Politics & Stuff

[IMissEden 20]

23 hours ago, Vesper said:

 

As touched on, one is geared to post like, talk like, and manipulate, teenagers. 

[IMissEden 20]

15 hours ago, ZAPHOD2319 said:

He is becoming more unhinged everyday. Now his safe place Fox News is calling him on his nonsense and he goes further into the weeds. It’s crazy.

 

Based on a snipped out of context clip from Kamala HQ? Do you like to work with honesty or not 

[Vesper 28,801]

 

 

 

 

Edited October 17 by Vesper

[Fernando 6,458]

18 hours ago, Fulham Broadway said:

Funny thing is they have a history of it since 1948. Nakba, 1967 Naksa Golan Heights, Sinai peninsular, Annexing Jerusalem 1980, another 320 illegal settlements (UN) in last 10 years etc etc

Even this year Israel has seized 23.7 sq km more than in the last 20 years...

Even Likud cabinet ministers have said Gaza is to be new Israeli settlements

Yes but those was after a war. Many nations wanted to destroy Israel so they have a right to defend themselves. In those wars the one that wanted to destroyed them lost and because of that lost land. That is what happened in war, if you lose you will lose land. 

If you want to defend land then go to Peru and defend the land they took from Ecuador. Go to Mexico and defend the land they lost to USA. Etc etc. 

But no, somewhere else no one cares but because it's Israel then people jump at any little thing. 

Edited October 17 by Fernando

[Fulham Broadway 16,845]

13 minutes ago, Fernando said:

Yes but those was after a war. Many nations wanted to destroy Israel so they have a right to defend themselves. In those wars the one that wanted to destroyed them lost and because of that lost land. That is what happened in war, if you lose you will lose land. 

If you want to defend land then go to Peru and defend the land they took from Ecuador. Go to Mexico and defend the land they lost to USA. Etc etc. 

But no, somewhere else no one cares but because it's Israel then people jump at any little thing. 

They have been aggressive before any 'wars'. The main reason is that it is an apartheid state, that is illegally occupying others land and they think they are better than everyone else.  In that instance the people that have been displaced and tortured have the right to defend themselves. 

Evangelical Christians blindly support israel because of the Judeo Christian links. I am not anti Israel have met many fantastic Israelis. 

However the UK and US with endless weapons for Netanyahu have sown much discord, and hate for decades towards Israel. 

[Sir Mikel OBE 4,919]

14 minutes ago, Fernando said:

Yes but those was after a war. Many nations wanted to destroy Israel so they have a right to defend themselves. In those wars the one that wanted to destroyed them lost and because of that lost land. That is what happened in war, if you lose you will lose land. 

If you want to defend land then go to Peru and defend the land they took from Ecuador. Go to Mexico and defend the land they lost to USA. Etc etc. 

But no, somewhere else no one cares but because it's Israel then people jump at any little thing. 

If Peruvians tried to genocide Ecuadorians we'd stop them.

 

Hell, we cant even stop Mexicans from hopping over the border without people screaming bloody murder so if any genocide happened we'd stop it.

 

Theres only one group who gets to kill at will, shame us about it, and then get paid after such shaming. Its why only 1 STATE  is a solution. 2 states would just be people killing each other until the end. These groups are going to have to live TOGETHER.

[Fernando 6,458]

30 minutes ago, Sir Mikel OBE said:

If Peruvians tried to genocide Ecuadorians we'd stop them.

 

Hell, we cant even stop Mexicans from hopping over the border without people screaming bloody murder so if any genocide happened we'd stop it.

 

Theres only one group who gets to kill at will, shame us about it, and then get paid after such shaming. Its why only 1 STATE  is a solution. 2 states would just be people killing each other until the end. These groups are going to have to live TOGETHER.

That would be awesome if it where to work. 

[Sir Mikel OBE 4,919]

1 hour ago, Fernando said:

That would be awesome if it where to work. 

If the people of Rwanda, who had a genocide when I was a kid, can come together to make one of the cleanest capitals in Africa today, then folks with all of the money and resources Israel have can come together and make something with Muslims.

[Fernando 6,458]

2 hours ago, Sir Mikel OBE said:

If the people of Rwanda, who had a genocide when I was a kid, can come together to make one of the cleanest capitals in Africa today, then folks with all of the money and resources Israel have can come together and make something with Muslims.

But the thing is in many believes they have that Israel is the enemy, like you have Iran who backs a lot of these terrorist organization that want Israel wipe out. 

So besides the make it work as one nation you will have to deal with nations like Iran that are constantly giving money to terrorist organization all over the middle east to destroy Israel. 

