Politics & Stuff

[Fernando 6,585]

30 minutes ago, Sir Mikel OBE said:

If Peruvians tried to genocide Ecuadorians we'd stop them.

 

Hell, we cant even stop Mexicans from hopping over the border without people screaming bloody murder so if any genocide happened we'd stop it.

 

Theres only one group who gets to kill at will, shame us about it, and then get paid after such shaming. Its why only 1 STATE  is a solution. 2 states would just be people killing each other until the end. These groups are going to have to live TOGETHER.

That would be awesome if it where to work. 

[Sir Mikel OBE 4,920]

1 hour ago, Fernando said:

That would be awesome if it where to work. 

If the people of Rwanda, who had a genocide when I was a kid, can come together to make one of the cleanest capitals in Africa today, then folks with all of the money and resources Israel have can come together and make something with Muslims.

[Fernando 6,585]

2 hours ago, Sir Mikel OBE said:

If the people of Rwanda, who had a genocide when I was a kid, can come together to make one of the cleanest capitals in Africa today, then folks with all of the money and resources Israel have can come together and make something with Muslims.

But the thing is in many believes they have that Israel is the enemy, like you have Iran who backs a lot of these terrorist organization that want Israel wipe out. 

So besides the make it work as one nation you will have to deal with nations like Iran that are constantly giving money to terrorist organization all over the middle east to destroy Israel. 

Edited October 17, 2024 by Fernando

[Sir Mikel OBE 4,920]

41 minutes ago, Fernando said:

But the thing is in many believes they have that Israel is the enemy, like you have Iran who backs a lot of these terrorist organization that want Israel wipe out. 

So besides the make it work as one nation you will have to deal with nations like Iran that are constantly giving money to terrorist organization all over the middle east to destroy Israel. 

Yea Iran is a big issue, but I think Israel needs to really show them that they arent living with them so do they want to keep making their life bad for outsiders, or live with the people living with them?

[cosmicway 1,333]

Donald Trump home and hosed I 'm afraid.
Todays bet:

Trump = 1.57
Harris = 2.37

Hamash-Putin-deranged commie lefties achieved this, gave him the victory.
 

 

[cosmicway 1,333]

Betfair explains the trend.
Their best explanation is the Hamash voters, the (2).

https://betting.betfair.com/politics/us-politics/us-election-favourite-why-are-trumps-odds-shortening-111024-171.html

 

Edited October 17, 2024 by cosmicway

[Vesper 30,117]

Most likely minimum EV paths to Trump winning atm.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Vesper 30,117]

Europe’s centre moves east

https://feps-europe.eu/europes-centre-moves-east/

17/10/2024

After the shock of the shift to the right in the first round of the French parliamentary elections, German-Polish government consultations took place in Warsaw in early July. The two events had nothing to do with each other, the proximity of dates was a coincidence. The consequences of the French election were, however, deeply felt. During the time of the nationalist PiS governments, these meetings were suspended for several years. This year’s meeting signalled a new dynamic. It could even suggest that Europe was looking for a new centre. Will the German-Polish engine replace the Franco-German engine as the driving force of Europe in the future? Without wishing to overuse such political formulas: Poland, with Donald Tusk, who has demonstrated how to defeat a right-wing nationalist party in elections without falling for its rhetoric, will be a key player in European politics for the foreseeable future.

Even if it was only just about possible to prevent the right-wing populists from making a breakthrough in France, looking at the political map of the continent after the European elections, many observers in Western capitals are rubbing their eyes: old Europe – the West – is now just as volatile or even more unstable and challenged by populism than the EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The new dynamic in German-Polish relations is merely an indicator of the shift in the intra-European balance of power towards the East. The development that the Union is entrusting the representation of its foreign and security policy to two Baltic commissioners (Kaja Kallas from Estonia as the EU’s foreign policy chief, and Andrius Kubilius from Lithuania, defence and space) is another sign confirming this trend. Behind this are far-reaching geo-political and -economic changes triggered by the Russian war against Ukraine. These developments are only slowly finding their way into the minds of politicians and citizens in the old West. This became clear at the beginning of May during the celebrations to mark the 20th anniversary of the EU accession of the Central and Eastern Europeans. In the West this was widely and unanimously celebrated as a great success, which is certainly true regarding the economic development and political integration of the accession countries into EU structures. From the perspective of the accession countries, however, this interpretation is the Western view, which only describes half the truth. What is ignored or seen with little empathy in the West are the radical social adjustments that people were exposed to from 1989 onwards during the transformation from ‘actually existing socialism’ to a market economy and democracy and the adoption of the acquis communautaire preparing for EU accession. And in all Central and Eastern European countries – unlike in the new German Länder of the former GDR – this had to be mastered without gigantic transfer payments from the West.

