Politics & Stuff

[Fulham Broadway 16,711]

7 minutes ago, cosmicway said:

Whatever.

Brilliant erudite answer.

 

[cosmicway 1,300]

7 minutes ago, Fulham Broadway said:

Brilliant erudite answer.

 

We more often say anti-hebrew for an enemy of the Jews.
Antisemite became the trend, though perhaps it should n't if the semites include more people.

[Fulham Broadway 16,711]

As the US proxy Israel attacks Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, they are still slaughtering children in tents in Gaza... just to keep Netanyahu from arrest and in power

France calls for permanent ceasefire in Gaza after dozens killed

 

The French foreign ministry “strongly” condemned the latest Israeli attacks that killed dozens of civilians including on an orphanage and school in northern Gaza and a family home in the southern city of Khan Younis.

“For several weeks, civilian infrastructure where populations find refuge has been repeatedly targeted by the Israeli army,” it said.

“In the face of need for absolute emergency in Gaza, France reiterates its call for the unconditional immediate and permanent ceasefire, which must allow the massive and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid.”

Medical sources say at least 79 people were killed in the Strip overnight and early morning.

[Vesper 28,398]

please sign if this is something you agree with

 

EUROPEAN CITIZENS’ INITIATIVE - Central online collection system

https://eci.ec.europa.eu/038/public/#/screen/home

Over the past months, you have stood with us in our mission to implement a European tax on the ultra-rich to fund a just ecological and social transition. Thanks to your support, we have already gathered over 340,000 signatures across the EU.

But we are not there yet! With only 7 days remaining until the campaign closes on October 9, we need one final push to increase this number as much as possible. Every signature counts.

We kindly ask you to go the extra mile by sharing this initiative with everyone in your network – friends, family, colleagues, neighbors. Spread the word and encourage them to sign and support this vital cause for more social justice in Europe.

Taxing great wealth to finance the ecological and social transition.

 

[Vesper 28,398]

How Trump’s energy policies could set America back decades

Joseph Stiglitz  1st October 2024

Just as Donald Trump’s overall economic strategy is based on nostalgia for a bygone era, his fossil-fuel-centered energy policies would represent a quixotic attempt to reverse history.

https://www.socialeurope.eu/how-trumps-energy-policies-could-set-america-back-decades

 

The outcome of the US presidential election in November will have an enormous impact on both the country and the world, and not least on efforts to combat climate change. While Donald Trump lacks a coherent platform, he clearly stands far apart from Vice President Kamala Harris on the issue.

Earlier this year, Trump reportedly “requested $1 billion in campaign contributions from fossil-fuel industry executives, promising in turn to roll back environmental regulations, hasten permitting and leasing approvals, and preserve or enhance tax benefits that the oil and gas industry enjoys.” Even if Trump is not an outright climate-change denier, he belongs to a broader school of politicians and commentators who do not think that we need to worry about it. His vision for “Making America Great Again” is to make the United States an even larger polluter, an even larger producer of fossil fuels, and an even bigger laggard behind Europe and much of the rest of the world. 

Both science and technology are working against the fossil-fuel industry. The cost of renewables has plummeted, and under normal circumstances, this would have driven down the price of fossil fuels. But because Russia is such a large supplier of petrochemicals, the war in Ukraine has distorted the market.

If elected, Trump would probably sell out Ukraine, or at least arrange a temporary ceasefire, thus facilitating a greater flow of oil and gas. He also wants to reverse the US Inflation Reduction Act and increase hostilities with China, which produces many of the world’s solar panels and other critical inputs for decarbonization. A major slowdown of the green transition in the US is thus a real risk, even before considering the possibility that Trump would further increase the already massive US subsidies for fossil fuels.

Trump’s first term already offered a preview of what an overtly fossil fuel-friendly America would mean for the rest of the world. He endorsed climate-change deniers in Brazil and a host of other countries, and the US withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. In the years thereafter, progress on global climate cooperation clearly slowed.

But eight years after he first assumed office, the economic and security implications of climate change have become even clearer. Europe and Japan seem resolute in their commitments to tax imports from major carbon polluters, and though Trump would probably retaliate for these policies, US allies can take some comfort in the fact that he would have imposed tariffs on them in any case. 

Ironically, often-vilified multinationals might play a crucial role in sustaining the green transition. The leaders of these companies recognize the realities of climate change, and they know that they must operate in multiple jurisdictions. If they do not join in the broader green transition, they will lose out now, and even more so in the future. 