Edited October 17 by Fernando

[Sir Mikel OBE 4,919]

41 minutes ago, Fernando said:

But the thing is in many believes they have that Israel is the enemy, like you have Iran who backs a lot of these terrorist organization that want Israel wipe out. 

So besides the make it work as one nation you will have to deal with nations like Iran that are constantly giving money to terrorist organization all over the middle east to destroy Israel. 

Yea Iran is a big issue, but I think Israel needs to really show them that they arent living with them so do they want to keep making their life bad for outsiders, or live with the people living with them?

[cosmicway 1,323]

Donald Trump home and hosed I 'm afraid.
Todays bet:

Trump = 1.57
Harris = 2.37

Hamash-Putin-deranged commie lefties achieved this, gave him the victory.
 

 

[cosmicway 1,323]

Betfair explains the trend.
Their best explanation is the Hamash voters, the (2).

https://betting.betfair.com/politics/us-politics/us-election-favourite-why-are-trumps-odds-shortening-111024-171.html

 

Edited October 17 by cosmicway

[Vesper 28,801]

Most likely minimum EV paths to Trump winning atm.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Vesper 28,801]

Europe’s centre moves east

https://feps-europe.eu/europes-centre-moves-east/

17/10/2024

After the shock of the shift to the right in the first round of the French parliamentary elections, German-Polish government consultations took place in Warsaw in early July. The two events had nothing to do with each other, the proximity of dates was a coincidence. The consequences of the French election were, however, deeply felt. During the time of the nationalist PiS governments, these meetings were suspended for several years. This year’s meeting signalled a new dynamic. It could even suggest that Europe was looking for a new centre. Will the German-Polish engine replace the Franco-German engine as the driving force of Europe in the future? Without wishing to overuse such political formulas: Poland, with Donald Tusk, who has demonstrated how to defeat a right-wing nationalist party in elections without falling for its rhetoric, will be a key player in European politics for the foreseeable future.

Even if it was only just about possible to prevent the right-wing populists from making a breakthrough in France, looking at the political map of the continent after the European elections, many observers in Western capitals are rubbing their eyes: old Europe – the West – is now just as volatile or even more unstable and challenged by populism than the EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The new dynamic in German-Polish relations is merely an indicator of the shift in the intra-European balance of power towards the East. The development that the Union is entrusting the representation of its foreign and security policy to two Baltic commissioners (Kaja Kallas from Estonia as the EU’s foreign policy chief, and Andrius Kubilius from Lithuania, defence and space) is another sign confirming this trend. Behind this are far-reaching geo-political and -economic changes triggered by the Russian war against Ukraine. These developments are only slowly finding their way into the minds of politicians and citizens in the old West. This became clear at the beginning of May during the celebrations to mark the 20th anniversary of the EU accession of the Central and Eastern Europeans. In the West this was widely and unanimously celebrated as a great success, which is certainly true regarding the economic development and political integration of the accession countries into EU structures. From the perspective of the accession countries, however, this interpretation is the Western view, which only describes half the truth. What is ignored or seen with little empathy in the West are the radical social adjustments that people were exposed to from 1989 onwards during the transformation from ‘actually existing socialism’ to a market economy and democracy and the adoption of the acquis communautaire preparing for EU accession. And in all Central and Eastern European countries – unlike in the new German Länder of the former GDR – this had to be mastered without gigantic transfer payments from the West.

Second-class EU members

Although the Soviet-style planned economy had proved to be uncompetitive with the capitalist West, there were political motives behind the revolutions of 1989-1990. At the time, the oppositions were movements for freedom, democracy and national independence. Nevertheless, the population expected that it would be possible to catch up economically with the West in the foreseeable future, adopt its institutions and thus also its successful welfare state. What was completely underestimated though, was the functioning of capitalist market economies, which produce winners and losers in phases of economic upheaval. Since the financial crisis of 2008-2010 at the latest it had become clear that these expectations would be disappointed for a long time to come. Despite all the convergence between the economies in the West and East, average incomes in the region today are still only 60-80 per cent of the EU level (40-60 per cent on accession in 2004). As a result, large sections of the population of Central and Eastern Europe are disillusioned with the West. Even decades after the end of the Cold War, there is still a widespread feeling in the region of being treated as ‘second-class Europeans’.

The West’s mistake was to tell the story of 1989 as one of victory (Fukuyama). From the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe, however, it is not a story of victory, but one of imitation (Krastev). The East wanted to become like the West, or rather, like the West was imagined to be. Yet imitation always involves the assumption that the imitated is better than the imitator. This is not a basis for building a strong sense of self-worth and a positive identity. 