Second-class EU members

Although the Soviet-style planned economy had proved to be uncompetitive with the capitalist West, there were political motives behind the revolutions of 1989-1990. At the time, the oppositions were movements for freedom, democracy and national independence. Nevertheless, the population expected that it would be possible to catch up economically with the West in the foreseeable future, adopt its institutions and thus also its successful welfare state. What was completely underestimated though, was the functioning of capitalist market economies, which produce winners and losers in phases of economic upheaval. Since the financial crisis of 2008-2010 at the latest it had become clear that these expectations would be disappointed for a long time to come. Despite all the convergence between the economies in the West and East, average incomes in the region today are still only 60-80 per cent of the EU level (40-60 per cent on accession in 2004). As a result, large sections of the population of Central and Eastern Europe are disillusioned with the West. Even decades after the end of the Cold War, there is still a widespread feeling in the region of being treated as ‘second-class Europeans’.

The West’s mistake was to tell the story of 1989 as one of victory (Fukuyama). From the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe, however, it is not a story of victory, but one of imitation (Krastev). The East wanted to become like the West, or rather, like the West was imagined to be. Yet imitation always involves the assumption that the imitated is better than the imitator. This is not a basis for building a strong sense of self-worth and a positive identity. 

But the ‘age of imitation’ is now closing. The supposedly exemplary international order of the Western old members turned out to be fragile in the wake of the financial crisis and the overlapping multiple crises that followed (migration, terrorism, pandemic, climate, etc.). In the East, it is becoming clear that democracy and the current form of global capitalism are also becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile in the West of the EU.

Parallel to this realisation, the economic importance of the Eastern countries for the entire Union has increased enormously. Based on successful modernisation efforts, flanked by massive investments from the western states of the Union, the countries have succeeded in integrating their economies into the European division of labour and their supply chains. However, in view of global dynamics, the East will not be able to rest on its laurels regarding integration into the common market. A second transformation is imminent, which should overcome the weaknesses of the previous ‘dependent’ growth model. The old industries (for example the automotive industry) must modernise. The existing industrial model is exhausted, active industrial policy is required. Demographic change, decarbonisation and digitalisation must be mastered. The service sector will become increasingly important. Under these conditions, further growth depends on productivity increases, which must be accompanied, above all, by investment in innovation and education. Nevertheless, the times when the region’s countries were marginalised and considered supplicants are over – they are now playing in the same league.

Central and Eastern Europe has become a beacon of hope for foreign trade for various countries in the EU – above all Germany. This has increased massively since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. In times of increasing multipolarity, growing competition for raw materials, investment locations and markets, de-risking and in-shoring, the EU internal market is gaining in importance.

For Germany, this means that the volume of foreign trade with the four Visegrad countries alone (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) is now significantly higher than with China or the US. Export growth in the region is around three times higher than the growth of German foreign trade as a whole. Leading the way for many of these developments is Poland, which will achieve GDP growth of 2.8 per cent in 2024. The country has grown faster than Germany and the EU average for three decades. According to forecasts, this successful trend is set to continue. 

From the margins to the centre of European politics

The region’s importance in the EU has grown not only economically. Russia’s war against Ukraine shifted the entire focus of European politics to the east. However, the surprise was much greater in Brussels and the Western capitals than in Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, the attack itself and the brutal nature of the Russian warfare confirmed the eastern countries in their membership of the EU and, above all, NATO. Putin’s turning away from the West had been accelerating since his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 at the latest. The path led from the second Chechen war via Georgia and Syria to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. On this way the president profiled his country as a violent military actor, ready and able to engage in multiple types of intervention: state terrorism, hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks, fake news campaigns and the deployment of mercenary troops, to name but a few. As dramatic as this was, it initially changed little in terms of policy towards Russia. This was true for Brussels, whose Russia policy had already come to a standstill sometime before the attack on Ukraine, and important Western European capitals, but above all for Berlin. The Russian threat was precisely what the Central and Eastern Europeans had been urgently warning against, at least since Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. For Germany, it became clear that its policy towards the region had largely been a derivative of its policy towards Russia. 

The EU’s cohesion and ability to act, particularly expressed in a series of sanctions programmes against Russia and the granting of candidate status to Ukraine, were among the positive surprises of the conflict. However, the domestic political consequences of the sanctions against Russia and of the ‘expensive ‘continued support for Ukraine were underestimated. As the war drags on, they will increasingly become a burden on broad solidarity in the EU member states. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are facing these challenges in the same way as the old members in the west of the Union.

Nevertheless, except for Viktor Orbán’s Russia-friendly Hungary, they are among the most resolute supporters of Ukraine. Against the backdrop of their own historical experiences with Russia or the Soviet Union, these countries are now home to a large proportion of Ukrainian migrants and are investing heavily not only in their own defence, but also in the expansion of European security structures and the European pillar of NATO. Their geopolitical status is further strengthened by the inclusion of Sweden and Finland in the defence community, which turned the Baltic Sea into NATO waters.