Even within America, the largest and most important states have already passed legislation pushing firms to decarbonize their operations and reduce their carbon footprints. That means large companies operating in multiple states are already pursuing and adopting green technologies and business practices – and for the same reasons that multinationals will.

Yes, there will be aggressive attempts by some fossil-fuel companies to roll back these regulations. But there will also be stronger civil-society efforts, including through the courts, to hold companies accountable for the damage they have wrought. Smart business leaders will recognize the folly of resisting the inevitable. Even in the oil and gas industry, some companies are already changing their business model to phase down fossil fuels and invest in renewable energy. 

Thus, global politics, science, technology, sound corporate management, and the climate itself all weigh against Trump’s love of fossil fuels. Four decades ago, many assumed that tropical countries would bear the brunt of the costs, owing to their already high temperatures. They indeed are affected, with some facing desertification and others poised to become uninhabitable. But they are hardly alone. The US has already suffered enormous damage, and by the end of the century those losses are estimated to be between 1-4% of GDP annually. 

It makes far more sense to do what we can now to limit this damage than to make the same kinds of repairs year after year. Four decades ago, we thought the cost of combating climate change would be very high. But low-cost renewables and the emergence of other new technologies have changed everything. The cost of renewable energy is low and falling, and it would be even lower and falling faster with a greater public commitment to the green transition and the investments it requires. 

Make no mistake: there will be a green transition. The only questions are how fast it will proceed, and how much damage we will incur if it is delayed. Trump will attempt to throw a wrench in the process. He wants the fossil-fuel industry’s support, and the industry will view its campaign contributions as a high-return investment. A Republican-controlled Congress would, of course, do whatever Trump says. 

The resulting pro-fossil-fuel environment would facilitate fossil-fuel investments, but since these have long time horizons, many would become stranded assets. American taxpayers thus may wind up paying thrice for the blunder. In addition to the direct and hidden subsidies during the Trump administration and the direct and hidden compensation for stranded assets sometime in the future, they also will have to deal with the resulting lack of energy and climate security. 

Elections always matter, but this one matters more than most.

[Vesper 28,398]

Inequalities unmasked: disparities across the EU

What should Europe do about inequality? The start is to recognise some of its citizens are more equal than others.

https://www.socialeurope.eu/inequalities-unmasked-disparities-across-the-eu

1. 

Left behind: workers in Athens protesting during a general strike in April against rising costs and low wages (Vedat Yeler / shutterstock.com)

 

In her political guidelines for the next European Commission, outlined in July, its now reappointed president, Ursula von der Leyen, presented ambitious priorities for the next five years. Among them was an emphasis on fairness in the modern economy and the need to address social inequalities.

While public reaction to inequality manifests itself in protests, the impact goes much deeper, permeating workplaces, degrading the labour market and increasing tensions in society. Making progress is fundamental to restoring European citizens’ trust in institutions and their faith in the future.

The proposed new college of commissioners has drawn some criticism for the lack of a singular portfolio focusing on equality and whether the approach to social and economic issues is adequately holistic. In fact, many inequalities in Europe are transversal, manifesting themselves not just in gender, identity and income, but also between generations and among regions and member states. Tackling them requires consensus, not just on policy but also in terms of public support.

Gender inequalities

The gender employment gap, at 10.7 per cent in 2022, has narrowed over time: 69.3 per cent of working-age women across the EU are employed, compared with 80 per cent of men—a transformation from a generation ago. There has however been stagnation in recent years and the continuing differential costs an estimated €320 billion annually in lost earnings and welfare contributions and the impact on the public finances.

Two out of three net new jobs in the EU over the last two decades have been taken up by women, and this increase has been strongest among women over the age of 30. The impact has been at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution: while women are increasingly represented in high-paying jobs, low-paying jobs formerly dominated by men are also becoming dominated by women.

Although female employment has been growing more quickly than for men in the highest-paying jobs (the top quintile by average wage), women remain under-represented as managers in almost all economic sectors and this is where the gender pay gap is greatest. While women still earn 13 per cent on average less per hour than men, at managerial levels there is an even larger gap—23 per cent—notwithstanding younger women increasingly outperforming younger men in educational attainment. Variable forms of pay, linked to performance or shareholding, are increasing more rapidly among men than women, which could further widen the gender gap.

But gender inequalities in employment stretch well beyond labour-market segmentation and pay gaps. The working conditions and job quality women and men experience across countries, sectors and occupations also vary greatly. Men report higher quantitative demands at work, whereas women are much more likely to report exposure to emotional demands or find themselves in disturbing situations.