But the ‘age of imitation’ is now closing. The supposedly exemplary international order of the Western old members turned out to be fragile in the wake of the financial crisis and the overlapping multiple crises that followed (migration, terrorism, pandemic, climate, etc.). In the East, it is becoming clear that democracy and the current form of global capitalism are also becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile in the West of the EU.

Parallel to this realisation, the economic importance of the Eastern countries for the entire Union has increased enormously. Based on successful modernisation efforts, flanked by massive investments from the western states of the Union, the countries have succeeded in integrating their economies into the European division of labour and their supply chains. However, in view of global dynamics, the East will not be able to rest on its laurels regarding integration into the common market. A second transformation is imminent, which should overcome the weaknesses of the previous ‘dependent’ growth model. The old industries (for example the automotive industry) must modernise. The existing industrial model is exhausted, active industrial policy is required. Demographic change, decarbonisation and digitalisation must be mastered. The service sector will become increasingly important. Under these conditions, further growth depends on productivity increases, which must be accompanied, above all, by investment in innovation and education. Nevertheless, the times when the region’s countries were marginalised and considered supplicants are over – they are now playing in the same league.

Central and Eastern Europe has become a beacon of hope for foreign trade for various countries in the EU – above all Germany. This has increased massively since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. In times of increasing multipolarity, growing competition for raw materials, investment locations and markets, de-risking and in-shoring, the EU internal market is gaining in importance.

For Germany, this means that the volume of foreign trade with the four Visegrad countries alone (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) is now significantly higher than with China or the US. Export growth in the region is around three times higher than the growth of German foreign trade as a whole. Leading the way for many of these developments is Poland, which will achieve GDP growth of 2.8 per cent in 2024. The country has grown faster than Germany and the EU average for three decades. According to forecasts, this successful trend is set to continue. 

From the margins to the centre of European politics

The region’s importance in the EU has grown not only economically. Russia’s war against Ukraine shifted the entire focus of European politics to the east. However, the surprise was much greater in Brussels and the Western capitals than in Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, the attack itself and the brutal nature of the Russian warfare confirmed the eastern countries in their membership of the EU and, above all, NATO. Putin’s turning away from the West had been accelerating since his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 at the latest. The path led from the second Chechen war via Georgia and Syria to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. On this way the president profiled his country as a violent military actor, ready and able to engage in multiple types of intervention: state terrorism, hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks, fake news campaigns and the deployment of mercenary troops, to name but a few. As dramatic as this was, it initially changed little in terms of policy towards Russia. This was true for Brussels, whose Russia policy had already come to a standstill sometime before the attack on Ukraine, and important Western European capitals, but above all for Berlin. The Russian threat was precisely what the Central and Eastern Europeans had been urgently warning against, at least since Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. For Germany, it became clear that its policy towards the region had largely been a derivative of its policy towards Russia. 

The EU’s cohesion and ability to act, particularly expressed in a series of sanctions programmes against Russia and the granting of candidate status to Ukraine, were among the positive surprises of the conflict. However, the domestic political consequences of the sanctions against Russia and of the ‘expensive ‘continued support for Ukraine were underestimated. As the war drags on, they will increasingly become a burden on broad solidarity in the EU member states. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are facing these challenges in the same way as the old members in the west of the Union.

Nevertheless, except for Viktor Orbán’s Russia-friendly Hungary, they are among the most resolute supporters of Ukraine. Against the backdrop of their own historical experiences with Russia or the Soviet Union, these countries are now home to a large proportion of Ukrainian migrants and are investing heavily not only in their own defence, but also in the expansion of European security structures and the European pillar of NATO. Their geopolitical status is further strengthened by the inclusion of Sweden and Finland in the defence community, which turned the Baltic Sea into NATO waters.

Against the backdrop of the West’s misjudgement of Russia and its ignorance of Russia critical voices from Central and Eastern Europe, the opportunity has arisen to meet on an equal footing and tackle common challenges in a coordinated manner. The countries in the region can now expect to be heard and respected. What they should not expect is that other countries in the Union will necessarily share their views and interests.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who mutated from a liberal beacon of hope of the fall of communism in 1989 to the enfant terrible and spokesman of right-wing populism, formulated the emancipation of the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU as early as 2017 with the words: “after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we here in Central Europe believed that Europe was our future. Now it turns out that we are the future of Europe”. Most of Orbán’s contemporaries can subscribe to the first part of the quote, but less so to the second, because, in the meantime, the idea of illiberal democracy and other right-wing populist concepts have become what characterises Orban’s vision of this Europe. The goals of the democratic elites and the electorate that supports them are more likely to be focused on seeing their interests respected in the EU to help ensure that the Union delivers prosperity and security in freedom.