Against the backdrop of the West’s misjudgement of Russia and its ignorance of Russia critical voices from Central and Eastern Europe, the opportunity has arisen to meet on an equal footing and tackle common challenges in a coordinated manner. The countries in the region can now expect to be heard and respected. What they should not expect is that other countries in the Union will necessarily share their views and interests.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who mutated from a liberal beacon of hope of the fall of communism in 1989 to the enfant terrible and spokesman of right-wing populism, formulated the emancipation of the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU as early as 2017 with the words: “after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we here in Central Europe believed that Europe was our future. Now it turns out that we are the future of Europe”. Most of Orbán’s contemporaries can subscribe to the first part of the quote, but less so to the second, because, in the meantime, the idea of illiberal democracy and other right-wing populist concepts have become what characterises Orban’s vision of this Europe. The goals of the democratic elites and the electorate that supports them are more likely to be focused on seeing their interests respected in the EU to help ensure that the Union delivers prosperity and security in freedom.

Seen in this light, the 2004 accession candidates have arrived in the Union. However, the club they are now members of differs greatly from the one they wanted to join back then. A few months before the 2004 enlargement, the first European security strategy stated: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”. Today, this self-image of the former EU seems like a distant place of yearning, albeit one the East can now equally contribute its part in achieving. 

[KEVINAA 129]

People have finally had enough Elon Musk on X.

Now most people are jumping ship to bluesky social - bsky.app. the owners took musk money and created the alternative of twitter.

X is now removing the block button.

If you block someone on X it just stops from from interacting or replying but doesn't stop you from seeing the account.

Search the lastest posts of bluesky or bsky.app in the search.

And so many people are using so many swear words to mysk replies at @ elonmusk 

 

 

Edited October 18, 2024 by KEVINAA

[Vesper 30,117]

Christian nationalist pastor Joel Webbon calls for the public execution of women who falsely claim to have been sexually assaulted: "#MeToo would end real fast ... All you have to do is publicly execute a few women who have lied."

https://www.peoplefor.org/rightwingwatch/joel-webbon-wants-publicly-execute-few-women-who-have-lied

 

 

[Vesper 30,117]

The emotional underpinnings of populism

This following conversation is based on a Social Europe podcast episode and is edited for length and clarity.

https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-emotional-underpinnings-of-populism

Henning Meyer: Peter Hall, thank you so much for joining me again on the Social Europe podcast. It’s hard to believe it’s been seven years since we last discussed the rise of populism in Western democracies. Back then, we talked about the economic and cultural drivers behind populism. In the meantime, you’ve published research on perceptions of fairness and economic uncertainty and how these have contributed to the rise of populism. Could you pick up from where we left off and share your new insights on the subject?

Peter A. Hall: Yes, of course. This is a moving and growing target. I’ve been working on this with Sung In Kim at Harvard, and we’ve been looking at European countries, trying to move beyond the standard interpretations. The traditional view is that economic hardship—like the loss of manufacturing jobs due to global shocks—has driven support for right-wing populist parties. Others, like Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, suggest it’s a cultural backlash against post-material values. Both of these perspectives have merit, but they don’t fully address the issue of fairness.

Politics is often about who gets what, when and how, but it also involves moral visions. Social democratic parties, for example, have historically focused on social justice, while the right justifies tax cuts and deregulation as fair rewards for individual effort. However, most analyses of populism don’t account for how much people’s sense of fairness—or lack thereof—drives their support for populist parties. Our research shows that people on both the radical left and right may support these movements because they believe their situation or society is fundamentally unfair.

A second point we’ve explored is that people aren’t just concerned with their current circumstances but are also deeply worried about future uncertainty—whether society or their own lives will improve or worsen in the coming years. Even those who have decent jobs may fear that their work is at risk of being automated or replaced by AI, and this uncertainty can lead them to support radical right parties. So, fairness and uncertainty are key to understanding why populism is rising.

Henning Meyer: This sense of future uncertainty seems to be growing. Technological change is accelerating, and more groups are affected. It used to be lorry drivers and self-driving cars, but now, with generative AI, even creative jobs are at risk. The breadth and speed of these changes seem to fuel uncertainty. Mainstream political parties don’t seem to have convincing answers for how to shape the future, which leads to a sense of lost control—something we saw with events like Brexit and migration, too. Do you see a connection between this uncertainty, the feeling of lost control, and the inability of mainstream parties to offer a clear vision?

Peter A. Hall: Absolutely. The truth is, we face an incredibly uncertain world. Who knows, maybe seven years from now, it’ll be an avatar interviewing me instead of you, Henning! This uncertainty is worrying people. What’s interesting is why this uncertainty leads to support for right-wing populist parties rather than center or left-wing parties.