Women also tend to work fewer paid hours than men and adjust their working time to the needs of their families. The proportion perceiving their work-life balance positively (82 per cent) is thus similar to that for men (80 per cent). Women however experience more conflicts between working and private life: they worry more about work, feel more exhausted and have a bigger burden of housework to face (74 per cent of women did daily housework and cooking in 2021, compared with 42 per cent of men). And overall, when paid and unpaid work are combined, women do eight full-time weeks more work per year than men.

Income inequality 

The share of population living below the poverty income threshold increased in two-thirds of EU member states between 2006 and 2021 and in more than half, amid the pandemic, in the latter year. Non-income data for 2022, focusing on the early stages of the cost-of-living crisis, showed households facing growing financial difficulties, especially those most vulnerable. On average across EU countries, 44 per cent of those in the bottom income decile faced reported difficulties to make ends meet in 2022, compared with 3 per cent in the top decile. Single-parent households were more at risk of energy poverty and women living alone more likely to be affected by it.

Yet there is vast disparity across countries. The 13 member states that joined the EU since 2004 have experienced increasing convergence and remarkable income growth. In many cases, this growth has been stronger among lower-income earners, reducing income inequalities.

Income growth has been more moderate among the 14 older member states, especially among the lowest earners in many cases, leading to growing income inequalities, even in more egalitarian Scandinavia. Mediterranean countries present the most disappointing picture of income growth between 2006 and 2021 (albeit in some inequality declined); hence they failed to match the newer member states in convergence towards higher national incomes. 

The welfare state plays a very important role in cushioning market inequalities, which are reduced by an average of 42 per cent across member states by taxes and benefits. This inequality-reducing effect is stronger in most Scandinavian and continental welfare states, as well as a few central-and-eastern European countries, while weaker in others among the latter and Mediterranean EU members. 

Age-related inequalities

The ageing of Europe’s population will continue to have implications for employment, working conditions, living standards and welfare. But the extent to which these are subject to an intergenerational divide is a different matter. For instance, while during the pandemic mental health deteriorated for people of all ages, young people and the over-80s were those most severely affected. 

More young people lost their jobs then than any other age group. There has since been a recovery but at a slower pace and with the individual psychological consequences and the loss of independence of unemployment experienced at a young age. The share of older workers in the labour market has meanwhile grown since 2007. This has been driven by employment expansion among the over-50s, especially women—albeit inadequate pensions and the rising cost of living may have been drivers here in turn.

Incomes have grown most since 2008 for the over-60s. In southern Europe, the income of this oldest group has increased while that of the youngest has fallen. By contrast, in eastern-European countries those under 60 have fared better than their elder peers in recent years. Both decreases and increases in income have however been less common among older people, for whom pensions are a stabiliser.

On the critical issue of housing, renting has increased generally but especially among those aged 30-39, rising from 38 per cent to 45 per cent between 2010 and 2019. Home ownership was already more common among those over 40 than those below. Housing costs increased more for renters (by 23 per cent) than for homeowners (by 8 per cent) between 2010 and 2019, deepening the gap between the two groups.

Rural-urban divide

The farmers’ protests across member states earlier this year placed rural­–urban differences in sharp focus. Over the past decade, employment has increased more rapidly in urban than in rural areas and in general the rate is persistently higher in cities. Median incomes are also higher in urban areas in almost every member state. The rural-urban income gap has thus increased by almost 20 per cent in ten years.

There is also a growing gap in accumulation of ‘human capital’, affecting available individual pathways to employment. Across the EU, 55 per cent of city dwellers aged 25-34 have third-level education, compared with just 34 per cent of their counterparts in rural areas. 

A digital divide is also evident—in both skills and infrastructure. Those living in cities are more likely to have digital skills and a computer in their home and enjoy significantly better broadband connections.

Rural residents are however less likely to be overburdened by housing costs or to live in a dark dwelling and can better afford to keep their homes warm. They also suffer less from problems in their neighbourhoods, from pollution and grime to crime and vandalism. 

Addressing inequalities

Inequalities persist across the EU, ranging across gender and employment pay gaps, intergenerational disparities and rural­­-urban differences. While EU-wide income inequality declined significantly between 2006 and 2021—due to convergence between new and old members—the share of population below the poverty threshold increased in most member states. The gap between the rich and poor continues to grow in some countries.

Concentrated efforts and targeted policies are urgently needed to mitigate such deep-rooted inequalities and create a fairer future. A champion of equality within the commission could lead the way—but, regardless, the transversal nature of the challenge means that for every member of the incoming college it should be a priority.

Edited 2 hours ago by Vesper