Seen in this light, the 2004 accession candidates have arrived in the Union. However, the club they are now members of differs greatly from the one they wanted to join back then. A few months before the 2004 enlargement, the first European security strategy stated: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”. Today, this self-image of the former EU seems like a distant place of yearning, albeit one the East can now equally contribute its part in achieving. 

[KEVINAA 97]

People have finally had enough Elon Musk on X.

Now most people are jumping ship to bluesky social - bsky.app. the owners took musk money and created the alternative of twitter.

X is now removing the block button.

If you block someone on X it just stops from from interacting or replying but doesn't stop you from seeing the account.

Search the lastest posts of bluesky or bsky.app in the search.

And so many people are using so many swear words to mysk replies at @ elonmusk 

 

 

Edited October 18 by KEVINAA

[Vesper 28,801]

Christian nationalist pastor Joel Webbon calls for the public execution of women who falsely claim to have been sexually assaulted: "#MeToo would end real fast ... All you have to do is publicly execute a few women who have lied."

https://www.peoplefor.org/rightwingwatch/joel-webbon-wants-publicly-execute-few-women-who-have-lied

 

 

[Vesper 28,801]

The emotional underpinnings of populism

This following conversation is based on a Social Europe podcast episode and is edited for length and clarity.

https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-emotional-underpinnings-of-populism

Henning Meyer: Peter Hall, thank you so much for joining me again on the Social Europe podcast. It’s hard to believe it’s been seven years since we last discussed the rise of populism in Western democracies. Back then, we talked about the economic and cultural drivers behind populism. In the meantime, you’ve published research on perceptions of fairness and economic uncertainty and how these have contributed to the rise of populism. Could you pick up from where we left off and share your new insights on the subject?

Peter A. Hall: Yes, of course. This is a moving and growing target. I’ve been working on this with Sung In Kim at Harvard, and we’ve been looking at European countries, trying to move beyond the standard interpretations. The traditional view is that economic hardship—like the loss of manufacturing jobs due to global shocks—has driven support for right-wing populist parties. Others, like Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, suggest it’s a cultural backlash against post-material values. Both of these perspectives have merit, but they don’t fully address the issue of fairness.

Politics is often about who gets what, when and how, but it also involves moral visions. Social democratic parties, for example, have historically focused on social justice, while the right justifies tax cuts and deregulation as fair rewards for individual effort. However, most analyses of populism don’t account for how much people’s sense of fairness—or lack thereof—drives their support for populist parties. Our research shows that people on both the radical left and right may support these movements because they believe their situation or society is fundamentally unfair.

A second point we’ve explored is that people aren’t just concerned with their current circumstances but are also deeply worried about future uncertainty—whether society or their own lives will improve or worsen in the coming years. Even those who have decent jobs may fear that their work is at risk of being automated or replaced by AI, and this uncertainty can lead them to support radical right parties. So, fairness and uncertainty are key to understanding why populism is rising.

Henning Meyer: This sense of future uncertainty seems to be growing. Technological change is accelerating, and more groups are affected. It used to be lorry drivers and self-driving cars, but now, with generative AI, even creative jobs are at risk. The breadth and speed of these changes seem to fuel uncertainty. Mainstream political parties don’t seem to have convincing answers for how to shape the future, which leads to a sense of lost control—something we saw with events like Brexit and migration, too. Do you see a connection between this uncertainty, the feeling of lost control, and the inability of mainstream parties to offer a clear vision?

Peter A. Hall: Absolutely. The truth is, we face an incredibly uncertain world. Who knows, maybe seven years from now, it’ll be an avatar interviewing me instead of you, Henning! This uncertainty is worrying people. What’s interesting is why this uncertainty leads to support for right-wing populist parties rather than center or left-wing parties.

Social psychology offers some answers. Research shows that when people feel uncertain, they become more attuned to issues of unfairness. There’s a mutually reinforcing relationship between economic uncertainty and the perception that their situation is unfair. At the same time, uncertainty makes people more defensive of their in-group, which often leads to hostility toward out-groups—like immigrants. Immigrants frequently become targets of right-wing populist rhetoric. So, the link between uncertainty and support for the populist right is a key causal chain.

For example, I have a friend at Northwestern University who conducted experiments where he showed people images of robots and then asked them about their views on immigrants. People who saw the robots were more hostile toward immigrants. It seems strange at first, but it reveals a deeper connection: when people feel the world is out of control, they become defensive and focus on perceived threats, like immigration.