Social psychology offers some answers. Research shows that when people feel uncertain, they become more attuned to issues of unfairness. There’s a mutually reinforcing relationship between economic uncertainty and the perception that their situation is unfair. At the same time, uncertainty makes people more defensive of their in-group, which often leads to hostility toward out-groups—like immigrants. Immigrants frequently become targets of right-wing populist rhetoric. So, the link between uncertainty and support for the populist right is a key causal chain.

For example, I have a friend at Northwestern University who conducted experiments where he showed people images of robots and then asked them about their views on immigrants. People who saw the robots were more hostile toward immigrants. It seems strange at first, but it reveals a deeper connection: when people feel the world is out of control, they become defensive and focus on perceived threats, like immigration.

Henning Meyer: The immigration issue is particularly complex. In Europe, people often oppose refugees while simultaneously acknowledging that labor shortages require more immigration. So, the context in which the immigration debate happens seems crucial. Does this align with your findings?

Peter A. Hall: Yes, it does. There’s a paradox in Western societies: we need immigration to maintain prosperity, and some argue that the American economy has fared relatively well recently due to immigration. But people’s thinking about immigration isn’t driven by rational economic logic. It’s more emotional. They see immigration not as a solution to economic problems but as a threat to their identity and culture. This emotional response, which populist politicians exploit, is crucial in understanding the current political landscape.

Henning Meyer: Many observers here in Europe have noted that policy solutions alone won’t solve the populist challenge. Recent elections, particularly in Germany, have shown that political strategies seem to be running out of steam. Popular politicians are barely winning. It feels like we’re reaching the limits of what politics can deliver in terms of defence. This leaves us with an underlying cultural struggle driven by uncertainty about the future. Could you expand on your research into how support for right-wing and left-wing populism differs?

Peter A. Hall: Sure. Sung In and I studied 13 European countries, distinguishing between personal unfairness—how people feel about their own situation—and social unfairness—how they feel about society’s fairness overall. Those who perceive high social unfairness tend to support the radical left or centre-left. Young people, the unemployed, and those with lower incomes are more likely to support the radical left. In contrast, people who feel their personal situation is unfair are more likely to support the populist right and oppose immigration.

The stark difference we found is that personal unfairness drives support for the populist right, while social unfairness leads people to the left. This contrast is one of the key insights from our research, which we published in Comparative Political Studies.

Henning Meyer: There’s been a worrying trend of young voters moving toward the far right in recent elections, both in Germany and Austria. Is this linked to the feeling of personal unfairness among the youth?

Peter A. Hall: Our research doesn’t specifically answer this question, but there are some plausible explanations. Older voters may have some residual loyalty to traditional parties, while young people don’t have that same connection. Another factor could be the economic situation of young people. In countries with high youth unemployment, like France and parts of southern Europe, young people face precarious job prospects. This might explain why they’re drawn to the populist right. However, I think more research is needed to fully understand this trend.

Henning Meyer: When we put all these pieces together—economic and cultural factors, uncertainty, and personal perceptions of unfairness—what’s your overall assessment of the health of Western democracies?

Peter A. Hall: It could be better. In Eastern Europe, democracy is under serious threat, with countries like Hungary and (previously) Poland eroding democratic institutions. In Western Europe, I’m somewhat more optimistic. Populist right parties have been part of coalition governments without necessarily undermining democracy, though they do pose threats to immigrant communities and social cohesion.

What concerns me most is the erosion of social norms that kept political discourse within certain bounds. The American case, for instance, shows how inflammatory rhetoric can have lasting effects. Even if populist politicians don’t win office, the divisions they create can leave deep social scars.

Henning Meyer: Against this difficult backdrop, what can mainstream parties—Christian Democrats, Social Democrats—do to change course?

One major issue is the perceived failure of public administration to deliver on big challenges. People are losing trust in government. Governments must become more capable of addressing people’s grievances and delivering tangible results. For instance, the government pledged to build 400,000 flats per year in Germany but has fallen far short of this target. Housing is a key factor in reducing uncertainty, yet the government has not delivered on this promise.

Beyond policy, though, mainstream parties must offer a broader political vision that addresses people’s fears about the future. Without that, policy solutions alone will not be enough to regain trust.

Peter A. Hall: You’re right. It’s easier said than done. While generous social benefits are important, people also want decent jobs. Governments can help make existing jobs better by focusing on living wage laws and other regulations that improve working conditions. This may not solve all the problems, but it can help reduce some of the uncertainty people feel.

Henning Meyer: During the last election, Olaf Scholz tapped into this sentiment, talking about “respect” for the workers who keep society running. It was part of his success then.

Peter, thank you so much for sharing your insights. Hopefully, in seven years, we’ll discuss how all of this has been resolved!

Peter A. Hall: It’s been a pleasure, Henning. Thanks for having me.

