Sport Club Corinthians Rudy Matondo

Let us hope he will try and stay and still buy into being a Chels lad. He finally seems to getting somewhat healthy. When fully fit, he is a bloody MONSTER of a player. I absolutely believe that deep down in my mind.

“The reason” – Ben Jacobs reveals why Chelsea have cooled their interest in Premier League ace Marcos Senesi https://Chelsea.news/2026/04/Chelsea-bournemouth-marcos-senesi-transfer/ Chelsea have reportedly cooled their interest in Bournemouth centre back Marcos Senesi according to journalist Ben Jacobs. The Blues have paid the price for not signing a replacement for Levi Colwill, whilst they failed in their pursuit of Jeremy Jacquet in January. Chelsea are expected to be busy in the summer, and are thought to very much still be in the market for a centre back. Chelsea cool interest in Marcos Senesi It’s believed Chelsea are open to signing players with more proven Premier League experience as they look to strengthen their squad. Co-owner Behdad Eghbali has said the model will be tweaked, but until that actually happens fans will very much remain sceptical. Chelsea have been linked with Brighton’s Jan Paul van Hecke, whilst Nottingham Forest’s Murillo is thought to be another name of interest. The Blues have also been credited with interest in Senesi, who’s expected to make a decision regarding his future soon, with his Bournemouth contract expiring at the end of the season. However, despite links with Chelsea, Jacobs has reported the Blues have actually cooled their interest in the centre back. “I’m told, contrary to reports and full respect to the excellent journalists that have said Chelsea, but I’m told that they’re not currently active, even though they considered Senesi in January,” he told The United Stand. “And the reason why is because Chelsea are prioritising height and aerial duel winning over only ball playing, and Senesi is very rounded and can play on the left or the right side as a centre-back, but not somebody that Chelsea are in negotiations for.”