Henning Meyer: The immigration issue is particularly complex. In Europe, people often oppose refugees while simultaneously acknowledging that labor shortages require more immigration. So, the context in which the immigration debate happens seems crucial. Does this align with your findings?

Peter A. Hall: Yes, it does. There’s a paradox in Western societies: we need immigration to maintain prosperity, and some argue that the American economy has fared relatively well recently due to immigration. But people’s thinking about immigration isn’t driven by rational economic logic. It’s more emotional. They see immigration not as a solution to economic problems but as a threat to their identity and culture. This emotional response, which populist politicians exploit, is crucial in understanding the current political landscape.

Henning Meyer: Many observers here in Europe have noted that policy solutions alone won’t solve the populist challenge. Recent elections, particularly in Germany, have shown that political strategies seem to be running out of steam. Popular politicians are barely winning. It feels like we’re reaching the limits of what politics can deliver in terms of defence. This leaves us with an underlying cultural struggle driven by uncertainty about the future. Could you expand on your research into how support for right-wing and left-wing populism differs?

Peter A. Hall: Sure. Sung In and I studied 13 European countries, distinguishing between personal unfairness—how people feel about their own situation—and social unfairness—how they feel about society’s fairness overall. Those who perceive high social unfairness tend to support the radical left or centre-left. Young people, the unemployed, and those with lower incomes are more likely to support the radical left. In contrast, people who feel their personal situation is unfair are more likely to support the populist right and oppose immigration.

The stark difference we found is that personal unfairness drives support for the populist right, while social unfairness leads people to the left. This contrast is one of the key insights from our research, which we published in Comparative Political Studies.

Henning Meyer: There’s been a worrying trend of young voters moving toward the far right in recent elections, both in Germany and Austria. Is this linked to the feeling of personal unfairness among the youth?

Peter A. Hall: Our research doesn’t specifically answer this question, but there are some plausible explanations. Older voters may have some residual loyalty to traditional parties, while young people don’t have that same connection. Another factor could be the economic situation of young people. In countries with high youth unemployment, like France and parts of southern Europe, young people face precarious job prospects. This might explain why they’re drawn to the populist right. However, I think more research is needed to fully understand this trend.

Henning Meyer: When we put all these pieces together—economic and cultural factors, uncertainty, and personal perceptions of unfairness—what’s your overall assessment of the health of Western democracies?

Peter A. Hall: It could be better. In Eastern Europe, democracy is under serious threat, with countries like Hungary and (previously) Poland eroding democratic institutions. In Western Europe, I’m somewhat more optimistic. Populist right parties have been part of coalition governments without necessarily undermining democracy, though they do pose threats to immigrant communities and social cohesion.

What concerns me most is the erosion of social norms that kept political discourse within certain bounds. The American case, for instance, shows how inflammatory rhetoric can have lasting effects. Even if populist politicians don’t win office, the divisions they create can leave deep social scars.

Henning Meyer: Against this difficult backdrop, what can mainstream parties—Christian Democrats, Social Democrats—do to change course?

One major issue is the perceived failure of public administration to deliver on big challenges. People are losing trust in government. Governments must become more capable of addressing people’s grievances and delivering tangible results. For instance, the government pledged to build 400,000 flats per year in Germany but has fallen far short of this target. Housing is a key factor in reducing uncertainty, yet the government has not delivered on this promise.

Beyond policy, though, mainstream parties must offer a broader political vision that addresses people’s fears about the future. Without that, policy solutions alone will not be enough to regain trust.

Peter A. Hall: You’re right. It’s easier said than done. While generous social benefits are important, people also want decent jobs. Governments can help make existing jobs better by focusing on living wage laws and other regulations that improve working conditions. This may not solve all the problems, but it can help reduce some of the uncertainty people feel.

Henning Meyer: During the last election, Olaf Scholz tapped into this sentiment, talking about “respect” for the workers who keep society running. It was part of his success then.

Peter, thank you so much for sharing your insights. Hopefully, in seven years, we’ll discuss how all of this has been resolved!

Peter A. Hall: It’s been a pleasure, Henning. Thanks for having me.

 

Listen to or watch the podcast episode here: https://podcast.socialeurope.eu/episode/the-emotional-underpinnings-of-populism

[ZAPHOD2319 4,477]

On 17/10/2024 at 07:12, IMissEden said:

Based on a snipped out of context clip from Kamala HQ? Do you like to work with honesty or not 

Have you been watching him this last week? His handlers have cancelled every event he was scheduled for including an NRA rally. There is no friendlier event for him than that. As far as honest, pick your own source, that was 100% not a misrepresentation of what he said.