 

Listen to or watch the podcast episode here: https://podcast.socialeurope.eu/episode/the-emotional-underpinnings-of-populism

[ZAPHOD2319 4,803]

On 17/10/2024 at 07:12, IMissEden said:

Based on a snipped out of context clip from Kamala HQ? Do you like to work with honesty or not 

Have you been watching him this last week? His handlers have cancelled every event he was scheduled for including an NRA rally. There is no friendlier event for him than that. As far as honest, pick your own source, that was 100% not a misrepresentation of what he said.

[Vesper 30,117]

The spectre of insecurity

Liberals have forgotten that in order for our lives not to be nasty, brutish and short, we need stability. Enter Hobbes

https://aeon.co/essays/why-liberals-fear-mongering-about-trump-should-read-hobbes

Downtown Welch, rural West Virginia, 19 May 2017. Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty

Alongside equality, freedom and opportunity, fear has long played a powerful role in political discourse. In ordinary life, fear is often a fitting response to danger. If you encounter a snake while out on a hike, fear will lead you to back away and exercise caution. If the snake is poisonous, fear will have saved your life. By contrast, the fears that dominate political discourse are less concrete. We are told to fear elites, terrorists, religious zealots, godless atheists, sexists, feminists, Marxists and the enemies of democracy. Yet even as these purported poisons are less obviously lethal, political rhetoricians have long understood that making them salient is a powerful way to shape citizens’ motivations. As Donald Trump told Bob Woodward: real power is fear.

It is tempting to think that political fear is largely manufactured – a cynical ploy to manipulate the masses. Trump’s dark vision of the United States would seem to be a prime example of this. Yet, fear can be fitting in politics. Citizens face real dangers from failed political leadership, as lethal to our livelihood as snake bites.

Thomas Hobbes, the 17th-century political philosopher, understood fear. Hobbes was born in 1588 in the English town of Malmesbury, during the Anglo-Spanish war. As rumours of an impending Spanish attack circulated, he described his mother as ‘filled with such fear that she bore twins, me and together with me fear.’ Fear would follow Hobbes throughout his life. England in the 17th century was torn apart by religious and political factions, recurring plagues, misinformation, inflation and a changing labour market. Like in our current moment, pessimism and uncertainty ran rampant. As Jonathan Healey notes in his fantastic book on this period, The Blazing World (2023), the parallels between these historical periods are not hard to find: ‘We, too, are living through our own historical moment in which a media revolution, social fracturing and culture wars are redefining society and politics.’

Frontispiece of Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes, engraved by Abraham Bosse. Public domain

Many dismiss Hobbes as a curmudgeon whose argument for authoritarianism was guided by his view that people are naturally selfish and violent. In Leviathan (1651), his most influential book, he argues that, without a powerful executive in absolute control, we would lead lives that are ‘nasty, brutish, and short’. He also seems to suggest that, once that sovereign is established, we have no right to rebel against it since the alternative is invariably worse (though commentators disagree on whether this is a fair interpretation).

We have good reason to reject the view that even the most horrific authoritarian regimes are always better than the chaos brought about by rebellion. Stability is not the only political value. But we have lost sight of how important it is. And though we certainly should reject Hobbes’s most extreme authoritarian conclusions, there is much we can learn from understanding the motivations that led Hobbes to accept them, particularly in this current moment in which the appeal of authoritarians like Trump is ascendant.

On the Hobbesian picture, fear is a fitting response to instability and insecurity. As Hobbes describes in one of the most influential passages in political philosophy, ‘wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them’, there is no point in hard work, because the results of it are uncertain. You might work hard to build a home or start a business, only for it to be taken from you by someone who finds a way to do so through strength or cleverness. And, as Hobbes argues, if the connection between our effort and the fruit of that effort is severed by uncertainty and instability, then so much of what we value loses its point. Without security there is ‘no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society.’ Instead, Hobbes suggests, we live in a state of continual fear.

It is not hard to see why insecurity about the future diminishes our lives. A dental emergency or a stolen catalytic converter might wipe out your savings. Inflation can turn a budget teetering on the edge of affordability into a financial emergency. When you are living in precarity, planning seems futile. Inflation, a rental increase or a medical emergency can leave you feeling a fool, with your plans and little else to show. Security is the foundation for much of what makes our lives worth living.

Like in the tumultuous period in which Hobbes wrote, far too many people currently face various sources of insecurity and instability. The 2023 report on the economy by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences finds that many Americans cite financial uncertainty and precarity as a central concern. The Starbucks worker who has no idea when their shift will be, how many hours they will work, or whether they will be able to keep their job is in a state of insecurity that makes it hard to plan for the future. And even if you are feeling flush today, workers are increasingly working jobs without guarantees against being fired from one day to the next, or of being able to afford retirement. Almost half of private-sector employees in the US do not have the option of saving for retirement through work.

The US is the only developed nation in the world to have the phenomenon known as ‘medical bankruptcy’

Inflation is also a source of insecurity. When you cannot know whether you can afford tomorrow what you can afford today, you are not certain how far your salary will go, even if you feel sure you will remain employed. Your life feels increasingly tenuous when your expenses multiply from one month to the next. Historically, Americans have purchased homes to protect themselves against rising housing costs, increasing rents and eviction. However, for younger Americans, owning a home has become a dream rather than a plan.

Housing costs have become one of the principal complaints of citizens across the wealthiest countries. Gallup has found that, in OECD countries, half of respondents are dissatisfied with the availability of affordable housing. Only 10 per cent of US adults surveyed by a Wall Street Journal/NORC poll in July 2024 said homeownership was easy to achieve, though 89 per cent thought it essential to their future. Furthermore, half of all renters in the US spend more than 30 per cent on rent and are classified as ‘cost-burdened’, according to a recent report by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University.

Healthcare costs are also a concern for many. The US is the only developed nation in the world to have a common phenomenon known as ‘medical bankruptcy’, and it is the leading cause of bankruptcy for Americans. In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service has suffered under decades of austerity economics. And, of course, the threat of climate change looms over all our lives. In many parts of the developing world, its devastating effects are already taking lives, destroying homes, and turning existence itself into a perilous proposition. After a brief pandemic blip, the safety net is in tatters in the US, and in the UK nearly a third of children live in poverty.

An economic system that values market efficiency over creating security and stability erodes the central planks of our lives – work, home and health.

Even if you are lucky enough not to experience these sources of insecurity yourself, it is rational to fear the possibility when you see it happening to those around you. What Hobbes understood is that instability and insecurity ripple through our social world undermining the lives even of those who haven’t been directly affected. If my neighbour’s insurance refuses to cover the damage his house sustained during an unprecedented storm and my friend’s insurance bill has wiped out her savings, my position starts to feel less secure. And when instability and insecurity take hold of the citizenry, the political project is in peril.

Many have interpreted Hobbes as a ‘law and order’ philosopher primarily concerned with political infighting and civil war. However, unpacking the historical context in which he was writing allows us to see that political instability was but one factor in a broader set of conditions to which Hobbes was responding. The English economy transitioned from feudalism to a market-based system during this period. The face of poverty changed from one of serfdom in the countryside, where at least one could count on room and board, to wage poverty in cities where homelessness and starvation were real threats. The very real precarity facing what we would now call the working class was a critical factor.

In Leviathan, Hobbes draws an extensive metaphor between the body politic and literal bodies to warn against the various diseases that can lead to the dissolution of the commonwealth. He writes that:

[T]here is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painful stitches.

This inflammation – massive inequality of power and wealth – breeds the instability and insecurity that characterise Hobbes’s historical period and resonate so much with our own.

If enough people stop trusting that this system works, we are, as Hobbes would put it, in a state of ‘warre’

For Hobbes, much like the fear of a poisonous snake should lead us to tiptoe away from danger, the rational response to the fear of insecurity is to seek its opposite: stability and security. Without it, we lose the precondition that makes so much of what we value – education, culture, industry, community – possible. Hobbes argues that it is rational to sacrifice many of our freedoms to achieve such stability and security. Those freedoms are, after all, entirely pointless if we are in conditions where we cannot enjoy them.

Political society is meant to solve this problem by protecting us against uncertainty and insecurity so we can lead our lives looking forward, rather than in a heightened state of anxiety about how to make it through today. The problem we face is that there are many people for whom the system of government doesn’t offer protection from daily insecurity and instability. And if enough people stop trusting that this system works better for them than the alternative, we are, as Hobbes would put it, in a state of ‘warre’.

At a rally in Virginia in June 2024 after the disastrous first debate of the latest election season, Trump said: ‘As every American saw firsthand last night, this election is a choice between strength and weakness, competence and incompetence, peace and prosperity, or war or no war.’ Carefully crafting the choice as one between the security that comes from strength and competence, and the insecurity that comes from weakness and incompetence, Trump again reinforced his message. If you don’t choose me, your lives will get only more insecure and uncertain. And after he was the target of an assassination attempt, he reinforced this message by emerging, fist pumping in the air – a picture of strength in the face of chaos.

Trump’s proposed solution is authoritarianism (as he said in 2016: ‘I, alone, can fix it’). The problem with this solution is that it ends up trading one source of insecurity – our fractured political system – for another – the whims of an individual whose principal interest is his own power rather than the wellbeing of the body politic. But even if we reject this solution as flawed, we cannot dismiss the concerns that drive many to consider it. The democratic party has a new candidate now, but it isn’t clear whether Kamala Harris and Tim Walz’s policies will address the need for security and stability.

Hobbes was wary of democracy precisely because he thought it would lead to instability and insecurity. Competing factions and groups would undermine the system’s stability by vying for power. Hobbes argued that stability is to be found in consolidating power into the sovereign and in the compliance of the governed. However, we cannot forget that for Hobbes, as for other social contract theorists, compliance is earned, not demanded.

Democratic liberal states have rejected authoritarianism as the solution to the problem of insecurity, preferring to emphasise the benefits of living in a state where our wellbeing is safeguarded by the enshrinement of our freedom into laws and institutions. Stability is meant to be the product of citizens’ acceptance of the shared values at the heart of liberalism. But does this compact guarantee the material security and stability that are preconditions for flourishing lives? For the millions who worry about whether they can afford their grocery bill, rent or medical expenses, the answer appears to be no.

Nostalgia’s power is most potent when no compelling, believable vision of a brighter future exists

The COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath offered a glimpse of a solution. When things felt precarious and uncertain, the US government stepped in with eviction moratoriums, universal basic income, free vaccines and a child tax credit. (Let’s not forget that Trump made sure that those stimulus checks bore his name.) But a few short years later, we are back to business as usual, leaving millions on the edge of precarity.

This is not to deny that xenophobia, sexism and racism also churn through the current discontent with liberalism. Nostalgia for times past is a strong undercurrent of the appeal of Right-wing movements. Some want the return of the well-paid factory job with strong benefits, while others want a return to white male supremacy. But nostalgia’s power is most potent when no compelling, believable vision of a brighter future exists.

Those who fear Trump’s re-election and the rise of Right-wing political movements keep reminding us that democracy is on the line. But sowing fear and doubt only adds to the growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty that is already unravelling people’s trust in the liberal project. It plays right into the hands of the strategy that Trump is so adept at playing. For people to see the value in the current system, we need to do more than fear-monger about the alternative.

Hobbes is often interpreted as being narrowly focused on justifying a powerful state that could control our worst appetites so as to prevent us from killing each other. I have argued that if we take his concern for stability and security seriously, the solution requires a far more radical rethinking of liberal states as they currently exist. Material insecurity and political instability cannot be divorced. A liberal state that leaves so many feeling as if their lives are on the verge of being ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ falls short of solving the problem that political society is meant to solve. Freedom is meaningless if you cannot count on a stable connection between the work you put in today and a good life tomorrow. But this is precisely the connection that has become severed for so many. If political society is to enable flourishing lives, then we need a political and economic system that can provide that kind of stability. This requires more than mere rhetoric. If we fail, Leviathan is waiting in the wings.

[Vesper 30,117]

https://www.liberalpatriot.com/p/what-if-it-just-comes-down-to-chance

In a presidential election this close, partisan supporters of both candidates desperately want some indication that things are going to break their way and that their theory of the American electorate is correct. 

Party boosters may be disappointed on November 5 in more ways than one. 

No hard-core Trump or Harris supporter wants to hear this but the election results may not be that decisive and could ultimately come down to chance—a few shifts here and there that produce a victory for one of the two without reflecting some grand voter theory or genius campaign moves. It’s turtles all the way down.

The contours of the election have been clear for a long time now, and if there’s a decisive victory for either Trump or Harris on Election Day it will be relatively straightforward to explain—in hindsight. 

A decisive Trump victory would mean the former president ran up big numbers with irregular and working-class voters across racial and ethnic lines in the most important states while keeping his suburban and college-educated defections to a manageable level. Why? Likely because enough voters rejected the policies of the incumbent administration and got over any trepidations they may have had about Trump’s character and actions as president. 

Conversely, a decisive Harris victory would arise from her amassing huge independent and college-educated numbers in the “Blue Wall” and other contested states, more than enough to offset any white, black, and Hispanic working-class defections. Why? Probably because enough voters got over their displeasure with Biden’s economy and immigration policies—and Harris’s past radical positions—but didn’t overlook their negative feelings about Trump and his behavior as president.

Polls have consistently highlighted these demographic, issue, and personality trends throughout the nearly two years of battles between Trump, Biden, and Harris. If voters behave one way or the other on Election Day, it won’t be hard to explain after the fact.

The maddening reality for everyone involved in this election, however, is that there is no clear way to anticipate which of two decisive outcomes is more likely to happen.

Pundits who confidently proclaim their analysis of the data or proprietary election model can predict the outcome of this puzzle are pulling your leg. They are either guessing or projecting what they want to occur. Maybe something will shift decisively in the final two and half weeks of the campaign to favor one of the above scenarios with more confidence, but probably not since nothing to date has been determinative.

There’s no analytical shortcut this cycle—we really do have to wait for people to vote.

A third very real possibility is that the 2024 election ends up being decided by exceptionally narrow margins in both the Electoral College and the popular vote in major swing states.

Why? No reason really. A Trump or Harris victory in November may not have the big meaning everyone craves—it could just be a few random things in different places. 

Maybe black turnout is down in Philly, Detroit, and Milwaukee while small-town and rural turnout in PA, MI, and WI is better than expected. Maybe the all-important suburban vote ends up more split than it seems and nudges only slightly in one direction. Maybe the economy/immigration and abortion/democracy party priorities cancel each other out and no one issue set dominates the minds of American voters this year. Maybe both the Trump and Harris campaigns end up doing the best they possibly can in all the battleground states, and the numbers—agonizingly for the losing team—end up a tad higher for one candidate over the other for no particular reason. 

In this scenario, no new theory of American politics is vindicated. No serious realignment of voters in either party direction occurs. It’s just another 100,000 or so votes in a few states that determine presidential power for another four years.

This “no rhyme or reason” outcome understandably will be disappointing to a great deal of people on the losing side, and will be rejected by the winning side as they claim an electoral mandate. Uncertainty and randomness are difficult for people to process.

Yet American politics is increasingly shaped by chance in a nation sharply divided between two political parties with a large chunk of people disgusted by both of them. The search for meaning and explanation after the election will certainly commence, but political cryptographers may not unravel any political Da Vinci Code.

The reasons for how and why people vote certain ways in recent times are somewhat confounding and do not match up with known historical, demographic, and ideological patterns in politics. Partisans line up in known ways while the unaligned and disengaged make decisions based on a number of factors including specific issues that may not fit into the traditional left-right spectrum, personality traits, or something unrelated to the campaign messages of Democrats and Republicans.

Americans will have to come to terms with more elections being determined by chance unless something fundamentally alters in our national life to lead voters towards a more unified political direction—or until one of the two political parties figures out how to represent the values and desires of a larger chunk of Americans in more places.

On this development, stay tuned tomorrow in TLP for Ruy Teixeira’s and Yuval Levin’s well-argued case for why both Democrats and Republicans have failed to overcome their weaknesses to build a sustainable majority—or even a convincing case for re-election. 

[Vesper 30,117]

In Israel, the War Is Also the Goal

Today on TAP: Yahya Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change the situation in Gaza.

https://prospect.org/blogs-and-newsletters/tap/2024-10-17-israel-gaza-yahya-sinwar-dead/

Yahya Sinwar, head of Hamas in Gaza, chairs a meeting with leaders of Palestinian factions at his office in Gaza City, on April 13, 2022.

 

One story you can tell about the Middle East over the last year is that Hamas engaged in an attack that killed 1,200 Israelis, and Israel systematically hunted down and killed everyone responsible, culminating with Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the attacks who was apparently killed on Wednesday. There would be alignment between this story and fiction, like the film adaptation of the Munich attacks, where Israel puts its intelligence arm to work to methodically find the Olympic hostage-takers and deliver extrajudicial justice.

That story would be false, because it blots out a year of unmitigated horrors against the Palestinian people in one of the most tragic examples of collective punishment in modern memory. In Munich, the last revenge killing signaled an ending, a settling of accounts. Today, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to say during the announcement of Sinwar’s death, “The war isn’t over.”

That Netanyahu’s personal and political goals vastly outweigh whatever could resemble military goals in this war in Gaza by now has become a cliché. Netanyahu wants to stay out of prison, and ending the war is likely to place him there. So new missions and operations and objectives sprout up for no reason.

Suddenly Bibi’s party has mused about re-settling northern Gaza for the first time in nearly 20 years, while transparently using a policy of mass starvation as a way to implement it. This was enough to even get the Biden foreign policy team to threaten a pullback of military aid—in 30 days, after the election—if the humanitarian situation didn’t improve. This led to 50 aid trucks coming in from Jordan; estimates from earlier in the year were that 500 trucks of aid per day must enter to meet the needs of Gaza.

Meanwhile, the leader of U.S. humanitarian efforts in Gaza whispered months ago that military aid will never be threatened, which I’m sure is not something unknown to the Israeli government. The modest steps at allowing food and water in have to be seen as performative at some level. The U.S. wants to get through the elections, package up some deal with the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates to declare a vassal state in Gaza, and pat themselves on the back. I don’t even think it’s worth crediting this by calling it a plan.

The war has long passed any moment where Israel has any interest in declaring victory, in the fight against terror or in the fight for the security of its people. Even bringing up the fact of continued Israeli hostages inside Gaza seems irrelevant at this point. The war is actually the goal itself, a continuation of punishment to fulfill the needs of the prime minister and his far-right political aims. The annals of blowback indicate pretty clearly that incessant bombing of hospitals and refugee camps will create many Yahya Sinwars, more than who can be killed. That is not something that particularly burdens the Israeli government. Another pretext would serve their continuing interests.

I am glad Sinwar will not be terrorizing anyone any longer. His tactics were disastrous for Palestinians. But if his death cannot lead to an end to the killing, there’s not much hope anything will.